Economic impacts of behavioural responses to flood risk: Exploring general equilibrium effects using micro-level insights by Husby, T.G.
Economic impacts of behavioural responses to flood risk
Exploring general equilibrium effects using micro-level insights
Trond Grytli Husby
"Economic impacts of behavioural responses to flood risk
Exploring general equilibrium effects using micro-level insights"
PhD Thesis, VU University Amsterdam
"Economische gevolgen van gedragsreacties op overstromingsrisico
Een onderzoek naar algemeen evenwichts effecten gebaseerd op micro inzichten"
Proefschrift, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Trond Grytli Husby, Den Haag, January 2016
ISBN/EAN: 978-94-91602-44-3
Cover page design by Elisabeth Schoch
Printed by Print Service Ede
The research on which this thesis is based has been carried out at the Institute for En-
vironmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam (www.ivm.vu.nl) and at the Netherlands
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (www.tno.nl). This research was carried out
within the framework of the Knowledge for Climate program (Theme 8), which was funded
by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.
  
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT 
 
 
 
Economic impacts of behavioural 
responses to flood risk  
Exploring general equilibrium effects using micro-level insights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan 
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
op gezag van de rector magnificus 
prof.dr. V. Subramaniam, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen 
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie 
van de Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde 
op maandag 22 februari 2016 om 13.45 uur 
in de aula van de universiteit, 
De Boelelaan 1105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
door 
 
Trond Grytli Husby 
 
geboren te Trondheim, Noorwegen 
 
iii
 promotor: prof.dr. M.W. Hofkes 
copromotor: prof.dr. H.L.F. de Groot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv
 thesis committee: dr. W.J.W. Botzen  
 prof.dr. J.H. Garretsen  
 prof.dr. E.C. van Ierland 
 prof.dr. M.E. Kahn  
 prof.dr. R. van der Ploeg 
  
 
 
v

Acknowledgements
Once during a presentation I was asked to explain how a Norwegian ended up in the Nether-
lands carrying out research on flood risk - this being a problem long fixed by the Dutch
water engineers and a research domain wherein non-Dutch may want to tread carefully. I
do not think I had a very good answer. Thinking back, the choice to stay in the Netherlands
may well have been just as much related to rowing as to the research on flood risk. However,
over the course of the PhD trajectory I have come to appreciate my research and I look back
on the years shaping this thesis with great satisfaction. Now that I appear to have produced
a book I must admit I am quite proud of the final result (strong words for a Norwegian). The
enormous breadth of potentially relevant topics, angles, levels and methodologies makes
it an exciting field of research. However, such an abundance of options can easily lead to
choice overload. The research underlying this thesis would not have materialised without
the careful guidance of the supervision team.
Marjan, thank you for taking me on as a PhD candidate and for the support and feedback
over the years. We needed to find out how we best could co-operate with each other and I
believe we discovered the formula somewhere during the second half of my PhD trajectory.
Our sometimes challenging discussions as well as your eye for detail were highly useful and
offered great learning experiences (I will never again write the past tense of lead as led). My
co-operation with you Henri goes back to 2009. Your passion for and immense knowledge
of such a wide range of topics within economics have always amazed me and the sessions
at your office were a highly potent source of inspiration. I am especially grateful for your
efforts during the finalisation of the thesis. Although the revisions at times felt tedious,
your many and detailed comments were invaluable. Olga, I could not have had a better
initial guide to GAMS programming than you. Your hands-on approach to modelling is
unparalleled - I still somewhere have the 10-page hand-written description of the prototype
agent-based model. Tatiana, your knowledge of climate change adaptation, housing markets
and agent-based modelling were of great help and inspiration. Finally, I regret that Wouter
Jonkhoff is not here to see the finalisation and defense of the thesis. His contributions to the
content and help on practical matters are not forgotten.
vii
I would like to thank the Knowledge for Climate programme for giving me the oppor-
tunity to carry out this research. Also thanks to all the other people in Theme 8, including
work package leader Ekko van Ierland, who in meetings and in review rounds of the Special
Issue gave highly useful feedback on this research. Also thanks to the Research Council
of Norway for providing the financial means for a three months research stay at the Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). Financial support from the 111
project "Hazard and Risk Science Base at Beijing Normal University" under Grant B08008,
Ministry of Education and State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, People’s Re-
public of China and from the Belpasso International Summer School on Environmental and
Resource Economics are also gratefully acknowledged.
Individual chapters of the thesis have benefited from discussions, inputs and feedback
from a number of co-authors: Martijn Dröes, Elco Koks, Brenden Jongman, Reinhard
Mechler and Oleg Sheremet. The three months spent at IIASA in Reinhard’s office kick-
started the final year of my PhD and the stay made me realise the emptiness of a life withouth
käsekrainer.
The support from my two paranymphs over the years of my PhD and during the organi-
sation of the defense and accompanying festivities was indispensable. The first paranymph
has primarily been a great girlfriend: Samantha, you gave me space when needed, you were
a conversation partner when I was stuck or not entirely motivated and you have been an im-
portant presence in my life the last years. Our complementary skills, especially in the area
of organisation, have also been highly useful at the end of the PhD. The second paranymph
has been sitting next to me for four years: Justin, it was a pleasure sharing an office with
you, head sets on, exchanging videos of crab-, crunk-, crewneck-, nintendo-, trance-, and
hardcore-core bands (I have some decent mall screamo I will send you, please remind me),
discussing recent events on the internet and sharing frustrations with early 1990s software.
Thanks to both of you and to doctor Koks for helping me with my Dutch on various occa-
sions.
I could hardly have found a better place to carry out my PhD research than the IVM.
The interdisciplinary and intense social environment provided inspiration, distraction and a
plentitude of good experiences. Special thanks to office mates, to the members of the IVM
cycling (A and B) and football team (may it one day reach its full potential), to the IVM
Käsekrainer Import Ltd. and to the always helpful staff.
I also wish to thank my current and previous colleagues at TNO who during my PhD
trajectory directly or indirectly provided help, advice or inspiration. The days spent at TNO
helped me to integrate smoothly into the group when I started working there. It also made
me realise that the coffee at the IVM was not so bad after all.
viii
Although my family lives far away, I have always had your warm and enthusiastic sup-
port. Mum, Dad, Tuva - we haven’t seen too much of each other over the last years but you
have always made sure it was great to come back home and it’s been really nice to have you
here. Maybe one day you will convince me to move back to Norway.
A number of friends in Amsterdam have helped making life here pleasant and enjoyable.
Elisabeth, who has helped me with the cover design, shared an unforgettable living experi-
ence with me and has been a good friend the years I lived in Amsterdam. The trips, drinks
and dinners with the (mainly) expat group also added gezelligheid to the stay in Amsterdam.
Last but not least, I have spent a substantial amount of time during my PhD at or near the
premises of the rowing club RSVU Okeanos. Rowing was a great combination with the, at
times, heavy amounts of theoretical work and frustrating programming experiences. I have
many fond memories from this time: frozen fingers full of blisters in Brugge, the cultural
experience of the jungalows in de Beekse Bergen, beating Nereus and Laga, ecstatic post-
victory parties and dinners, the Holland beker, racing Cambridge on the river Moscow with
the bow man crouched up in fetus position on the river bank... Thanks to the crew of EJL’11
for sharing those memories with me - when will we finally start up the veteran team?
ix

Table of contents
Table of contents xi
List of figures xv
List of tables xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Structure of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I Macroeconomic effects of flood risk: historical background and
modelling 9
2 Do floods have permanent effects? Evidence from the Netherlands 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Disasters and population dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Floods and policy: the Dutch case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 The flood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.3 The policy response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.1 Difference-in-differences with response functions . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.2 Estimated models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5.3 Coding of treatment variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6.1 The flood model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table of contents
2.6.2 The Deltaworks model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6.3 The mixed model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.4 Stock dynamics from the flood and the Deltaworks . . . . . . . . . 27
2.7 Conclusion and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix 2.A Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix 2.B Treatment groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Incorporating behavioural responses to risk in disaster impact models 35
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 The economics of natural disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.1 Concepts and terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 Household migration and risk judgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Economic disaster impact modelling: current practice . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.1 Input-Output models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.2 Computable General Equilibrium models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.3 Limitations of IO and CGE models in disaster impact analysis . . . 44
3.4 Agent-based modelling of household migration under risk and uncertainty . 45
3.5 Conclusions and future research challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
II Flood risk and expectations: housing market dynamics and im-
pacts on mobility 51
4 Flood protection and endogenous sorting of households 53
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3.1 Credit markets and flood risk: the real estate agent . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3.2 Households: utility and mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3.3 The effect of property valuations on equilibrium housing prices . . 63
4.3.4 Interregional migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.5 Welfare effects measured by equivalent variation . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3.6 Parameter values and steady-state targeting procedure . . . . . . . 66
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4.1 Mobility and unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4.2 Housing consumption and equilibrium housing prices . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.3 Welfare effects and clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
xii
Table of contents
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix 4.A Labour-market dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Appendix 4.B Household maximisation problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Appendix 4.C Description of variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Appendix 4.D Solution procedure and stability of the model . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Appendix 4.E Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5 Loss aversion and housing market capitalisation of flood risk 79
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2.1 Risk judgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.2.2 Household utility and mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.2.3 Housing demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
III Flood risk and expectations: impacts on regional labour supply
and production 93
6 What if Dutch investors started worrying about flood risk? 95
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.2.1 RAEM: general description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.2.2 Utility and migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.2.3 Production and monopolistic competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.2.4 RAEM: recursive dynamics and capital accumulation . . . . . . . . 102
6.3 Case-study: the large Rotterdam area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.3.2 Simulations and scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.4 Results from the case-study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.4.1 Ex-ante results: changes in labour force, production and unemploy-
ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.4.2 Ex-post results: capital destruction and casualties . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.4.3 Ex-post results: welfare losses and tax revenues . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix 6.A Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
xiii
Table of contents
7 Public concern as a driver of disaster losses 115
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.2.1 Risk judgements and household location decisions . . . . . . . . . 119
7.2.2 Individual risk opinions leading to public concern . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.2.3 Introducing extremist opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.3 Simulations and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.3.1 Labour supply and production in Rotterdam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3.2 Labour supply and production in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Appendix 7.A Households’ location decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Appendix 7.B Choice experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Appendix 7.C Results ABM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8 Conclusions 139
8.1 Overview and answers to research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.2 Discussion and relevance for flood risk management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.3 Final remarks and suggestions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Publications and working papers 145
References 147
Nederlandse samenvatting 167
xiv
List of figures
1.1 A framework of the topics discussed in the thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Map of the Netherlands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Inundated areas as a result of the flood of 1953. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 The Deltaworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Mean population growth in control and treatment group (flood). . . . . . . 19
2.5 Mean population growth in control and treatment group (Deltaworks). . . . 20
2.6 The response function of the flood model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 The response function of the DW Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.8 The response function of the mixed model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.9 The stock effects predicted by the response function in the Flood model. . . 27
2.A1 Mean of population growth over time with 95% confidence interval. . . . . 30
2.A2 Standard deviation of population growth over time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.A3 Outliers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.A4 Differences between the original data set and the data set used for the analysis. 31
2.B5 The percentage municipalities affected by the Deltaworks and the flood. . . 32
2.B6 Municipalities hit by the flood. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.B7 Municipalities affected by the Deltaworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1 Within-region labour and housing market interactions. . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Mobility and migration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3 Property valuations carried out by the real estate agent for different return
periods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.4 Change in mobility and aggregate unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5 Housing consumption and housing prices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.6 Change in welfare and share of vulnerable households. . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1 The probability weighting function from PT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.2 Reductions in the price of housing from a flood. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
xv
List of figures
5.3 The shadow-value of housing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.4 Housing prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.5 Mobility resilient households. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.6 Mobility vulnerable households. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.1 A simplified description of the model structure of RAEM. . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2 The large Rotterdam area and NUTS-3 regions in the Netherlands. . . . . . 105
6.3 Impacts on labour force, production and unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.4 Impacts on household welfare in the large Rotterdam area. . . . . . . . . . 109
6.5 Impacts on tax revenues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.1 An illustration of the recursive dynamics in the combined model. . . . . . . 119
7.2 Impacts on labour supply in Rotterdam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.3 Impacts on total output in Rotterdam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.4 Impacts on the regional supply of labour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.5 Impacts on regional production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.C1 Public concern. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
xvi
List of tables
2.1 Regression results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1 Descriptions, values and sources of the parameters used in the model. . . . 67
4.C1 Description of the endogenous variables in the model . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.E2 Impacts on a number of key variables from variations in χ . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.1 Sectoral capital damage in case of flooding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.2 Reductions in direct capital damage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.3 Reductions in casualties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.1 Parameters used in the agent-based model of opinion dynamics. . . . . . . 124
7.2 RAEM-ABM scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.B1 Parameters used in the empirical application of the model . . . . . . . . . . 135
xvii

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Recent large-scale disasters have gained substantial attention in the media and research.
Disaster events such as hurricane Sandy which hit New York during the fall of 2012, the
floods of the Danube which affected large parts of central Europa during summer 2013 and
the floods in the UK in the spring of 2014, inflicted substantial damage upon impact. The
direct shock caused by these disasters was followed by ripple effects, spreading disaster
impacts to agents, sectors and regions not directly affected by the events. The International
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which summarises evidence from a large number of in-
dependent studies, confirms that disaster losses have increased dramatically the past few
decades (IPCC, 2012, 2014). In particular, the number of reported flood events as well as
losses associated with these events have both exhibited a strong upward trend (Kundzewicz
et al., 2014). Projections of losses attributed to hydrological events suggest that this upward
trend will continue in the future.
Extreme hydrological events include rainfall related and coastal flooding. Rainfall re-
lated flooding is usually divided into large-scale floods from high river discharge and local
and urban floods from excessive rainfall, while coastal flooding is categorised as windstorm
events (Bouwer, 2013). Flood risk is commonly defined as a function of three elements:
hazard, exposure and vulnerability (Huggel et al., 2013; IPCC, 2014). Hazard refers to dis-
aster related events or biophysical impacts of such events. Vulnerability is conceptualised
as sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to adapt (IPCC, 2014). Exposure
describes the elements in an area in which hazard events may occur. Although most of the
existing literature in the field have identified increasing exposure as the main driver behind
the upward trend in losses, it is increasingly argued that rising exposure cannot fully explain
this trend (Mechler and Bouwer, 2014; Neumayer and Barthel, 2011). There is growing
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evidence that hazard probability has been increasing in many regions in the world (IPCC,
2012). Increased river discharge and sea level rise can result in further increases in hazard
probability in the future.
The future increase in flood risk – driven by socioeconomic change, but possibly also
by climate change – implies that adaptation to existing environmental changes will be nec-
essary, even if we are successful in mitigating climate change (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011).
The operational goal of flood risk management is to reduce risk through combinations of
measures aimed at any or several of the three elements of risk. Traditionally, risk reduction
policies have focused on reducing hazard probability through the implementation of struc-
tural engineering measures such as dikes, dams and flood walls. For example, the flood
risk management strategy of the Netherlands, which is used as a case-study in several chap-
ters of this thesis, is to a large extent affected by hazard reduction implemented decades
ago. Due to the long life-time of dikes and to the substantial investments in technology and
institutions providing safety, there is a strong path-dependency in flood risk management.
Recent policy documents from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (Min.
I& M, 2014) confirm that ex-ante investments in protection will remain the main risk re-
duction strategy in the Netherlands for the foreseeable future. As such, adaptation is likely
an order of magnitude more important than climate driven increases in hazard probability
for the long term development of flood risk (Tol and Langen, 2000). It is the interaction of
hazard and society – namely the feed-back effects between increasing hazard and response
from policy makers and individuals – that matter for the development of overall risk. This
highlights the importance of behavioural responses as inputs for policy decisions on flood
risk management.
How do policy makers decide on the level and type of protection to offer to different
regions? Implicitly or explicitly, such decisions are made by comparing the benefits of
avoided damage with the costs of implemented measures. Modelling tools which provide
estimates of disaster losses are therefore useful tools for policy makers making such de-
cisions. Modelling tools used for disaster impact analysis come in many flavours. The
simplest type are reduced form models which translate direct physical damage into mon-
etary losses. These models typically use flood-depth curves, depth-damage curves and
loss damage curves. Model inputs are exogenous trends in hazard, vulnerability and ex-
posure. However, empirical evidence suggests that direct disaster impacts are followed by
ripple effects, transmitting disaster losses to sectors and regions not directly impacted by
the events. Losses attributed to ripple effects can be substantially higher than the losses
attributed to the direct impacts. More elaborate models which include a representation of
the macro-economy allow for investigating how such ripple effects spread between sectors
2
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and regions. Examples of such models include Input-Output models and Social Accounting
Matrix models. These models model the macro-economy as a flow of goods and services
between different sectors. Due to the linear form and limited representation of behaviour,
these models are somewhat ill-suited to capture the interaction between risk and society. A
number of economic models build on the Social Accounting Matrix data structure, while
attempting to incorporate economic behaviour through responses to changing prices. Flexi-
ble production and utility functions allow firms and consumers to switch between factors of
production and consumption goods as prices of goods and services change. However, these
models generally do not include behavioural responses to hazard – either hazard events or
increasing hazard probability. Ignoring direct responses to hazard is likely to result in biased
estimates of the overall risk. It is increasingly argued that feedbacks between environmental
change and human responses must be incorporated in models (Palmer and Smith, 2014).
This entails modelling economic decision-making under risk and uncertainty, where there
is a time-lag between decision and outcome and where agents form expectations about the
future.
It is well known that people adapt to environmental change. Archaeological data confirm
that climate variability as well as extreme events are associated with migratory movements
(Eriksson et al., 2012). For example, DNA extracted from bones from people living in the
Andean highlands between AD 640 and 1200 suggests that droughts and flash floods in
coastal areas caused the population to move to the mountains (Fehren-Schmitz et al., 2014).
These population movements coincided with increasing climate variability in these areas.
More recent evidence also suggests that risk and hazard events have an impact on house-
holds’ location decisions. Household responses range on a spectrum from displacement to
voluntary move. At one end of the spectrum, large-scale disasters like Hurricane Katrina
led to widespread destruction of housing stock, displacing large amounts of people. Dis-
placement was particularly prominent among marginalised households, more likely to live
in low-quality houses and less likely to be covered by insurance. At the other end of the
spectrum, there is also evidence that risk is a factor for prospective home-owners deciding
upon buying a house. Several empirical studies have found that a house located in the flood-
plain commands a lower price than a (hypothetically) identical house located in a safe area
(e.g., Daniel et al., 2009a).
Traditionally, when studying cases where there is a time-lag between decision and out-
come economists have employed decision-making models defined over objective probability
distributions (expected utility). According to the expected utility formulation, individuals
base their expectations on known probability distributions where the moments are calculated
with data from past observations (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). In a variant of ex-
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pected utility theory individuals form subjective opinions around the moments of probabil-
ity distributions (Savage, 1954). Economists following the Keynesian tradition make a clear
distinction between risk and uncertainty (Davidson, 1991). In their view, many decision-
making environments are “non-ergodic” dynamical systems (i.e., processes moving through
time with immeasurable uncertainty). These are environments of true uncertainty in which
probabilities offer little guidance for decision making. Keynes himself referred to uncer-
tainty not only to ’distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The
game of roulette is not subject, in this sense to uncertainty. The sense in which I am us-
ing the the terms is that...there is no basis on which to form any calculable probabilities
whatever. We simply do not know.’(p. 213 Keynes, 1937).
How should one decide whether models of risk or models of uncertainty should be ap-
plied? Expected utility theory assumes that agents are able to conceive all relevant outcomes
and attach probabilities to them (Muth, 1961). Decision-making in systems where true un-
certainty (also referred to as “Knightian” uncertainty) prevails implies that agents are unable
to calculate probability and consequences (Knight, 1921). The underlying question moti-
vating the research presented in this thesis is which decision-making model to apply to situ-
ations of flood risk: risk or uncertainty? Firstly, hazard probabilities – for example stated in
terms of the yearly probability of flooding – can generally be calculated. In many cases, for
example in the Netherlands, mandatory safety standard stated in terms of exceedance prob-
ability (i.e. the yearly probability that a designated value will be exceeded) are supposed
to convey information about the probability of flooding. Secondly, flood maps which show
inundated areas for a given type of flood or water level are designed to convey information
about the consequences should a flood occur, while depth-damage and loss-damage curves
translate physical consequences of given water levels into monetary losses.
However, limited and uncertain information about future hazard or personal beliefs are
likely to shape decision making. Low probability high impact phenomena such as natu-
ral disasters are particularly challenging because, even if experts agree, there is often a
large difference between the technical assessment of risk and the public perception of risk
(Botzen et al., 2015). In some cases people perceive disasters as more likely than experts do.
For example, in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the German government decided
to phase out its nuclear programme, largely reflecting public fear associated with nuclear
meltdown. Yet in other cases people ignore risks identified by experts as potentially se-
rious. For example, the main explanation behind the large losses and the high number of
casualties associated with hurricane Katrina, was the combination of a high concentration
of people living in the flood-plain and inadequate maintenance of the levees set up to protect
the city from flooding – a responsibility of the local government in New Orleans (Burby,
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2006). The examples of Fukushima and Katrina reveal two important points relevant for
decisions making in the context of disasters. Firstly, risk is just one of several factors shap-
ing individual decision making. For example, the availability of cheap housing was likely
a main important reason why so many households chose to locate in flood prone areas in
pre-Katrina New Orleans (Vigdor, 2008). This means that studies analysing the impact of
risk on location decisions must incorporate risk as on of a number of other factors shaping
location decisions. Secondly, as Fukushima as well as the policy debate in the aftermath of
Katrina illustrate, disaster events change the public perception of risk and sometimes even
work as political game changers. As such, studies analysing household decision making
under risk also need to account for the fact that the same type of disaster can be either ig-
nored or lead to overreactions. In addition, there are likely to be important feed-back effects
between public reactions and policy responses to risk.
In this thesis it is assumed that decision-making under flood risk can involve elements
of both risk and uncertainty. Along the thesis both types of decision-making environments
will be investigated. Importantly, any study of decision-making under risk and uncertainty
involves questions about the nature of knowledge, what can be known and by whom. For
example, it might well be that some agents act as if hazard probabilities and consequences
are known. As mentioned above, in the absence of hazard event, risk may be of limited
relevance for households’ decision making. However, it is likely that financial institutions
such as banks, mortgage lenders and insurers to a larger extent than households take both
hazard probability and consequences into account. Similarly, investors and firms with assets
in risky areas may be obliged to carry out some type of formal risk analysis, thereby basing
expectations on objective probabilities. As such, even if the probability and consequences
are fundamentally uncertain, some agents may have incentives to act upon the available in-
formation at the time of making a decision. Households could therefore ultimately be indi-
rectly affected by risk, as changes in expectations of for example credit lenders and investors
lead to changes in prices of goods and services. Using different types of economic mod-
els, this thesis investigates how risk and uncertainty affect expectations and how changed
expectations affect economic decision-making. It analyses the impacts on overall risk as ex-
pectations are reflected in macroeconomic variables, leading to changes in exposure and/or
vulnerability.
1.2 Research questions
Figure 1.1 summarises the topics discussed in the thesis, illustrating the connection between
expectations formations, behavioural change and ensuing macroeconomic effects. Changes
in hazard probability and the occurrence of events provide information for expectations for-
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Figure 1.1 A framework of the topics discussed in the thesis.
mation processes. In general, probability conveys information relevant for decision making
under risk, while events convey relevant information for decision-making under uncertainty.
Changes in expectations can lead agents agents such as investors, financial institutions and
households to take risk into account in their decision-making. Such behavioural responses
to risk impact macroeconomic variables, including housing demand, labour supply and re-
gional production structure. Interdependencies between housing markets and population
size as well as between production and population size transmit the effects from changes
in expectations from one market to another. Changes in these macroeconomic variables
determine exposure and vulnerability. Based on information about hazard, exposure and
vulnerability, flood risk management aims to reduce overall risk, targeting (combinations
of) hazard probability, exposure and vulnerability. The arrows in the figure indicate the in-
dividual chapters where different types of behavioural responses and macroeconomic effects
from these responses are discussed.
The thesis is divided into three parts, broadly seeking to answer the following three
research questions:
1. What are the short and long run impacts on population dynamics of large scale flood
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events?
2. Can flood risk affect household mobility through the housing market?
3. What are the macroeconomic impacts from behavioural responses manifested in house-
holds’ migration decisions?
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The first part of the thesis serves as a methodological and historical introduction to the sub-
sequent parts. Chapter 2, entitled “Do floods have permanent effects? Evidence from the
Netherlands” analyses the population dynamics following a major flood in the Netherlands
in 1953. In the years after the disaster an extensive system of engineering-based flood pro-
tection was implemented in the country. The analysis reveals that the flood had temporary
negative effects on population growth, and that the protection measures had permanent pos-
itive effects. Consequently, areas that received protection, of which several were also hit by
the flood, grew at a higher rate than other areas. The chapter thus provides empirical evi-
dence on the feedback effects between risk and household location decisions and highlights
the role of policy.
Chapter 3, entitled “Incorporating behavioural responses to risk in disaster impact mod-
els” clarifies some of the most relevant elements of disaster economics, provides a selected
literature review of macroeconomic modelling of disaster impacts and an overview of house-
holds’ decision making under risk and uncertainty. We argue that models currently used for
economic disaster impact analyses are useful in illustrating ripple-effects. However, these
models suffer from limitations in representing realistic household decision making in the
context of disaster risk. Traditional models could be combined with elements of Agent-
based models to capture household responses.
Part II of the thesis focuses on how flood risk affects the housing market through changes
in expectations. Investments in the housing stock are inter-temporal decisions, where expec-
tations formed today impact the future resale value of housing. Consequently, the models
presented in this part are dynamic with forward-looking agents. Part II also investigates
the interconnection between the housing market and household mobility. Chapter 4, “Flood
protection and endogenous sorting of households: the role of credit constraints” focuses on
how spatial differences in protection can lead to endogenous sorting of certain household
types in areas of relatively low protection. Pessimistic property valuations in a risky area,
reduce the ability of credit constrained households residing in this area to refinance their
mortgage. This, in turn reduces the geographical mobility of credit constrained households
and leads to a clustering of such households in a risky area.
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The subsequent chapter 5, entitled “Loss aversion and housing market capitalisation of
flood risk” uses a similar model to show how endogenous sorting can also occur if a recent
flood event changes housing price expectations among households. The flood event triggers
loss aversion, where households expect declining housing prices will lead to a reduction
in the future resale value of their housing stock. The reduction in demand and ensuing
decline in housing has a similar effect as the property valuations in the previous chapter,
namely a reduction in housing wealth and a reduction of the geographical mobility of credit
constrained households.
Part III of the thesis investigates the macroeconomic impacts of changes in expecta-
tions, focusing on changes in regional production and labour supply. For this purpose, Part
III employs a spatial general equilibrium model with detailed data on regional production,
interregional flows of goods, services and labour. Rotterdam (the Netherlands) is used as
a case-study in this part. In chapter 6, entitled “What if Dutch investors started worrying
about flood risk?” a macroeconomic model is used to investigate the impact on potential
disaster losses if investors divert capital away from Rotterdam. Results from the model
exercise suggest that the changes in investment behaviour lead to a reduction in productive
capital in the Rotterdam area but not to a reduction in labour supply. This entails a reduction
in the potential capital destruction from a flood in Rotterdam but not a reduction in fatalities.
This chapter highlights some of the challenges with the proposed move towards a regime of
greater acceptance of living with flood risk. Our results also suggest that the implementation
of individual mitigation measures is crucial.
Chapter 7, entitled “Public concern as a driver of disaster losses” combines elements
of multi agent modelling with the macroeconomic model used in the previous chapter to
investigate the impact of public concern on production losses following a flood event in
Rotterdam. Public concern is shaped and possibly amplified through the exchanges of in-
dividual opinions regarding the negative welfare effects associated with residing in a risky
area. The public concern generated by the disaster event leads households to settle in other
regions than Rotterdam, reducing labour supply in Rotterdam and exacerbating production
losses following the flood. The model results also show how interregional substitution ef-
fects, where decreased exports from Rotterdam and increased labour supply in other regions
leads to changes in the spatial production pattern in the Netherlands.
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Macroeconomic effects of flood risk:
historical background and modelling

Chapter 2
Do floods have permanent effects?
Evidence from the Netherlands
This chapter investigates the short- and long-run impact on population dynam-
ics of the major flood in the Netherlands in 1953. A dynamic difference–in–
differences analysis reveals that the flood had an immediate negative impact on
population growth, but limited long-term effects. In contrast, the resulting flood
protection program (Deltaworks), had a persisting positive effect on population
growth. As a result, there has been an increase in population in flood prone
areas. Our results suggest a moral hazard effect of flood mitigation leading to
more people locating in flood prone areas, increasing potential disaster costs.
2.1 Introduction
Hurricane Katrina, but also more recently Hurricane Sandy, remind us about the potentially
severe consequences of natural disasters. These hurricanes made large stretches of land
uninhabitable, destroyed local communities, and left many unemployed. Although estimates
vary, some have suggested that the economic cost of Hurricane Katrina alone may well be
as large as 150 billion US dollars (Neumayer et al., 2014).
Even though the death toll of natural disasters has decreased over the past decades due
to early-warning systems, stricter building codes, but also better evacuation routines, the
economic costs of disasters have increased as population has at the same time concentrated
This chapter is based on Husby, Trond G, Henri LF de Groot, Marjan W Hofkes, and Martijn I Dröes
(2014). "Do floods have permanent effects? Evidence from the Netherlands." Journal of Regional Science,
54(3), 355–377.
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in disaster-prone areas (IPCC, 2012). Moreover, although large scale natural disasters are
rather unique events, especially in developed countries, if a disaster does occur it directly
creates a demand for policy intervention to mitigate the impact of the disaster, including
any potential future disasters, possibly further increasing the clustering of population in
risky areas (Boustan et al., 2012; Kahn, 2005). This raises the question to what extent
governmental disaster protection is actually partially counteracted by individual responses
as revealed by household location decisions.
To examine how natural disasters, and the ensuing government policies, affect popula-
tion dynamics is difficult because the full effect of such disasters and related policies may
take decades to unfold. To find evidence of such effects, we have to dig deep into history.
In 1953, a substantial part of the Netherlands was flooded due to a combination of strong
winds and a high tide. As a result, the Dutch government started a disaster prevention pro-
gram (the Deltaworks) which resembles programs that are being proposed today for other
locations at or below sea level, such as New York City.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the impact of the Great North Sea Flood of
1953 and the construction of the Deltaworks on population dynamics in the Netherlands.
We utilise data on population levels for all municipalities in the Netherlands between 1947
and 2000. We use a dynamic difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of
the flood and the Deltaworks on the growth of population. The Deltaworks consist of five
separate projects which were constructed and finalised at different points in time and space.
It is this variation in treatment that we exploit to identify the dynamic response of popu-
lation to the flood and the Deltaworks. This set-up allows us to investigate the unintended
consequences of flood mitigation. Flood mitigation could lead to more people locating in
flood prone areas (moral hazard), increasing the potential costs of a disaster.
The results in this chapter show that municipalities that were affected by the flood had,
one year after the flood, population growth levels of about 0.6 percentage points lower than
non-affected municipalities. These negative effects, however, did not persist over time. In
the long run, the municipalities that were hit by the flood had, as a result of the Deltaworks,
an annual growth rate of about 0.75 percentage points higher than the growth rate in non-
affected municipalities. This relatively small difference in annual growth rates may lead to
considerable differences in population levels over a longer period of time. Since our results
suggest that population concentrates in areas at risk of flooding, serious challenges to flood
risk management may arise regarding both the optimal degree of flood protection as well as
risk financing.
Our results are based on unique long time series data with a relatively large level of re-
gional detail. This provides us with an opportunity to study population dynamics following
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a unique and highly interesting sequence of events. As such, this chapter contributes to an
expanding literature studying the dynamics of the spatial distribution of people and eco-
nomic activity after an important historical event (e.g. the theory of increasing returns and
the theory of locational fundamentals, a discussion we will briefly touch upon). Whereas
much of the existing literature focuses on man-made disasters (e.g. Davis and Weinstein,
2002, 2008; Gerritsen, 2005), we study a natural disaster that was followed by man-made
interventions.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 contains a concise
literature review. Section 2.3 discusses the historical background of the 1953 flood and the
Deltaworks flood protection program. The data and methodology are presented in Sections
2.4 and 2.5. Section 2.6 shows the results, while Section 2.7 provides the conclusions.
2.2 Disasters and population dynamics
A growing literature has attempted to estimate the economic impact of disasters. This re-
search spans various macroeconomic modelling approaches (Hallegatte and Ghil, 2008;
Okuyama, 2008; Rose, 2004; Rose and Liao, 2005) as well as empirical studies on dif-
ferent regional levels (Kousky, 2012; Noy, 2009). Despite a wide variety of approaches
and definitions adopted in these studies, expected losses attributable to disasters are ulti-
mately driven by the likelihood of the disaster (the hazard) and the consequences should it
take place (the exposure). Recent research identifies the latter as the most important factor
(Bouwer, 2011; Kahn, 2005; Pielke Jr et al., 2008). The growth of population in coastal
areas and areas subject to river floods are a particular source of concern, especially because
of expected future sea level rise and increased river discharge (IPCC, 2012).
A general finding in the empirical literature on disasters is that economic effects tend
to disappear after a few years, at least in developed countries (Noy, 2009). Xiao (2011),
for example, found that per capita income in flooded counties in the U.S. rebounded to pre-
flood conditions, if not higher, in the years after the flood. One possible explanation is that
the occurrence of a disaster provides an impetus for governmental action aimed at reducing
hazard. Boustan et al. (2012) argue that government disaster relief programs may partly
have cancelled out individual responses, leading people to return or move to hazard-prone
areas. Furthermore, flood mitigation measures in the form of large infrastructure projects
may have a transformative role on local economies. Hornbeck and Naidu (2012) argue that
an exodus of black workers led to an increased mechanization of flooded counties in the
South of the U.S. Given that a reduction of flood risk frequently involves substantial sunk
costs or implementation of essentially irreversible policy measures, predictions on long-
term effects of both disasters and risk reduction measures following in their wake could
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provide valuable input to policy makers.
The spatial distribution of population over time as well as its underlying dynamics,
have been widely discussed in the literature on man-made disasters (Bosker et al., 2008;
Davis and Weinstein, 2002, 2008; Redding, 2010). Theoretical explanations include ran-
dom growth (Gabaix, 1999), locational fundamentals (Krugman, 1996), and increasing re-
turns (Henderson, 1974). Random growth theory explains the distribution of people as a
result of a random distribution of growth rates across space. The locational fundamentals
theory posits that the economic attractiveness of each location is determined by some fun-
damental geographical factors, that are also randomly distributed. The theory of increasing
returns explains the size of cities as a result of agglomeration forces inherent in modern
economies. According to the theory of locational fundamentals, we should not expect to
find any long-term effects from the flood in 1953 since the flood left the distribution of
fundamentals unaltered. A finding of long-term effects would, however, be in line with
the theory of increasing returns. If the flood had transformative effects on local labor- or
housing markets, the result could be a new equilibrium population size in affected areas.1
2.3 Historical background
2.3.1 Floods and policy: the Dutch case
The mere topography of the Netherlands explains the central role of flood protection in
Dutch policy making. One quarter of the land is situated below mean sea level and the
country hosts the estuary of four large rivers. As Figure 2.1 indicates, in case of a storm
surge at sea or high river discharges, as much as two thirds of the country would be in-
undated. Not surprisingly, Dutch history and institutions are marked by the constant fight
against water. The Dutch Water Boards, dating back to the twelfth and thirteenth century,
were given the responsibility for flood safety in their particular regions. Following their
establishment, a systematic enclosing of rivers and formation of polders began. Current
flood defences are largely an extension of protection strategies outlined centuries ago. The
main protection against river flooding continues to be dikes, whereas dunes offer the most
important defence against sea-water intrusion.
The country has nevertheless been hit by several major flood disasters over the centuries.
Some of them have played a large role in shaping flood management policies. The flood of
1916 is one clear example of the influence of floods on the policy process. Although not
1A related strand of literature investigates how amenities affect migration (Partridge, 2010; Rodríguez-Pose
and Ketterer, 2012). Our findings – i.e. that the massive constructions of protective structures, concentrated
in one area, had the unintended consequences of increasing the population and economic value at risk – also
relate to the discussion on the usefulness of place-based policies (Barca et al., 2012).
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Figure 2.1 Map of The Netherlands. Note: the red colour indicates flood-prone regions.
Source: www.risicokaart.nl.
among the deadliest or the costliest in economic terms, the flood provided an important im-
pulse for the creation of a large dike (the Afsluitdijk) which protected the north western part
of the country by closing off the South Sea (Zuiderzee). The construction of the Afsluitdijk
also exemplifies another important feature of Dutch flood policies: motives other than flood
protection are often important in the political decision making. Closing off of the Zuiderzee
led to the creation of a large freshwater lake (IJsselmeer) and enabled the creation of an en-
tirely new province (Flevoland). This secured fresh water supply in the densely populated
Randstad area and made large areas of new land available. Studies conducted before the
second World War had already concluded that the flood protection in the south western part
of the Netherlands would offer inadequate protection under certain extreme weather condi-
tions. However, the second World War and the reconstruction in its aftermath, had pushed
concerns for flooding down on the political agenda (Deltaworks, 2014).
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2.3.2 The flood
Saturday January 31. 1953 at 6.00 P.M., an emergency telegram was sent out from the
Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI), reporting strong north western winds
and unusually high water in the North Sea. Due to poor early-warning routines, the message
was hardly noticed by the population in the south western parts of the Netherlands. In
the early morning when the peak of the tide occurred, a large part of the population was
sleeping. The combination of high water and storm resulted in simultaneous dike breaches
across the south western provinces (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2 Inundated areas as a result of the flood of 1953. Source: Wikipedia.
Poor building quality as well as inadequate evacuation routines probably resulted in an
excessive number of casualties (van der Klis et al., 2005). The disaster could, however, have
had far graver consequences. The dikes on the northern side of the Hollandse IJssel which
protected the populous and economically important Randstad region, were in poor condition
and only through some desperate and unorthodox action a major catastrophe was avoided
(such actions included jamming a ship in a dike to plug gaping holes thereby preventing
water from flowing through). A major flood in the Randstad region would most certainly
have led to a more than tenfold increase in the number of casualties and almost unimaginable
economic damage (Deltaworks, 2014). Still, the devastations resulted in a total of 1836
casualties and in the destruction of 4,500 houses. Some 140,000 hectares of land remained
flooded for a longer period, leading to the evacuation of approximately 100,000 people (de
Kraker, 2006).
2.3.3 The policy response
As was the case with the flood in 1916 and the construction of the Afsluitdijk, the flood in
1953 provided an immediate impulse for action. Some strengthening of dikes had already
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been implemented by 1950, but the 1953-flood set the stage for the establishment of the
Deltacommission which in effect had the task of determining Dutch flood management for
several decades. The response took the form of the Deltaworks plan which aimed at closing
certain river mouths and sea arms as well as strengthening existing and building new dikes
(see Figure 2.3 for the measures taken in regions hit by the 1953 flood).
Figure 2.3 The Deltaworks. Source: Deltaworks (2014).
The first project of the Deltaworks was the storm barrier at the Hollandse IJssel, com-
pleted in 1958. This was a direct response to the devastations resulting from the 1953-flood.
The project included strengthening existing dikes as well as the construction of a storm
surge barrier, consisting of huge steel screens which could be lowered into the water in
case of exceptionally high water levels. The next phase of the Deltaworks Plan was The
Three Islands Plan which included the construction of Veersegatdam and Zandkreekdam,
both finished in 1961. These were built to improve safety in areas affected by the flood. The
Grevelingendam (1965) and the Volkerakdam (1969) were secondary dams, meaning that
their primary function was to facilitate the construction of other dams. Grevelingendam and
Volkerak were built to facilitate the construction of two of the most complex parts of the
Deltaworks Program: the Haringvlietdam and the Brouwersdam, both completed in 1971
(Deltaworks, 2014; Pilarczyk, 2007).
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2.4 Data
We use annual population data at municipality-level covering the period 1947–2000. Data
were retrieved from two sources: the Historical Database of Dutch Municipalities (HDNG)
– a data base consisting of municipal level statistics from the Dutch censuses starting in
1795 until present (Beekink et al., 2003) – and from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The
former covers the time period from 1947 to 1959, while the latter covers 1960 to 2000. The
data set was limited to this period as this covers a reasonable before/after period for the
1953-flood and the construction of the Deltaworks. It was decided to make an upper cut-off
at the year 2000 (14 years after completion of the last part of the Deltaworks), as it was
assumed that any additional years would not greatly improve the quality of the analysis.
The use of such long time series obviously poses some challenges as the number of
municipalities has changed substantially over the years. The number of municipalities in
2000 is not even half of that a 100 years earlier (Beekink et al., 2003, p. 158). In order to
create a consistent data set it was therefore necessary to account for changes in the borders
of municipalities. This was achieved through the creation of a concordance table, using
the municipalities as they were defined in 2000 and then tracing them back in time. From
1960 onwards this proved to be a relatively straightforward, although tedious, procedure, as
both numbers of inhabitants as well as the area transferred between municipalities are listed
by CBS. Before 1960 the information about municipal changes comes from van der Meer
and Boonstra (2006) which only includes information about border changes but not about
the number of people ’transferred’ between municipalities. We refer to Appendix 2.A for a
more detailed discussion of the data set.
2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 Difference-in-differences with response functions
The data described were organised as a panel with population size for m = 1, ...,531 mu-
nicipalities in years t = 1947, ...,2000. Population growth is defined as the difference in
the natural logarithm. As Figure 2.A1 in Appendix 2.A suggests, substantial heterogeneity
across both time and space is present in the data.
The central topic of this chapter is to investigate whether post-disaster trends in popu-
lation growth rates diverge between municipalities which were (treatment group) and were
not (control group) affected by the flood in 1953. An important prerequisite for such an
analysis is that the treatment and control group follow similar trends before the disaster.
Figure 2.4 plots growth rates in treatment and control groups over time. The figure does al-
ready suggest that there is a common, downward trend in population growth in both groups
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Figure 2.4 Mean population growth in control and treatment group (flood).
in the period right after 1947. Then there is change in the direction of the trend in both
groups. In Figure 2.5, the treatment group consists of municipalities which were affected
by the Deltaworks Program while the control group consists of non-affected municipalities.
This figure is very similar to Figure 2.4.
One major challenge with difference-in-differences analyses is to isolate the effect of
the treatment from other possibly confounding factors. In our case with a data set covering
an almost 60-year period this poses a serious problem. A shift in land use resulting from a
shrinking importance of the agricultural sector is one candidate source. Falling fertility rates
in the southern provinces of the Netherlands may also cause a bias. We control for these
potential biases in our empirical model by including fixed effects as well as municipality-
specific trend variables. Since our main interest is to investigate whether the effects on
population growth rates are temporary or permanent, we decide to follow the approach in
Wolfers (2006) who uses a response function consisting of yearly dummy variables instead
of the commonly employed before-after dummy variable. This allows us to investigate the
dynamic response of population growth explicitly.
2.5.2 Estimated models
The pure flood model is used to investigate the dynamic effects from the flood in 1953. It is
specified as follows:
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Figure 2.5 Mean population growth in control and treatment group (Deltaworks).
gm,t =α+∑
k≥0
βkFloodRFm,k,t +[∑
m
Municipalitym ∗Trendt ] (2.1)
+∑
t
T FEt +∑
m
MFEm+ εm,t
The dependent variable (population growth) is calculated using the natural logarithm:
gm,t ≡ ln(Popm,t/Popm,t−1). T FEt and MFEm are time- and municipality-fixed effects, re-
spectively. We estimate two models, one with a municipality-specific trend variable and
one without. We also tried alternative specifications of the model which included quadratic
trends as well as the inverse of the linear trend, without major changes to our results. The
response function is written as ∑k≥0βkFloodRFm,k,t , where k represents the number of years
since the flood or since the completion of a protective measure. The variable FloodRFm,k,t
takes the value 1 in the treatment-group in period k and is equal to zero otherwise. For
the response function in Equation 2.1, k = 0 corresponds to t = 1953 for all municipalities
which were affected by the flood. We define k = 0,1, ...,15,o15 where o15 covers all time-
periods beyond 15 years after the flood. This means that the dummy variable FloodRFm,o15,t
takes the value one after 1968 (for the treatment group) and zero otherwise. Population was
counted on December 31, so that the dependent variable actually measures the percentage
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population growth in year t. The interpretation of the coefficient βk is the percentage point
difference in the population growth rate between the treatment and the control group k years
after the flood.
In the second model, the Deltaworks (DW) model, the response function from Equation
2.1 is replaced with a similar function for the Deltaworks:
gm,t =α+∑
k≥0
ηkDW RFm,k,t +[∑
m
Municipalitym ∗Trendt ] (2.2)
+∑
t
T FEt +∑
m
MFEm+ εm,t
One major difference between the response function from Equation 2.1 and that of Equa-
tion 2.2 is that the ’treatment’ year (i.e. the year corresponding to k = 0) differs between the
municipalities in the treatment group in the latter case. This is due to the fact that various
parts of the Deltaworks were finished in different years. This allows us to better isolate the
effects from the Deltaworks.
Finally, we estimate a model controlling for both the effect of the flood and the Delta-
works simultaneously:
gm,t =α+ γDW BAm,t +∑
k≥0
βkFloodRFm,k,t (2.3)
+[∑
m
Municipalitym ∗Trendt ]+∑
t
T FEt +∑
m
MFEm+ εm,t
DW BAm,t in the mixed model in Equation 2.3 represents a simple before-after treatment
dummy that takes the value one in affected municipalities (treatment group) in all time
periods after the completion of a relevant construction of the Deltaworks and zero otherwise.
The basic idea behind this model is that the Deltaworks may itself represent an omitted
variable in the model in Equation 2.1.
2.5.3 Coding of treatment variables
In the case of the 1953 flood it is relatively straightforward to categorise municipalities. It is
well-documented which municipalities were affected, both in terms of deaths and material
damage (Deltaworks, 2014; van der Klis et al., 2005). For the Deltaworks Program the
definition is more complicated. It is clear that a dike breach around Rotterdam would have
affected large parts of the Randstad area, and not only the areas close to the water. In the
face of the difficulties related to defining the spatial extent of the protection, we chose to
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define treatment municipalities as only those directly affected by the mitigation efforts. For
example, the treatment group in the first period of the construction of the Deltaworks are
municipalities that border the Hollandse IJssel. The location of the affected municipalities
in each treatment group are plotted in Figures 2.B6 and 2.B7 in Appendix 2.B. Several
municipalities were affected by the flood as well as by the Deltaworks. In the year the last
constructions were completed, almost 25 percent of the municipalities in the Deltaworks
treatment-group are municipalities that had not been affected by the flood. Appendix 2.B
further elaborates on this issue.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 The flood model
The estimates of the parameters of the flood model in Equation 2.1 are presented in the
left part of Table 2.1. An F-test confirmed that the dummy variables forming the response
function were jointly statistically significant. The inclusion of the trend variable does only
marginally alter the estimates, and, interestingly, the effect seems to be growing over time.
Prior to the flood the true trend of population growth is, if anything, slightly negative, and the
inclusion of a linear trend variable should therefore not change the estimates much. How-
ever, from the late 1950s to around 1970 the true trend in population growth is increasing,
suggesting that the trend variable captures the true trend.
Based on the previous discussion, one would expect an event such as the flood in 1953
to have had a dramatic effect on the population in affected areas: crops were affected for
years by the intrusion of sea water, providing a striking blow to the agricultural sector.
At the same time the destruction of large parts of the housing stock meant that people in
many cases had no houses to return to. Such effects were also suggested by Figure 2.4, in
which there appeared to be a reduction of growth rates in the early 1950s. The estimated
response function in Equation 2.1, depicted in Figure 2.6, suggests that the flood had an
immediate negative impact. It appears that affected municipalities suffered an immediate
drop in population growth of about 0.6 %-points as compared to non-affected municipalities.
Thereafter, the results are less clear cut. There is some weak evidence of a bounce-back
effect the year following the flood, but this is statistically insignificant. In the following
years the response function is mostly negative and statistically insignificant.
The estimated parameter values for the last dummy variable βRFo15, however, is positive
and statistically significant. This suggests that the growth rate in municipalities which were
hit by the flood was, in each year, 0.75 percentage points higher than in those municipalities
that were not hit. Judging by the observations from the literature, it is questionable whether
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Figure 2.6 The response function of the flood model.
this positive permanent effect is directly related to the flood. As we shall see, it is likely that
other factors than the flood, e.g. the Deltaworks, are at least equally important in explaining
the positive divergence from the trend. In addition, since there is a high correlation between
the 1953 flood and the Deltaworks, there is a potential omitted variable bias problem in
Equation 2.1.
2.6.2 The Deltaworks model
The estimates of the parameters of the Deltaworks (DW) model of Equation 2.2 are pre-
sented in the middle part of Table 2.1. Figure 2.7 depicts the estimated response function
from Equation 2.2. As Figure 2.7 suggests, the Deltaworks Program had a positive effect
overall. One initial factor may have been the construction phase itself, requiring manpower
and supplies. The inflow of workers and an increase in demand for goods may have caused
positive ripple effects in local economies. Reconstruction of the housing stock and normal-
ization of the agricultural sector may also have played a part. However, as suggested by
Figure 2.5, the largest positive difference between the control and treatment group seems
to occur from 1970 onwards. In other words, the construction of the different parts of the
Deltaworks may itself have had a positive effect. But the effect is large and positive into the
early 1980s – ten years subsequent to the finalization of the major parts of the Deltaworks
Program. This suggests again that factors, other than the more immediate ones discussed
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above, may be at play. One possible explanation is that the lowering of risk led households
to move back or households living elsewhere to settle in affected areas. Another possible
explanation is that the lowering of risk was accompanied by changes in land regulations: as
more and more areas were offered better protection, more land was made available for de-
velopment. The development led to construction of housing, which again may have caused
positive ripple effects.
Figure 2.7 The response function of the DW Model.
2.6.3 The mixed model
A logical next step is to include the Deltaworks as a control in the regression for the 1953-
flood. To this end, the Deltaworks dummy was included in the model with the response
function for the flood (the mixed model, Table 2.1). Controlling for the Deltaworks ren-
dered the parameter value for the last dummy variable FloodRFo15 statistically insignificant,
and an F-test revealed that the dummy variables forming the response function were not
jointly statistically significant. The value of the coefficient is less than one third of the cor-
responding coefficient from Equation 2.1. This again suggests that the Deltaworks Program
is more important in explaining population growth than the 1953-flood. Figure 2.8 plots
the response function, controlling for Deltaworks. Compared with Figure 2.6, we see that
the last part of the dashed line is shifted downwards, entailing a dampening of the positive
effects from period 5 onwards: in this specification, no positive effects remain which are
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statistically significant at a 5 percent level, although the negative effects remain unchanged.
The first parts of the Deltaworks were finalised 5 years after the flood (1958). Given the
positive effects from the Deltaworks construction identified above, these results are not all
that surprising.
Figure 2.8 The response function of the mixed model.
Summing up, we can conclude that the flood in 1953 slowed down the population growth
in affected municipalities. There is some weak evidence suggesting that population growth
remained lower in non-affected areas for roughly ten years after the disaster. In the long run
population growth in flood-affected municipalities stays above that of non-affected munici-
palities. Although some municipalities in the treatment group of the flood are coded as not
directly affected by the Deltaworks, they may have been indirectly affected by the construc-
tion. This could explain the robust positive effects in the 1980s. As suggested above, any
positive effects on population growth are most likely to be related to the Deltaworks rather
than to the flood itself.2 3
2As a robustness check, we also estimated Equations 2.2 and 2.3 using a broader definition of the Delta-
works treatment variable (i.e. the treatment group almost doubled in size). The estimated parameter values
and standard errors remain virtually the same.
3Another issue is the definition of the control group. Several other flood mitigation measures have been
implemented in municipalities in the control group during the time period covered by our analysis (Wesselink
et al., 2013). This leads to a potential underestimation of the Deltaworks effect.
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Table 2.1 Regression results
Flood model DW model Mixed model
Constant 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
DW dummy 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Trend −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Period after the event (k)
Year 0 −0.0075∗ −0.0075∗ 0.0028 0.0026 −0.0075∗ −0.0075∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Year 1 0.0007 0.0008 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0008
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Year 2 0.0032 0.0033 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0032 0.0033
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Year 3 0.0016 0.0017 0.0155∗ 0.0158∗ 0.0016 0.0017
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Year 4 −0.0024 −0.0023 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ −0.0024 −0.0022
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Year 5 −0.0049∗ −0.0047∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ −0.0052∗ −0.0051∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Year 6 −0.0003 −0.0001 0.0122∗ 0.0127∗ −0.0006 −0.0005
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Year 7 −0.0004 −0.0002 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ −0.0008 −0.0006
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Year 8 −0.0034 −0.0032 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ −0.0044 −0.0042
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Year 9 −0.0025 −0.0023 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗∗ −0.0035 −0.0033
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Year 10 −0.0028 −0.0026 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ −0.0038∗ −0.0036†
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Year 11 −0.0003 −0.0001 0.0132∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ −0.0013 −0.0011
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Year 12 0.0021 0.0024 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0042) (0.0043)
Year 13 0.0057† 0.0060† 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.004 0.0043
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Year 14 0.0023 0.0026 0.0109∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.001
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Year 15 0.005 0.0053 0.006 0.0065† 0.0033 0.0036
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Over 15 years 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0014 0.002
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013)
N 28673 28673 28673 28673 28673 28673
R2 0.2298 0.2304 0.231 0.2316 0.2313 0.2319
adj. R2 0.2134 0.214 0.2145 0.2152 0.2148 0.2154
Resid. sd 0.0187 0.0187 0.0187 0.0187 0.0187 0.0187
Robust standard errors in parentheses. † significant at p < 10%; ∗p < 5%; ∗∗p < 1%; ∗∗∗p < 0.1%
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2.6.4 Stock dynamics from the flood and the Deltaworks
In terms of population levels, our results suggest that the permanent effects of the Delta-
works had a much larger impact than the temporary effects of the flood. Figure 2.9 illustrates
this point. Suppose there are two hypothetical municipalities – one in the control group and
one in the treatment group, which both have an initial population (Pop1952) equal to 20,000.
Their size at time τ equals:
PopControl groupτ = Pop1952 ∗
τ
∏
i=1953
(1+ g¯i)
PopTreatment groupτ = Pop1952 ∗
τ
∏
i=1953
(1+ g¯i+βk)
The municipality in the control group grows with the average national growth rate each
year (g¯τ ), while the municipality in the treatment group grows with the growth rate plus the
estimated coefficient (βk for the relevant year) from Equation 2.1. By using this model we
assume that the positive very long-term effects which were found (beyond 15 years), are
related to the construction of the Deltaworks rather than to the flood. Treatment does in this
case thus refer to both the flood and the Deltaworks.
Figure 2.9 The stock effects predicted by the response function in the Flood model with
time trend from Equation 2.1.
27
Do floods have permanent effects? Evidence from the Netherlands
The results from this comparative exercise are depicted in Figure 2.9. Investigating the
first 15 years, we see that the municipality in the treatment group suffers an immediate loss
of population relative to the municipality of the control group. The population recovers
quickly, and the difference is never larger than 400 inhabitants, meaning that the impacts
from the flood on population levels were actually rather limited. When examining the whole
time period, we see that the (positive) very long-term effects led to a substantial difference
in population levels. The municipality in the control group has by the year 2000 nearly 9000
less inhabitants than the municipality in the treatment group. As such, the permanent effects
resulting from the construction of the Deltaworks have a much larger effect on population
levels than the temporary effects from the flood.
2.7 Conclusion and discussion
Although the number of casualties resulting from disasters in developed countries tend to
be limited, the monetary costs associated with them tend to be large. Estimates suggest that
the flood which struck parts of Central Europe in June 2013 may have resulted in direct
damages of approximately 10 billion Euros. A concentration of population and economic
activities in hazardous areas is a main driver behind these losses. Thus, as countries grow
richer and their ability to protect increases, disasters strike with less frequency, but result
in greater monetary costs if they occur. People can respond to disasters by moving out of
hazardous areas, but governments have strong incentives to react to a disaster by increasing
protection, possibly crowding out individual responses. As such, studies investigating the
long-term impacts of disasters should analyse the disaster in conjunction with mitigation
efforts following in its wake.
In this chapter, we have examined the long-term impacts on population growth from the
North Sea Flood in 1953 in the Netherlands. The flood gave impetus to the development of
a large scale flood protection program, the Deltaworks. Due to the unique characteristics of
our data, we are able to analyse the effects from the flood while separating the influence of
the Deltaworks. Our results suggest that the long-term effects on population growth were
most likely not directly related to the flood in 1953. The positive long-term effects found
were instead due to the policy interventions following the flood. Our analysis of the very
long-term effects suggest that the municipalities which were affected by the flood had a
yearly population growth of on average 0.6 percentage points higher than the municipalities
which were not affected. Our hypothetical example illustrates the large effect on popula-
tion levels due to the compounding nature of population growth. There is thus reason to
believe that the Dutch government, through its Deltaworks Program, was highly successful
in crowding out individual responses to the disaster. This is an important policy lesson for
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other governments who see the Dutch experience as providing guidance for their own flood
risk reduction programs.
Our results are similar to those found in the literature on man-made disasters: tempo-
rary shocks such as a flood have limited long-term effects while policy interventions may
well have such effects. Natural disasters differ from man-made disasters in the sense that
the likelihood of them occurring is closely linked to geography. It is, for example, likely
that the south east coast of the U.S. will be hit by hurricanes in the future. Consequently,
the equilibrium population in hazardous areas should, at least partly, be determined by the
likelihood that a disaster strikes.
In light of the locational fundamentals theory, the limited long-term impacts from the
flood are therefore not surprising since the flood did not alter the likelihood of future dis-
asters. According to the theory of increasing returns a disaster may well have long-term
effects. Several authors suggest that Katrina, through its destruction of cheap housing, in
fact led to a new and lower equilibrium population of New Orleans (Glaeser, 2005; Vigdor,
2008). Our results therefore seem, at a first glance, to be at odds with the theory of increas-
ing returns. But, in contrast to hurricane Katrina, the flood in 1953 led to a massive policy
response. This policy response not only reduced flood risk – several of the constructions
of the Deltaworks Program had other purposes than flood protection – the constructions
also provided freshwater supply as well as transport infrastructure. It is likely that local
economies were fundamentally changed by these massive constructions. Subsequent to the
construction of the protective measures, new land was made available. In the Netherlands,
a country with one of the highest population densities in the world, it is possible that new
land available at lower prices led people to move to areas protected by the Deltaworks.
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Appendix 2.A Data
This Appendix further elaborates on the quality of the data underlying our analysis. Fig-
ure 2.A1 plots the mean of population growth in the different municipalities with the bars
representing 95 percentage confidence interval. What is readily seen is that there is a large
difference in variance in the data between the years before around 1950 and the years there-
after. A closer inspection revealed that the standard deviations in population growth start
decreasing from 1947, the year of the first census after the war. However, the year 1948 did
see a huge increase in the variance in population growth. This was, however, caused by an
outlier – the municipality of Leeuweradeel in Friesland – which, according to the data expe-
rienced a population decrease of almost 150 percent. The source of error is either erroneous
typing of data by the creators of the HDNG or problems with the original sources.4
Figure 2.A1 Mean of population growth
over time with 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.A2 Standard deviation of popu-
lation growth over time.
The solution here is simply to remove this particular observation, which yields Figure
2.A2. Subsequently the standard deviations drop drastically from the year 1947 onwards.
There are few universal rules of thumb for identifying outliers, and in this particular data set
the definition of an outlier is likely to vary between the years. We know from other sources
that there were large interregional variations in population growth rates, and an outlier could
simply be a high growth municipality in a high growth region. Nevertheless, a plot showing
4The HDNG appears to be riddled with errors in the years of WWII. Especially the year of 1944 is prob-
lematic: several municipalities are registered with a 150-200 percentage population drop, just to experience
an increase of a similar magnitude the following year. Again, sources behind the errors are something of an
enigma. Inaccuracies in the coding may well be one source of error. But also lacking or erratic information
about municipality changes as well as typos in the original data sets may have caused deviations.
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outliers over time with a universal definition of outliers, can give some useful information
about the data.
Figure 2.A3 Outliers. Figure 2.A4 Differences between the
original data set and the data set used for
the analysis.
Figure 2.A3 plots the number of outliers per year, where an outlier was defined as over
ten times larger than the aggregate growth rate (in absolute values). Some peculiar patterns
appear, which again raise questions about the reliability of the pre-1947 data. There were
no censuses between 1930 and 1947, meaning that any data points between these years are
results of extrapolations. The sharp increase in the number of outliers in the years of the
second World War (WWII) is therefore highly suspicious, as the data for these years should
be based on the same extrapolations used for the data in the 1930s. We also see an in-
crease in the number of outliers around 1980, but this may have a more natural explanation.
The aggregate population growth was dropping fast towards the end of the 1970s, but with
regional variations, possibly resulting in an increase in outliers. Another point is that all
observations from the province of Flevoland are left out of the data set. This province was
created with the closure of the Zuiderzee and subsequent land fill, and data series for the
municipalities in the province are therefore incomplete. Another potential source of error
is the concordance table. Figure 2.A4 illustrates the difference in total population in the
Netherlands between the original data set and the data set used in our analysis. The line
represents population (left axis), while the vertical bars represent deviations (right axis).
The figure clearly shows that that the total population in the reconstructed data set deviates
significantly from the total population in the original data set until the end of WWII.
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Appendix 2.B Treatment groups
In this Appendix we indicate the municipalities affected by the flood and the Deltaworks.
The overlap between the treatment groups is depicted in Figure 2.B5. The share of munic-
ipalities affected by the flood but not by the Deltaworks drops steadily with the finalization
of constructions. Finally, over 60 percent of the municipalities in the treatment group of the
flood are also in the treatment group of the Deltaworks. The share of municipalities affected
by the Deltaworks but not by the flood follows a similar development. For the year that
the last constructions were finalised, over 75 percent of the municipalities affected by the
Deltaworks are municipalites that had also been hit by the flood.
Figure 2.B6 shows the municipalities which are coded as hit by the flood. Treatment
group is indicated with a darker color. The number of municipalities amount to a total of 41,
where treatment switches on in 1953 for all of the affected municipalities. Similarly, Figure
2.B7 shows the municipalities which are coded as having been affected by the different
phases of the Deltaworks construction.
Figure 2.B5 The percentage of municipalities affected by the Deltaworks but not by the
flood (solid line) and the percentage of municipalities affected by the flood but not by the
Deltaworks (dotted line).
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Figure 2.B6 Municipalities hit by the flood.
Figure 2.B7 Municipalities affected by the Deltaworks.
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Chapter 3
Incorporating behavioural responses to
risk in disaster impact models
Detailed estimates of economy-wide disaster losses provide important inputs
for disaster risk management. The most common models used to estimate
losses are Input-Output (IO) and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) mod-
els. One strength of both these models is the ability to depict the economy-wide
effects of disasters, referring to the transmission of disaster impacts to regions
not directly affected. One important transmitting channels is household migra-
tion, which is likely to have substantial impacts on local labour and housing
markets. In this chapter we argue that IO and CGE models suffer from lim-
itations in representing household migration under disaster risk. We suggest
combining IO and CGE models with elements from Agent-based models to im-
prove the representation of migration in disaster impact analysis.
3.1 Introduction
On March 31. 2014 Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change
(IPCC) published its contribution to the latest in a series of Assessment Reports on the
impact of climate change (IPCC, 2014). The report confirms results from previous reports,
stating that climate change, if left unchecked, will likely inflict serious economic damage in
several countries across the world. One of the key risks of climate change is the possibility
of future increases in the frequency or severity of natural disasters. Models which translate
physical disaster impacts into economic damage, provide valuable inputs to policy makers,
allowing for a comparison between the benefits and costs of reducing risks. It is, however,
well known that individuals respond and adapt to environmental changes such as increasing
risk (van der Leeuw, 2008). Such responses, may in turn have an impact on estimated
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disaster losses. It is therefore increasingly argued that models used for policy analysis need
to incorporate adaptive human responses to the uncertainties and risks associated with a
changing climate (Palmer and Smith, 2014).
A particular challenge in disaster impact analysis is the estimation of indirect and long-
term effects. Ripple effects in the aftermath of disasters spread the effects of the shock to
agents, sectors and regions not directly affected by the events. Studies suggest that losses
due to indirect effects can be even larger than losses from direct effects (Hallegatte, 2014).
Household responses in the aftermath of disasters represent potentially important indirect
and long-term effects. It is well known that extreme weather events can trigger household
migration (Black et al., 2011a). For example, according to recent census numbers the pop-
ulation of New Orleans has still not recovered to pre-Katrina levels (Fussell et al., 2014).
Such massive changes in the spatial distribution of people have large impacts on housing,
labour and product markets in both origin and destination region. Shortage of labour supply
and lower demand for products in disaster struck regions can lead to inflated total losses in
affected regions, while large amounts of displaced households can lead to housing shortages
and put pressure on welfare systems in destination regions.
Obtaining reliable empirical estimates of the magnitude of indirect losses is complicated
by the fact that macroeconomic variables move together, often without any clear causal rela-
tionship. Indirect effects are therefore usually estimated using macroeconomic models such
as Input-Output (IO) and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (Okuyama and
Santos, 2014). Both of these models describe the economy as a set of interlinked equations,
where agents and sectors are linked with each other through monetary flows of services and
goods. Although IO and CGE models differ significantly in terms of structure and underly-
ing assumptions, they share common strengths which make them suitable for modelling of
indirect effects. Firstly, the rich details of the economic structure including sectoral interac-
tions captures well how disaster effects spread from one sector to another. Secondly, both
of these model types are calibrated on data consistent with national accounts. Thirdly, the
analytical tractability of these models allows for a clear analysis the aggregate dynamics of
macroeconomic variables (Mulder et al., 2001). All these characteristics make IO and CGE
models attractive for policy analysis.
While IO and CGE models are rich in details on the production-side of the economy,
they are often criticised for lack of details or unrealistic assumptions regarding individual
household behaviour (Scrieciu et al., 2013). One of these assumptions is that interactions
between individual agents have no effects on aggregate variables. We argue that the repre-
sentation of household migration decisions is a limitation for these models in the analysis
of disaster impacts. Firstly, household decisions in the context of natural disasters are likely
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subject to a large degree of risk and uncertainty. When confronted with choices involving
uncertainty and risk, humans frequently rely on intuitive thinking or they are affected by
the opinion of others (IPCC, 2014; Safarzynska et al., 2013). Secondly, the literature inves-
tigating the growth impacts of disasters find contradictory results, suggesting the presence
of multiple equilibria (Cavallo et al., 2013). Multiple equilibria could arise, as we argue
in Chapter 7, when public concern is amplified through the exchange of individual risk
judgments (Kasperson et al., 1988).
In order to capture realistic household behaviour in the aftermath of disasters, IO and
CGE models can be complemented with elements from other modelling formats, such as
Agent-based models (ABM). ABMs are bottom-up models, focusing on how system prop-
erties emerge through the interactions of individual agents (Grimm et al., 2006). Precisely
the focus on interaction effects between heterogeneous agents in ABMs, addresses some of
the limitations of IO and CGE models and allows for analysing out-of-equilibrium dynam-
ics.
In this chapter we review the recent literature on disaster impacts carried out using IO
and CGE models. We argue that these models, despite of their strengths in this context,
suffer from limitations in capturing realistic household migration decisions in the context of
natural disasters. ABMs could be combined with one of the two prevailing model types to
address some of these limitations.1
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, the economics of natural disasters
and household migration in the context of risk and uncertainty are discussed. Section 3.3
gives a short description of IO and CGE models. Section 3.4 discusses the limitations of
these models and provides an overview of elements from ABMs which could address these
limitations. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The economics of natural disasters
3.2.1 Concepts and terminology
In the economic literature losses are often referred to as costs (Kousky and Walls, 2014),
and for the purposes of this chapter losses and costs are treated as synonyms. In line with
standard welfare economics, costs should represent the value of resources used/lost where
1For a more extensive review of models on disaster impacts see Okuyama and Santos (2014). For a re-
view of the empirical literature on climate change related migration, see Klaiber (2014) and for a review of
modelling of migration in the context of climate change, see McLeman (2013). We limit the discussion to the
most prevalent models within disaster impact analysis, leaving out studies investigating the economic effects
of disasters using other types of macroeconomic models (e.g., Barro, 2009, 2013; Martin and Pindyck, 2014).
For a general review on economic effects of climate change, including labour market impacts, see Dell et al.
(2014).
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value is measured in prices reflecting the resource’s most efficient use. Accounting princi-
ples determine which costs should be included and which costs should not be counted as
losses. Here, a distinction is usually made between stocks and flows — the former repre-
senting a certain quantity at a certain point in time and the latter services or outputs of stocks
over time. Business interruptions are typically measured in terms of flows. Although stock
and flow measures are complementary measures, flow measures are more frequently used in
economy-wide impact analysis, partly because they readily describe indirect effects (Rose,
2004).
Furthermore, a distinction is made in macroeconomics between short-run and long-run
costs — the former corresponding roughly to time periods up to three years and the latter
to time periods beyond that (Cavallo and Noy, 2009). This distinction arises because of the
convention in economics to treat certain inputs (usually capital) as fixed in the short run but
variable in the long run. Short-run costs and long-run costs will usually differ significantly.
For example, in the short run producers may well resort to new combinations of inputs in
order to adapt to constraints of the supply of traditionally used inputs. In the long run,
as supply lines are re-established, traditional input combinations may be used but some
changes may persist for efficiency reasons. This latter phenomenon is sometimes referred
to as a Schumpeterian "creative destruction" of disasters (Cavallo and Noy, 2009).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, disaster risk is commonly defined as a function of hazard,
vulnerability and exposure. A distinction is often made between physical vulnerability and
socioeconomic vulnerability of households. Many traditional risk assessments only evaluate
physical vulnerability, i.e. the vulnerability of structures and goods (Filatova, 2014). How-
ever, several studies highlight the importance of the socioeconomic dimension of vulnera-
bility for disaster outcomes, where socioeconomic vulnerability is seen largely as a function
of a household’s sociodemographic status (e.g., Cutter et al., 2003; Koks et al., 2015; Smith
et al., 2006). Several policy measures have been developed to reduce vulnerability, ranging
from better evacuation routines and risk insurance to measures aimed at stimulating indi-
vidual mitigation. Such individual mitigation measures are elevating houses, refitting the
interior of buildings, purchasing sandbags as flood barriers and relocating movable equip-
ment. Financial incentive mechanisms, such as insurance with risk-based premiums can
be introduced to stimulate the implementation of individual measures (Botzen et al., 2009).
However, due to financial constraints and lack of information and incentives, vulnerable
households may be less likely than other household types to implement such mitigation
measures. The concentration of vulnerable households living in areas exposed to disasters
is therefore an important determinant of losses (Mechler et al., 2014).
Exposure is widely regarded as the main driver of increasing disaster losses during the
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past decades (IPCC, 2012). Exposure refers to the concentration of people, natural re-
sources, and economic assets and services located in disaster-prone areas (IPCC, 2014).
Some studies argue that hazard reduction possibly inadvertently leads to an increase in
exposure. For example, in Chapter 2 we suggested that the wide-reaching dike building
programmes in the Netherlands led to an increased concentration of population in areas po-
tentially inundated in case of a flood. This phenomenon is referred to as the levee-effect
(Tobin, 1995) or the safe development paradox (Burby, 2006). Measures targeted at reduc-
ing exposure include land-use regulations, zoning and relocation of households and produc-
tive assets. As such, the migration of households after a flood could substantially change
the exposure in an area to a future flood. Household locations are not only an important
determinant of exposure — migration in the aftermath of a disaster is also a transmitter of
disaster effects.
3.2.2 Household migration and risk judgements
The possibility of waves of migrating households as a consequence of either gradual effects
of climate change or extreme weather events is a contentious topic, which recently has re-
ceived a great deal of attention (Black et al., 2013, 2011a,b; Corbyn, 2010; Gemenne, 2011;
McLeman, 2013; Obokata et al., 2014; Warner, 2010). Neglecting household responses in
disaster impact analysis is likely to lead to a biased estimate of the total disaster effect, as
population displacements have severe impacts on labour and housing markets in both origin
and destination. For example, Vigdor (2008) argues that the massive population displace-
ments following Katrina in 2005, shifted the city to a new equilibrium of housing prices and
employment: the rampant destruction of houses, mainly located in poor neighbourhoods,
meant an end to cheap housing for many, forcing poor households to leave New Orleans.
As such, the aftermath of Katrina is associated with a decrease in average unemployment
and an increase in average housing prices in New Orleans (Glaeser, 2005). However, the
displacement of thousands of poor households is likely to have had the opposite effect in
destination regions for the migrating households (Fussell et al., 2014).
Although estimates vary, some studies suggest that the number of displaced households
is likely to be substantial (Piguet, 2010). The main reason behind the disagreement between
researchers regarding the quantitative impacts on household migration from climate change
is the fact that household location decisions are complex phenomena likely to be affected
by a range of non-climate related factors. In addition, it might also be the case that some of
these other factors are indirectly affected by climate change, making it difficult to establish
direct causal links between climate change and migration. Empirical studies typically seek
to estimate one of the following two hypotheses: (i) to what extent do households migrate
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following changes in economic conditions due to climate change; (ii) to what extent do
households respond directly to climate or safety as a consumption amenity. In the latter
case it is assumed that changes in climate or (perceived) hazard reduces the attractiveness
of a location for households.
One example of a study investigating the first hypothesis is Feng et al. (2010, 2012) who
examine linkages between climate variability, crop yields and migration among households
in Mexico. The authors use an instrumental variable model to estimate the semi-elasticity
of migration with respect to crop yields. Their results suggest that a 10% decline in yield
results in a 1.7% decrease in population as a consequence of migration.
Examples of studies investigating the latter hypothesis can be found in the voluminous
hedonic pricing literature (Atreya et al., 2013; Bin et al., 2008; Bin and Landry, 2013; Bin
and Polasky, 2004; Daniel et al., 2009b; MacDonald et al., 1987; Shultz and Fridgen, 2001;
Speyrer and Ragas, 1991). These studies typically investigate whether disasters such as
floods lead to house price disparities between risky and non-risky locations. This literature
consistently finds that disasters have the effect of reducing the attractiveness of risky loca-
tions for prospective house buyers. Such housing price differentials suggest that disasters
lead households to update risk judgements in the aftermath of an event. A disaster thus
works as a focusing event, whereby risk judgements among households are triggered by the
experiences. In a meta-analysis of the hedonic-pricing literature, Daniel et al. (2009a) find
that a 1 percentage point increase in the yearly probability of flooding is associated with, on
average, a 0.6 percent decrease in housing prices. Similar impacts of flood events on risk
perceptions have been observed by empirical studies using survey data (for a review see,
e.g., Kellens et al. (2013)).
Marchiori et al. (2012) attempt to jointly estimate responses to climate that incorporate
changes in economic conditions and changes in amenities. Using country-level panel data,
the authors investigate the link between weather anomalies and migration in sub-Saharan
Africa. Weather impacts migration both directly and indirectly through an interaction with
the agricultural sector. The authors find evidence suggesting that both changes in economic
conditions as well as changes in amenities had an effect on migration. They hypothesise
that the amenity effect is related to health concerns or risk judgements.
However, a simple relationship between risk judgements and migration cannot be as-
sumed (Hunter, 2005). A voluminous literature suggests that households, when faced with
low probability high impact events, such as disasters, make decisions which deviate from
what is considered rational (Barberis, 2012; Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989). The sep-
aration of objective risk from individual risk judgements is one key insight of Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Prospect The-
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ory suggests that people see outcomes in terms of gains or losses, attaching subjective
weights to gains and losses. Probability weighting occurs over ranks of probabilities, not
over untransformed probabilities. The implication of that weighting procedure is that low-
probability/high-impact risk are overweighted and high probability/low-impact risk are un-
derweighted (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989). Tversky and Kahneman (1973) do, however,
suggest that people are likely to overestimate risks with which they have some familiarity
and ignore risks that are unfamiliar. Translating availability heuristic to the case of flooding,
households will ignore flood risk until a flood actually happens, after which they will attach
a disproportional weight to the likelihood of a new flood.
Furthermore, predicting and assessing public reactions to events are complicated by the
fact that collective risk judgements bear signs of being self organising processes. The Social
Amplification of Risk Framework suggests that collective risk judgements are amplified as
(possibly biased) opinions of individual agents flow from one individual to another (Kasper-
son et al., 1988). This theoretical framework emphasises that (i) opinions of individual
agents are affected by opinions of other agents in their social network; (ii) individual level
risk judgements are often polarised, with high and low judgements of the same hazard co-
existing in the same population. Empirical evidence supports the existence of ”bandwagon
effects”, where events – even non-disastrous ones – results in major public concern as a
lack of information leads to repetition and distortion of opinions through media and social
networks. Amplification effects are likely to become ever more important with the ongo-
ing growth of mass media and communication technologies. The perceived risk associated
with residing in one specific location can have an impact on households’ location decisions.
As such, in a context of increasing risk household location decisions could potentially be
affected by this type of amplification effects.
3.3 Economic disaster impact modelling: current practice
This section provides a short review of the most commonly applied models in disaster im-
pact analysis, namely IO models and CGE models. Although these models are based on
rather different assumptions, the connection with data and the relatively simple structure of
both IO and CGE models make both models useful for disaster impact analysis.
3.3.1 Input-Output models
Standard Input-Output (IO) models are static linear models which describe the economy
through sets of interrelationships between sectors themselves (the producers) and others (the
consumers). These interrelationships between sectors are driven by intermediate demand
and come as a result of fixed production technology in each sector. The intermediate demand
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is determined by the final demand. The exogenous final demand consists of the demand for
consumption of goods from households, governments and exports and investments. Due
to these characteristics, IO models have been employed in analyses of how the effects of a
disaster ripple through the economy (see e.g., Hallegatte, 2008; Okuyama, 2004; Steenge
and Bocˇkarjova, 2007). Their simple representation of the economy makes them relatively
easy to combine with models which contain a more detailed description of, for instance,
the water-cycle (hydraulic models) (Rose, 2004). Examples of these coupled models are
Jonkman et al. (2008) and Koks et al. (2014). Standard IO models, however, are assumed
to yield high losses mainly due to the assumption of fixed prices and lack of substitution
possibilities within the production system.
The assumption of fixed production technology in traditional IO models means that these
models neglect eventual changes on the supply-side: the production form (i.e. technology)
in different sectors is assumed to remain unchanged after the disaster strikes. Furthermore,
producers and final consumers are restricted in importing inputs and consumption goods
among non-affected suppliers (Hallegatte, 2008). Omission of such mechanisms would
serve as to inflate disaster-costs. To overcome some of these issues in traditional IO frame-
works, several hybrid models have been developed. Such hybrid models still retain the
simplicity of IO models, while providing more flexibility as available in CGE modelling.
An example of a hybrid model is the Adaptive Regional Input-Output (ARIO) model, de-
veloped by Hallegatte (2008).
As argued before, an inherent weakness of standard IO models and current IO disaster
impact models is the exogenous and rather simplistic behavior of households (captured in
the final demand). In the long history of IO modeling, such issues have been (partly) tackled
by developing extended IO models. Some of these extensions have focused on migration.
For instance, Beyers (1980) integrated a multiregional IO model with a demographic model
to capture the combined effects of employment, income levels and migration. Another
example is the study by Sastry (1992) who quantified, in more detail, the effect of (elderly)
migration on income, employment and earning levels for a single-region economy. An
interesting recent example is the development of a spatial regional econometric input-output
model (REIM), developed by Kim and Hewings (2012). By integrating a more bottom-up
approach into an IO, the authors are able to carry out a detailed analysis of the population
behavior in specific regions. This bottom-up approach can show, in more detail, the specific
effects of local changes on a macroeconomic level, such as migration or changes in land-use
policies.
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3.3.2 Computable General Equilibrium models
CGE models describe the macroeconomy as a circular flow of goods and services between
sectors. In these models, representative households and firms choose their demand and
supply following constrained optimisation problems, taking prices as given. Prices are de-
termined by market equilibrium conditions. CGE models are therefore driven by changes
in relative prices, rather than solely by changes in the quantities of goods (as IO models
are). Hallegatte (2008) argues that the latter approach makes IO models superior to CGE
models in the disaster-context, while Rose and Guha (2004) are of the opposite opinion: rel-
ative price effects add economic details and relax the assumption of linearity in substitution
possibilities. This allows for incorporating input/import substitution, non-infinite supply-
elasticities and more realistic behavioural content and working of both factor and product
markets (Rose, 2004). As mentioned, CGE models are considered to yield "optimistic" re-
sults in terms of disaster losses – especially compared to IO models (Okuyama and Santos,
2014). This is partly a result of the inherent adaptation in the models, achieved through
factor substitution, and partly a result of the assumption that prices work in such a way as
to balance demand and supply and to create incentives for production of the most needed
goods and services (Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010). Another reason is that CGE models do
not treat all causal relationships as unidirectional. For example, price and output changes
would work in a way as to offset each other, where lower output raises the price thereby
curtailing demand.
CGE models have been extended and further developed as well, to make them more
suitable for the modelling of disasters. For instance, Rose and Liao (2005) have developed
a CGE model, where they recalibrate the production function to account for resilience -
both static and dynamic. The former type of resilience is incorporated in the specification
of the production functions for individual industries, while dynamic resilience is modelled
through changes to parameters. In order to make the model mimic the real world, parameters
are calibrated using survey-data. Also, a disaster may require additional constraints in the
economy, particularly in the short run. For example, there might well be restrictions on the
movement of capital and labour in the aftermath of a crisis. Tsuchiya et al. (2007) develop
a Spatial CGE model to assess the economic impacts of infrastructure disruption. In spatial
CGE models the distance between agents in the economy is explicitly incorporated as a
dimension. In order to incorporate additional constraints, the authors simulate the impact
of certain links of the transportation network becoming disconnected. In the model this
results in higher transportation costs on the affected links, again leading to a new post-
disaster equilibrium. Thus, this allows for a calculation of a new short-run equilibrium
when capital and labour inputs are restricted on certain links, which again can be used to
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establish political priorities regarding which links to be strengthened (Tsuchiya et al., 2007).
Some studies have focused specifically on economic impacts from changes in demand
in the aftermath of disasters. Rose and Oladosu (2008) explicitly model the impact of dis-
asters on households’ demand for goods and analyse the feedback effects on the economy.
In another promising attempt of adding more details to the demand-side, Giesecke et al.
(2012) use survey data on stigmatised asset values to obtain detailed information changes
in risk perception in case of a terrorist attack using biological weapons in Los Angeles.
Information about reductions in demand for goods produced in Los Angeles is fed into a
CGE model used to assess the macroeconomic consequences of such an attack. The authors
find that behavioural effects (households may require higher wages, investors may require
higher returns, and customers may require price discounts) lead to production losses up to
14 times the size of ordinary production losses. Several attempts have also been made at
modelling household decisions under risk and uncertainty (e.g., Pratt et al., 2013). In these
models household decisions under uncertainty is usually represented as mimicking actuarial
calculations of risk.
Scholars within regional economics have developed CGE models to capture migration
effects as well. Examples of such models are the RELU-TRAN (Anas and Liu, 2007),
RAEM (Ivanova et al., 2007; Thissen, 2005) and RHOMOLO (Brandsma et al., 2014) (see
Partridge (2010) and Giesecke and Madden (2013) for reviews of regional CGEs). Regional
CGEs are mainly being used to capture the regional effects of specific (national) government
policies. Migration in particular is one of many drivers that is being considered and is mainly
determined by spatial differences in wages. Many of these models also include more than
one household type, where the households’ optimisation problem differs depending on for
example whether the household is employed (e.g., Anas and Liu, 2007).
3.3.3 Limitations of IO and CGE models in disaster impact analysis
Recurring insider critiques include concerns regarding data quality, as well as questions re-
lated to technical limitations and interpretations of results (Albala-Bertrand, 2013; Okuyama
and Santos, 2014). Additionally, one major challenge with these models is the calibration of
used parameters, as data is scarce and often of poor quality. Sensitivity analyses have shown
that results are often highly dependent on certain parameter values, in particular those gov-
erning speed of reconstruction and adaptation characteristics (Koks et al., 2014). Problems
with data availability often limit the level of detail in the analysis.
A common outsider critique against equilibrium-type of models regards the use of rep-
resentative agents (Colander et al., 2008; Kirman, 1992). In CGE models optimisation prob-
lems are stated for and solved by one agent assumed to be representative for a whole pop-
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ulation or groups of the population. One important reason behind the popularity of the
representative agent approach is that the use of this approach renders the mode tractable and
solveable. Modern CGE models are likely far to complex to be solved for millions of het-
erogeneous interacting agents. However, the representative agent approach imposes rather
strong, and in some contexts unrealistic, assumptions on individual behaviour.
It is, for example, implicitly assumed that agent have access to all information relevant to
their optimisation problem. This assumption entails that information such as the probability
distribution of disasters is known by agents. As mentioned above, the context of disaster
risk is characterised by lack of information or behavioural biases in the interpretation of
information. Individual risk judgements may well be shaped by the exchange of information
between individuals. By determining representative group of agents CGE models effectively
rule out interaction between members within one group, and thereby the potential effect of
interactions on aggregate variables.
A related critique regards the limited description of the dynamic process of reaching
equilibrium (Hallegatte and Ghil, 2008). IO or CGE models assume a set of equilibrium
prices: in IO models prices are fixed while in CGE models it is implicitly assumed that
equilibrium prices are reached through tatonnement between sellers and buyers. However,
some researchers suggest that the set of prices obtained by CGE models represents just one
of many possible sets of prices (Gintis, 2007). Discarding the assumption of representative
agents, it is likely that partly private information and behavioural rules which includes copy-
ing and imitation can give rise to a wide range of equilibrium outcomes. As such, even if
economic fundamentals and preferences remain unaltered after an event, beliefs and inter-
action effects could be a source of multiple equilibria (Dosi, 1990; Dosi and Egidi, 1991).
This is particularly important in the context of natural disasters: the likely impact of indi-
vidual beliefs and interaction effects on migration decisions could result in a number several
candidate equilibria besides the equilibrium obtained in an IO or CGE model.
3.4 Agent-based modelling of household migration under
risk and uncertainty
Above we argued that households’ location decisions are likely to be affected by individual
risk judgments and public concern. Although several IO and CGE models incorporate en-
dogenous labour migration, they suffer from limitations in capturing elements which bear
signs of self-organising processes. We suggest that some of the limitations of IO and CGEs
can be addressed by incorporating elements from ABMs in IO and CGE models.
ABMs are increasingly promoted as an alternative to more traditional economic tools.
These models can be used to simulate dynamic real world processes for which empirical
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studies are hampered by lack of data or difficulties in obtaining reliable parameter estimates
(An, 2012). ABMs relax assumptions regarding representative non-interacting agents and
optimisation behaviour. In this type of models the economy is conceptualised as a complex
system, characterised by (i) interacting agents and (ii) emergent properties, meaning that
properties of the system arise from interactions rather than being properties of the agents
themselves (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). ABMS have been applied in a wide range of re-
search areas, including land markets (Filatova et al., 2009b), financial markets (Gallegati
et al., 2003), housing markets (Geanakoplos et al., 2012) and evaluation of flood protection
measures (Brouwers and Boman, 2011; O’Connell and O’Donnell, 2013; Sobiech, 2013).
One of the most influential agent-based models used to investigate household migra-
tion is Schelling’s neighbourhood segregation model, also called the ‘checkerboard-model‘
(Schelling, 1969, 1978). This model shows how complete segregation into black and white
neighbourhoods is possible even if such an outcome is not in line with individual people’s
preferences. The checkerboard model includes two types of agents. Agents are distributed
on a square lattice, with some squares left unoccupied. Agents have a preference for the
share of agents of the same type as themselves in their immediate neighbourhood. In each
time-step of the model each agent is allowed to move to an unoccupied square. The model
ends when all agents are located such that they have no incentive to move elsewhere. Some-
what surprisingly, complete segregation is the outcome even when agents have only slight
preferences for living in a neighbourhood consisting of agents of the same type. When one
agent decides a move, the composition of agents in a neighbourhood is affected, in turn
leading other agents to move. As such, a relatively small change, i.e. the move of one agent,
sets off bandwagon effects leading to neighbourhood level changes.
A number of authors has investigated household migration in the context of climate
change using ABMs (Cai and Oppenheimer, 2013; Kniveton et al., 2012; Smith, 2014).
Kniveton et al. (2012) develop a model to explore how climate and demographic change
combine to influence migration to and from Burkina Faso. The main goal of the authors is
to identify the relative contribution of a range of factors potentially affecting migration de-
cisions. Migration flows are governed by an agent-specific probability of migration between
two regions, determined by personal attributes and rainfall variability. Rainfall variability
is used as a proxy for all types of climatic influences on migration. An agent’s attitude
towards migration is also affected by networked peers: an agent’s probability of migration
is adjusted for the proportion of linked agents who have already migrated. Simulation ex-
ercises illustrate how migration increases in drier conditions. However, migration occurs
through a complex chain of causalities between rainfall, population growth and social net-
works. The isolated impact of climate factors remains non-significant.
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In Kniveton et al. (2012) risk judgment and the formation of public concern is assumed
to play a role for migration behaviour but it is not modelled explicitly. The dynamics of the
formation of collective opinions have been studied in a literature using stylised mathematical
simulations models (Castellano et al., 2009; Deffuant et al., 2002, 2000; Hegselmann and
Krause, 2002; Quattrociocchi et al., 2014; Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd, 2000; Weisbuch et al.,
2002). Moussaïd (2013), for instance, develops an ABM of opinion dynamics addressing
how the collective opinion of risk such as attitude towards climate change is formed through
exchanges of individual risk judgements. In this model, agents are initially exposed to
the same information through mass media, but agents differ in terms of the probability to
search for new information. Individual opinions are, in each time-step of the model, updated
with a weighted opinion of a randomly chosen neighbour in a social network. Numerical
simulations reveal the key role of social interactions: if the social interactions are low there
is little updating and few alterations to the initial distribution of opinions. When social
interactions increase, there is an emerging correlation of opinions between neighbours on
the social network. For very high levels of social interactions a consensus regarding risk
emerges. Acemoglu et al. (2013) use an opinion dynamics model to analyse the impact on
risk judgements from the presence of extremist opinions. Extremists are conceptualised as
agents holding extreme opinions who do not change their opinion through the interaction
with other agents. The combination of a large share of extremists and a high degree of
connectivity between agents in a population can have the effect of pushing up the consensus
risk judgment. As such, exchanges of risk opinions can be a source of multiple equilibria.
Although promising steps have been taken regarding modelling more realistic final de-
mand in IO models and in incorporating data on individual responses to disasters, few stud-
ies have carried out disaster impact analysis using an IO or CGE model combined with an
ABM. The literature on combining top-down/bottom-up models provides some suggestions
on how IO and CGE models could be connected with ABMs (Böhringer and Rutherford,
2008; Hourcade et al., 2006).
One option — soft linking — entails connecting independently developed IO or CGE
models and ABMs. For example, the reduction in housing stock due to a flood (output from
CGE or IO model) could provide inputs to an ABM where housing choices are influenced by
network effects. The ABM subsequently determines aggregate demand for housing which
is used as an input in the CGE or IO model. This approach can potentially result in problems
related to overall coherence due to differences in behavioural assumptions and accounting
principles across the models. A second option is to focus on one model type, for example
the IO or CGE, and let parameters in this model be determined by a reduced form version
of the ABM. A third approach — hard linking, or a complete integration — could be by
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accomplished by solving the combined CGE and IO as a mixed complimentarity problem.
In this approach, outputs from the ABM would have to be part of the solution algorithm in
the IO or CGE. This is likely to be a challenging option, potentially leading to difficulties
with convergence in the IO or CGE.
One approach — hard linking, or a complete integration — emphasises the overall eco-
nomic consistency and makes use of a single integrated modelling framework. In such a
formulation outputs from the ABM would have to part of the solution algorithm in the IO or
CGE. Böhringer and Rutherford (2008) suggests that hard linking bottom-up and top-down
models could be accomplished by solving the combined CGE and IO as a mixed comple-
mentarity problem. The mixed complementarity approach, frequently used to solve CGE
models, entails establishing a system of weak inequalities and complementarity between
decision variables and market equilibrium. Böhringer and Rutherford (2008) shows how
bottom-up and top-down models can be solved iteratively: in order to solve the top-down
economic equilibrium model, complementarity methods are used, while quadratic program-
ming is applied to solve the bottom-up model. One possibility in this case would be to let
agent’s decisions to buy a be governed by an ABM rich enough in detail of housing mar-
ket decisions to include risk judgements. Wages and prices for goods and services, both
determinant of a household consumption budget which is a key factor in housing market
decisions, could be determined in a CGE model.
Hard linking is likely to be a challenging option, potentially leading to difficulties with
convergence in the IO or CGE. To the best of our knowledge, the literature of disaster
impact analysis contains no examples of studies attempting to hard link IO or CGEs with
ABMs. A second option — soft linking — entails connecting independently developed IO
or CGE models and ABMs through somewhat more limited data exchange between the two
models. For example, the aggregate demand for housing in a CGE or IO model could be
determined within an ABM of the housing market. Differences in behavioural assumptions
and accounting principles across the models can potentially result in problems related with
overall coherence.
An example of a combined soft-linked model is found in Chapter 7 in this thesis, where
we use an ABM of opinion dynamics to analyse the impact of public concern on disaster
losses predicted by a Spatial CGE model. Increasing public concern reduces the utility flow
from amenities in the disaster struck region, making this region less attractive as a place of
residence. Output from the ABM enters household location decisions which are modelled in
the recursive dynamics structure of the CGE. As such, the ABM helps determining house-
hold relocations in-between time periods in the CGE. The public concern generated by the
disaster and the ensuing relocation reduces labour supply in the disaster affected areas and
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exacerbates macroecomic losses from the disasters.
A key message from the model exercise in Chapter7 is that individual uncertainty and
interaction effects leading to amplification of public concern, have substantial quantitative
impacts on modelled disaster losses. In fact, for one specific level of capital destruction,
there are several possible equilibrium labour supply responses and consequently multiple
equilibria in modelled disaster losses. Combined CGE-ABM can therefore allow for an
investigation of how individual uncertainty and interactions can lead to predicted multiple
equilibra in disaster losses.
Despite the attractive features of combined macroeconomic models and ABMs, there are
also substantial challenges in developing and employing such models. A first challenge con-
cerns the technical implementation of the integration or of the data exchange. As mentioned
above, the rich literature on combining top-down and bottom-up models provide sugges-
tions on how to overcome the technical challenges. A second, related, challenge is ensuring
the overall consistency of the combined model. Differences in aggregation levels, in units
of measurement or in time-scale between the models may result in difficulties when using
outputs from the ABM as inputs to the macroeconomic model. A third challenge, particu-
larly relevant for hard linked models, is that a macroeconomic model will be unsolveable
unless there are bounds on the outcomes of the ABM. The use of the combined model may
therefore rule out a number of potentially plausible outcomes of the ABM.
3.5 Conclusions and future research challenges
The likely future increases in disaster risk have recently gained a great deal of attention
in research and policy. Quantitative estimates of disaster impacts provide useful inputs for
policy makers involved in developing responses to the threat posed by increasing risk. One
important side-effect of disaster risk is household migration — essentially a form of adaptive
behaviour on the household side. Large changes in the spatial distribution of labour supply
as well as in the demand for goods and services are likely to be an important determinant
of estimated disaster losses. Household migration are therefore an important component in
models used for disaster impact analysis.
In this article we have discussed some of the limitations of these models in represent-
ing household migration under disaster risk. More specifically, individual risk judgments
and public concern are likely formed and shaped through interactions between individual
agents with heteroegenous beliefs. Such interaction effects could possibly lead to multiple
equilibria which are not easily captured within IO and CGE models. We suggest that these
limitations could potentially be addressed by combining IO and CGE models with elements
from ABMs.
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Throughout the chapter we have sought to highlight the relative strengths of both types.
IO models offer simplicity and transparency, yet their high level of details on sectoral and
regional interlinkages make this model type powerful tools in disaster impact analysis. Rel-
ative to IO models, CGE models add more detail regarding the economic behaviour of
agents, including reactions to price changes. Although IO and CGE models are based on
rather different assumptions and are often seen as competing modelling traditions, they are
highly complementary in disaster impact analysis. Researchers are also exploring the added
value of carrying out joint analyses with IO and CGE models (e.g. Hu et al., 2014). For all
these reasons, it is expected that IO and CGE models are likely to remain among the most
important tools used for disaster impact analysis at least in the near future.
In addition, ABMs developed for studying microeconomic phenomena such as the im-
pact of flood risk on migration decisions tend to suffer from shortcomings in accounting for
price distortions, economy-wide interactions and income effects (Böhringer and Rutherford,
2008). Some authors argue for abandoning the macroeconomic models currently in use, in-
cluding IO and CGE models, in favour of fully-fledged macroeconomic ABMs (Farmer and
Foley, 2009). However, although ABMs are highly informative in exploring phenomena
such as multiple equilibria or out-of equilibrium dynamics, it is likely that macroeconomic
ABMs require introducing a large number of restrictions to reach stability (Mandel, 2012).
Most importantly, macroeconomic ABMs developed so far remain too ad hoc to be used
for concrete policy advice (Colander et al., 2008). Finally, the introduction of additional
assumptions and extra layers of complexity can render ABMs vulnerable to black box criti-
cism, where only a small number of practitioners will be able to use the models in a mean-
ingful way. In comparison, the usage of tractable models such as IO and CGEs entails a less
steep learning curve. Instead of discarding the models currently in use we suggest a step-
wise improvement: by combining the existing models with ABMs, the rigorous structure of
IO and CGE models set limits on outcomes from the ABM, while the ABM adds realistic
behavioural features to the IO and CGEs.
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Part II
Flood risk and expectations: housing
market dynamics and impacts on
mobility

Chapter 4
Flood protection and endogenous sorting
of households: the role of credit
constraints
Migration is increasingly seen as a promising climate change adaptation and
flood risk reduction strategy. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how
spatial differences in flood risk, due to differences in flood protection, reduce
the mobility of vulnerable households through a credit constraint mechanism.
Using an equilibrium model with two household types and endogenous sort-
ing, we show how spatial differences in flood protection lead to clustering of
vulnerable households in risky regions.
4.1 Introduction
Economic development and rapid urbanisation in coastal regions has led to a sharp increase
in the concentration of the world population living in flood-prone areas. Many of these ar-
eas are populated by a disproportionate share of vulnerable households. A key challenge for
policy makers is to reconcile economic development goals with adaptation goals such as re-
ducing vulnerability in flood-prone areas. Information about the mechanisms that could lead
to clustering of vulnerable households in flood-prone areas provides valuable information
for the design of adaptation policies.
This chapter is based on Husby, Trond G, Henri LF de Groot, Marjan W Hofkes, and Tatiana Filatova
(2015). "Flood Protection and Endogenous Sorting of Households: the Role of Credit Constraints." Mitigation
and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change (Forthcoming).
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Migration out of harm’s way is increasingly seen as a potentially important climate
change adaptation option (Black et al., 2011a,b; McLeman and Smith, 2006). Climate-
driven migration is already pronounced in developing countries, where individual adaptation
to increasing risks such as severe floods or droughts is often the only option to avoid risks.
Developed countries are usually able to invest in flood protection such as dikes and levees.
However, in developed countries there are still pockets of vulnerable households residing in
risky areas. Moreover, as probabilities and severity of climate-related disasters increase, the
necessity to activate private adaptation decisions in developed countries grows. A challenge
for the design of adaptation policies aimed at stimulating mobility is that household mobility
is affected by a range of factors, including the access to mortgage credit. In this chapter we
show how spatial differences in flood protection can trigger a credit constraint on vulnerable
households, leading to clustering of such households in risky regions.
Flood protection is often considered a public good (Fankhauser et al., 1999). The lit-
erature on endogenous Tiebout-sorting suggests that spatial differences in the supply of
public goods lead people to vote with their feet, moving to areas that offer a supply in
line with their preferences (Tiebout, 1956). Low-income households are more likely than
high-income households to trade-off public goods against monetary benefits, leading to an
increased concentration of low-income households in regions with a low supply of public
goods.
As acknowledged by Kuminoff et al. (2010), previous literature has not yet analysed
sorting in a setting of natural disaster risk. Much of the sorting-literature has investigated
cases where the public good is regulation of currently present nuisance such as air pollution
(Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008). One obvious challenge for sorting models in the context of
flood risk is that people react to risks that they see (Hunter, 2005). In the absence of or
a long time after large-scale events, low-probability events such as floods may have little
direct impact on household decision making (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006). If flood risk is
not directly relevant for household preferences, spatial differences in protection will also
not be reflected in housing prices. Exogenous shocks causing spatial differences in housing
prices would be necessary in order to induce a Tiebout-type of migration among households.
However, the possibility of spatially correlated catastrophic losses means that financial
institutions, such as insurance companies and banks, are likely to take flood risk into account
(Barnett et al., 2008). Credit providers may wish to shield themselves from covariate risk by
raising collateral requirements for mortgages in areas where protection is low. Households
who need to take up a mortgage are therefore indirectly affected by flood protection through
the credit market. A strand of literature within macroeconomics focuses on how the presence
of credit constraints leads to spatial lock-in of households via a housing market mechanism
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(Ferreira et al., 2010, 2012; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; Quigley, 2002). It is precisely this
type of mechanism that we exploit to induce the exogenous impulse leading to Tiebout-
sorting.
In this chapter we combine the insights from the Tiebout-literature and the macroeco-
nomic literature mentioned above to investigate how spatially differentiated flood protection
leads to endogenous sorting of households. Using a general equilibrium model with credit
constraints and endogenous sorting we illustrate how spatial differences in protection lead
to clustering of vulnerable households in risky regions. Households in our model choose to
locate in the region that offers their preferred combination of economic benefits and disad-
vantages. The model distinguishes two household types — one which depends on obtaining
a mortgage for moving (vulnerable) and one which does not (resilient). In our model, credit
lenders do not raise collateral requirements. Instead, the collateral value of a unit of housing
is reduced following property valuations carried out by a fictitious real estate agent. These
property valuations reflect the probability and housing price impact of a flood. The latter is
modelled according to the time-decay function from the hedonic pricing study by Bin and
Landry (2013).
The aim of this chapter is to show how clustering of vulnerable households in risky re-
gions can occur, in a real world setting of common United States (US) flood zones. We find
clustering effects of some size for flood zones with return periods of less than 30 years. If
we assume an average mortgage amortisation period of 30 years, our results suggest that
clustering occurs if credit markets can reasonably expect a mortgage holder to have ex-
perienced a flood before his or her debt is repaid. It is argued that flood risk reduction
strategies should involve soft measures providing stimuli for individual vulnerability reduc-
tions (Filatova et al., 2013). Our model provides a connection between housing finance
and vulnerability, highlighting the importance of access to mortgage credit for individual
vulnerability reductions.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a brief overview of the relevant
literature, while section 4.3 presents and discusses the model. Section 4.4 presents the
results, and Section 4.5 discusses the results and draws conclusions.
4.2 Literature review
Due to the spatial variation of flood risk and protected economic interests, cost-benefit anal-
ysis is increasingly used to inform decisions on flood risk reductions. In order to determine
the marginal benefits from protection, economists often try to estimate welfare effects such
as willingness to pay for protection. Estimating willingness to pay is complicated by the fact
that household demand for public goods such as flood protection is unobservable. To over-
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come this difficulty, researchers have tried to reveal households’ willingness to pay through
their behaviour on the housing market. A number of studies have applied hedonic pricing
techniques to analyse the impact of flood risk on housing prices (Atreya et al., 2013; Bin
et al., 2008; Bin and Landry, 2013; Bin and Polasky, 2004; Daniel et al., 2009b; MacDon-
ald et al., 1987; Shultz and Fridgen, 2001; Speyrer and Ragas, 1991). In a meta-analysis
of this literature Daniel et al. (2009a) find that a 1 percentage point increase in the yearly
probability of flooding is associated with a 0.6 % decrease in housing prices.
One drawback of the hedonic pricing approach is that it, by design, depicts a static one-
way causal relationship. Charles Tiebout suggested that spatial differences in the supply of
public goods could lead people to vote with their feet, moving to areas offering a supply of
public goods in line with their preferences (Tiebout, 1956). A growing literature of Tiebout-
sorting analyses endogeneity effects between the supply of public goods and private decision
making (Epple et al., 2010; Kuminoff and Pope, 2012; Kuminoff et al., 2010; Sieg et al.,
2004). Several authors suggest that interactions between protection and private decision
making are important in a flood context as well (Hallegatte, 2011, 2012; Kousky et al.,
2006). A core element of equilibrium sorting models is how the local supply of public
goods leads households to vote with their feet. Migration is driven by the implicit price
for public goods, manifested in housing prices, wages or local taxes.1 Depro et al. (2012)
provide evidence of concentration of minorities and low-income households in areas with a
high concentration of nuisance. In making a trade-off between lower air quality and more
housing services, these households are more likely to take on more air pollution in exchange
for a larger house. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) connect the hedonic-pricing and the Tiebout-
literature: if demand for public goods increases with income, lower income households will
locate in more risky areas where housing prices are lower. A concentration of low-income
households in regions with a low supply of public goods results from a tendency among
low-income households to trade off public goods for lower housing costs to a larger degree
than high-income households.
Some researchers argue that the decline in housing prices not only works as an attrac-
tor, but that it also reduces household mobility (Ferreira et al., 2010, 2012; Quigley, 2002):
a decline in housing prices reduces housing wealth which again reduces household mo-
bility. A macroeconomic literature investigates the interconnection between credit con-
straints and household mobility, often focusing on the so-called negative equity problem
(The Economist, 2010). Chan (2001) finds strong evidence of spatial lock-in due to falling
housing prices. Ferreira et al. (2010) and Ferreira et al. (2012) find that negative equity as
1See Kuminoff et al. (2010) for a recent review of equilibrium models. For a review of sorting models
based on hedonic pricing, see van Duijn and Rouwendal (2012).
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well as higher mortgage service costs have a large impact on household mobility. Several
studies have investigated the labour-market effects of falling housing prices using structural
models (Haavio and Kauppi, 2000; Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; Nenov,
2012; Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2006). The general equilibrium properties of such mod-
els allow for investigating feedback effects between falling housing prices and the rest of
the economy. Sterk (2010) develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)-
model, where households face difficulties in moving to a new house as housing prices start
to fall. Declining housing prices reduce the collateral value of housing, limiting the pos-
sibilities of obtaining a new mortgage. The model predicts that households subject to a
debt-constraint suffer a larger reduction in mobility than households who do not rely on a
mortgage to finance a move.
4.3 The model
For our analysis we develop a two-region version of the general equilibrium model from
Sterk (2010). The model is defined for two representative households f , consisting of a
continuum of members, in t time periods. We differentiate between a safe and risky region,
i.e. i = safe, risky. Similar to Sterk (2010), we distinguish between two household types —
one type that depends on obtaining a mortgage for financing a move (vulnerable households)
and one type that does not (resilient households), i.e f = vulnerable(vul), resilient(re). As
mentioned in the Introduction, it is plausible that, in the absence of an event, flood risk
has limited direct impacts on households’ decision making. However, demand for housing
in risky areas may still be affected if flood risk impacts credit markets. In our version of
the model we separate (endogenous) equilibrium housing prices from (exogenous) property
valuations carried out by a fictitious real estate agent. The valuation of risk by credit markets
are incorporated in the model through the real estate agent. Property valuations determine
the collateral value of a housing unit while equilibrium housing prices affect the demand
for housing. Property valuations are therefore only directly relevant for the mobility of
vulnerable households.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the agents in a specific region interact through the labour and
housing markets. Each region is populated by two representative households and one firm
owned by the resilient households. Equilibrium housing prices are determined by equating
the (fixed) supply of housing with the aggregate demand. The labour market is modelled
according to the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model where firms post vacancies accord-
ing to profit maximisation and employment is determined by matches between unemployed
workers and firms. Long distance job offers can only be accepted if a household moves. A
decrease in mobility leads to a rise in unemployment, as households are less likely to move
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to accept jobs elsewhere.
Figure 4.1 Within-region labour and housing market interactions.
Figure 4.2 illustrates how changes in mobility affect equilibrium utility and the migration
decision of the two households. A households’ location decision is modelled as a two-step
process, similar in spirit to the push-pull theories of migration (Lee, 1966; Massey et al.,
1993). In a first step households evaluate utility at their current location, taking moving
costs into account (the mobility decision). This step determines households’ mobility rate.
Both aggregate as well as individual factors related to moving away from the current location
are taken into account. The first step thus captures the push aspect of migration. In a second
step households compare utility levels across regions (the migration decision). This step
corresponds to the pull-aspect of migration, where the attractiveness of different locations is
being compared. Vulnerable households depend on obtaining a mortgage to finance a move.
Their mobility is therefore tied to the property valuations. Lower property valuations reduce
the demand for housing units, leading to a decrease in utility.
Furthermore, lower mobility affects the utility of vulnerable households via two addi-
tional channels: it increases the rejection rate of long distance job offers and it reduces ex-
pected moving costs. The first channel leads to a decrease in utility, while the latter channel
leads to an increase in utility. The mobility of resilient households is not directly influenced
by the property valuations as the debt constraint is never binding for this household type.
These households are, however, indirectly affected by property valuations through the hous-
ing market. The ceteris paribus effect of a reduction in housing demand among vulnerable
households implies an increased availability of housing and a decline in the equilibrium
housing price. Lower housing prices induce resilient households to purchase the housing
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Figure 4.2 An illustration of how mobility and migration are determined for both household
types.
units sold by the vulnerable households. The possibility of increased consumption of hous-
ing is associated with higher levels of utility, while higher unemployment leads to lower
levels of utility.
4.3.1 Credit markets and flood risk: the real estate agent
Flood risk is incorporated in the model through the property valuations at time t in region
i, pvt,i, carried out by a real estate agent. The property valuations reflect the concern of
credit markets that housing prices can, with a certain probability, deviate from their steady
state value due to a flood. In the risky region we assume, in each time-period, a fixed
probability of flooding, while the probability of flooding in the safe region is always zero.
The real estate agent evaluates the probability of one flood occurring in time-period t = 1.
Property valuations are carried out in t = 0 and are not updated with new housing market
information. The real estate agent possesses information about the probability of a flood
and about the impact on housing prices, should a flood occur. The probability of flooding is
derived from the yearly probability according to return periods of common U.S. flood zones,
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while impacts from a flood on housing prices are modelled according to the ratio-model in
Bin and Landry (2013). This means that pvt,i takes on a value lower than the steady-state
housing price pss immediately after t = 0, converging towards pss over time. The decline
in housing prices from a flood is modelled according to the time-decay function in Bin
and Landry (2013). Following a standard expected utility formulation, we assume that the
expected housing price in time t+1 is a weighted average of housing prices in case of flood
and in the case of no flood. The weights used, Prrpi represent the probability of flooding
during t for various return periods.
Assuming that property valuations are based on the steady-state housing price pss, the
expected housing price is equal to the steady-state housing price if no flood occurs. Conse-
quently, for the safe region we have:
pvt,sa f e = pss (4.1)
Furthermore we assume a price differential of ∆−t in case of a flood. Consequently for the
risky region we have:
pvt,risky = (1−Prrprisky)pss+Prrprisky pss(1+∆−t ) (4.2)
= pss[1+Prrprisky∆
−
t ]
A number of recent hedonic pricing studies have investigated how the housing price effect
of a flood decays over time (Atreya et al., 2013; Bin and Landry, 2013). Bin and Landry
(2013) found a price differential between 6 and 20 %, which essentially disappears after 5-6
years. In order to obtain a pvt,i similar to the ratio-model depicted in Bin and Landry (2013,
Figure 2), we specify a functional form for ∆−t which decays at a decreasing rate
∆−t =
−Θ
t
γ3 (4.3)
where γ3 is the coefficient for the ratio specification in Bin and Landry (2013, Equation (3)).
Θ is set such that the difference between the pvt,i and the steady-state housing price falls
within the range of the estimates from Bin and Landry (2013). Figure 4.3 plots pvt,i. We see
that its shape corresponds well with the graph in Bin and Landry (2013, Figure 2). In time
period t = 1, pvt,i is, depending on the return-period, between 0.1 and 4.5 % lower than the
steady-state housing price.
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Figure 4.3 Property valuations carried out by the real estate agent for different return periods
(pvt,i). The horizontal axis shows time-periods (months) after the property valuation, while
the vertical axis shows percentage difference from steady-state housing prices.
4.3.2 Households: utility and mobility
Let the share of vulnerable households in region i at time t in the economy be denoted by νt,i.
Both households receive utility from consumption of non-durable goods ct,i, f as well as from
square metres of housing ht,i, f . The fraction of unemployed household members (nu,t,i, f )
receive a utility flow κ f from time spent at home. Households also receive a stochastic
locational utility flow ulo,t,i, f . Households choose ct,i, f , ht,i, f and dt,i, f so as to maximise
utility2:
maxE0
∞
∑
t=0
β tf {lnct,i, f +α f lnht,i, f +κ f nu,t,i, f +ulo,t,i, f } (4.4)
subject to the budget constraint:
ct,i, f + pt,iht,i, f +nm,t,i, f ζ +Rt−1dt−1,i, f
= (1−nu,t,i, f )yt,i, f + pt,iht−1,i, f +dt,i, f (4.5)
2In Appendix 4.B the household maximisation problem is presented in more detail. Appendix 4.C provides
a list of the endogenous variables in the model. Appendix 4.A gives a description of the labour market
dynamics.
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The left-hand side of the budget constraint shows household expenditures. Here pt,i is the
housing price in units of non-durable goods, ζ represents moving costs and nm,t,i, f is the
fraction of moving household members of type f at time t in region i (or, equally, the
mobility rate of household type f ). Rt−1 is the gross interest rate on debt from the previous
period to be repaid in t, dt,i, f is the amount of debt. The right-hand side shows household
income. The employed members (1− nu,t,i, f ) receive labour-income yt,i, f . As in Sterk
(2010), resilient households receive the profits of the firm in addition to labour income,
while vulnerable households only receive labour income. The term pt,iht−1,i, f is the current
resale value of the housing stock from the previous period. Income consequently consists
of labour-income, new debt and the sales value of the existing housing stock. The amount
of debt in each period is restricted by the following constraint:
dt,i, f ≤ nm,t,i, f χ pvt,iht,i, f +(1−nm,t,i, f )dt−1,i, f (4.6)
The debt constraint consists of two terms. The first term is only relevant for household
members who move. For these household members a new mortgage will be limited by
housing wealth, as assessed by the real estate agent (pvt,iht,i, f ), multiplied by the loan-to-
value ratio χ . For household members who do not move the maximum amount of debt
is limited by the existing amount of debt (the second term). The fact that the collateral
requirement applies only to household members who intend to move, reflects that the debt
constraint is really a refinancing constraint.
Households also receive a utility flow from private factors assumed to affect mobility.
Such factors include changes in family composition or changes in the neighbourhood. These
private factors are incorporated in the model through the locational utility flow ulo,t,i, f . In
each period there is a stochastic shock εt,i, f . The parameter is normally distributed with
mean equal to zero and standard deviation σ . In optimum there will be two cut-off levels
for εt,i, f - one for household members with a long-distance job offer, ε¯do,t,i, f and one for
household members without such an offer, ε¯t,i, f . The share of household members with a
long-distance job offer is ndo,t,i, f . Household members that do not move, receive εt,i, f as a
utility flow, while household members that move receive a fixed utility flow ψ f instead. ψ f
is, as in Sterk (2010), treated as a parameter, and can be interpreted as perceived benefits of
moving, before a move has actually taken place.3 The presence of ψ f means that moving is
attractive for members with a relatively low realisation of εt,i, f . If εt,i, f is below the cut-off
3As in Sterk (2010), ψ f actually takes on negative values for both household types, which appears unreal-
istic. However, in the empirical application what truly matters for the household decision is the difference in
distribution between εt,i, f and ψ f .
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level, the household member will move. ulo,t,i, f consequently becomes:
ulo,t,i, f = ndo,t,i, f [ψ f F(ε¯do,t,i, f )+
∫ ∞
ε¯do,t,i, f
εdF(ε)]
+(1−ndo,t,i, f )[ψ f F(ε¯t,i, f )+
∫ ∞
ε¯t,i, f
εdF(ε)] (4.7)
Here F(.) represents the cumulative density function of the shock εt,i, f . F(εdo,t,i, f ) is there-
fore the mobility rate of household members with a long-distance job offer, while F(εt,i, f )
is the mobility rate of household members without such an offer. The mobility rates follow
from the utility flow cut-offs:
nm,t,i, f = ndo,t,i, f F(ε¯do,t,i, f )+(1−ndo,t,i, f )F(ε¯t,i, f ) (4.8)
Declining mobility has two countervailing effects on utility. On the one hand, a decline
in mobility leads more household members to refuse long distance job offers, causing an
increase in unemployment. Increased unemployment leads to a reduction in utility. On the
other hand, lower mobility also entails less expected moving costs, leading to an increase in
disposable income and consumption possibilities.
As mentioned above, the resilient households receive the profits of the firm. Profits
can be increased by posting less vacancies (see Appendix 4.A). Resilient households thus
finance the purchase of housing by posting less vacancies, causing even higher unemploy-
ment in the risky region. This assumption may sound ad hoc, but an increase in unemploy-
ment in risky regions is consistent with the mechanism envisaged by Kousky et al. (2006),
where firms relocate to regions offering higher levels of protection.
4.3.3 The effect of property valuations on equilibrium housing prices
One of the main innovations of our model relative to Sterk (2010) is the separation between
property valuations and equilibrium housing prices. The impact from property valuations
on housing prices can be illustrated in Equation (4.9) which is the first order condition for
housing (for derivation of all first order conditions, see Appendix 4.B).
pt,i
ct,i,g
=
α f
ht,i, f
+β f
pt+1,i
ct+1,i, f
+λcc,t,i, f nm,t,i, f χ pvt,i (4.9)
The right hand side of Equation 4.9 shows the shadow-value of housing which indicates the
utility change due to an incremental change in ht,i, f . The shadow-value consists of three
terms: the direct utility gain from a marginal unit of housing; the utility gain from the dis-
counted resale value of a unit housing; the additional borrowing capacity generated by an
63
Flood protection and endogenous sorting of households
extra unit of housing. λcc,t,i, f in this equation is the Lagrange-multiplier on the debt con-
straint. Since λcc,t,i, f = 0 for resilient households, property valuations are not directly rele-
vant for their optimal choice of housing. Equation 4.9 must be satisfied for both λcc,t,i,re = 0
and λcc,t,i,vul ̸= 0. Housing prices are implicitly determined by the closure of the housing
market in Equation 4.10, where h¯i is the fixed supply of housing:
h¯i = νt,iht,i,vul +(1−νt,i)ht,i,re (4.10)
The effect on equilibrium housing prices from a change in property valutions, ∂ pt,i∂ pvt,i , cannot
be derived analytically, but our simulation results suggest that there is a positive relationship.
4.3.4 Interregional migration
The variable nm,t,i, f is referred to as geographical mobility by Sterk (2010). This variable
is in optimum determined by a households’ ability and incentives to relocate to another re-
gion. In Sterk (2010) there is no actual relocation taking place, meaning that the share of
vulnerable households must remain constant. We extend the model in Sterk (2010) by ex-
plicitly modelling migration flows. This innovation in the model allows us to endogenously
determine the share of vulnerable households in each region.
As a set up for migration decisions we use a a modified version of the Braun Model of
Migration and Growth in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). Population at time t in region i of
household-type f , Popt,i, f , is a stock which grows at the rate γL,t,i, f :
Popt,i, f = Popt−1,i, f (1+ γL,t−1,i, f ) (4.11)
We set initial population to Pop0,i, f = 1. γL,t,i, f is defined in line with Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2003, eq. 9.36), where households compare costs and benefits from moving through
a comparison of the benefits from a move with a world-level of benefits. In Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2003, eq. 9.31), Bt,i, f represents the net benefits from a move while the world-level
of benefits are defined as Bt,world, f = ∑ j Bt, j, f . The growth rate of the population becomes:
γL,t,i, f = ψmig[
Bt,i, f
Bt,world, f
] (4.12)
We define the benefits from moving similarly to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). How-
ever, while they use the net present value of a wage differential to represent benefits from
migration, we use the equilibrium utility, U∗t,i, f , which is determined by plugging in opti-
mised values of the variables in the utility function. In our two-region setup, the world-level
benefits are also not a constant, but determined as the average of the utility in the two re-
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gions. As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), ψmig is a function which satisfies the conditions
ψ ′mig > 0, ψ ′′mig < 0 and ψmig(0) = 0. We therefore have:
γL,t,i, f = ψmig[
U∗t,i, f −U∗t,world, f
U∗t,world, f
] (4.13)
which after some calculations gives
γL,t,i, f = ψmig[
U∗t,i, f −U∗t, j, f
U∗t,i, f +U
∗
t, j, f
] (4.14)
As can be seen from Equation 4.14, population growth in region i will be positive as
long as benefits obtained in that region is larger than that of region j and smaller than zero
if it is smaller. By setting all choice variables equal to their steady-state values, utility will
be equal in both regions, resulting in zero population growth. The two-region setup entails
symmetric migration flows between the regions in the sense that emigration from one region
is immigration in the other. We model ψmig as a sigmoid function to impose such symmetry:
γL,t,i, f = ψmig[
(U∗t,i, f −U∗t, j, f )
U∗t,i, f +U
∗
t, j, f
] = ψmig(Bˆt,i, j, f ) (4.15)
ψmig takes the functional form:
ψmig(Bˆt,i, j, f ) =
1
1+ exp(−ϕmigBˆt,i, j, f )
−0.5 (4.16)
where ϕmig is a parameter used for calibration. This function satisfies the conditions from
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) for Bˆt,i, j, f ≥ 0. For Bˆt,i, j, f < 0 we have ψ ′mig < 0 which
accounts for the symmetry. The share of vulnerable households in each region is therefore:
νt,i =
Popt,i,vul
∑ f Popt,i, f
(4.17)
4.3.5 Welfare effects measured by equivalent variation
To analyse the welfare effects due to the economic changes we use the equivalent variation
(EV), defined as "the gain in income which if experienced without the price falling, would
make the consumer as much better off as he is made by the fall in price without a change in
money income." (Hicks, 1943). In our case, we interpret EV as a measure of the additional
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income necessary for a household to be as well off as if the fall in housing prices had not
happened. Normally a reduction in prices is associated with higher utility levels due to an
increase in disposable income, but in our model the reduction in housing prices also entails
a reduction in housing wealth. Our EV measure is calculated by combining Equations 4.4
and 4.5 (Equation 4.18).
Ut,i, f = ln[(1−nu,t,i, f )yt,i, f +dt,i, f − pt,i(ht,i, f −ht−1,i, f )
−nm,t,i, f ζ −Rdt−1,i, f ]+α lnht,i, f +κ f nu,t,i, f +ulo,t,i, f (4.18)
Equivalent income yEVt,i, f is the income needed to reach U
∗
t,i, f , given steady-state values of all
other variables in the utility function (Equation 4.19). Steady-state values are denoted with
superscript ss.
yEVt,i, f =
1
(1−nssu, f )
[
exp
(
U∗t,i, f −α lnhssi, f −κ f nssu,i, f −usslo,i, f
)
−dssi, f (1−Rss)+nssm,i, f ζ
]
(4.19)
Our EV measure is the difference between yEVt,i, f and steady-state income y
ss
f , measured as a
percentage of steady-state income:
EVt,i, f =
yssi, f − yEVt,i, f
yssi, f
(4.20)
4.3.6 Parameter values and steady-state targeting procedure
The estimation procedure for the parameters reported in Table 4.1 follows the steady-state
targeting strategy and uses the same data as Sterk (2010). This involves setting parameter
values such that the model in its steady state reproduces some essential characteristics of
the empirical data. Some parameters are also set based on observations from the literature.
The data used by Sterk (2010) is U.S. data. Since our parameter values are very similar to
those in the original model, we keep the discussion on this point relatively short, reporting
only values for the parameters where our values deviate from Sterk (2010). The full list of
parameters and the original values can be found in Sterk (2010, Table 3). For a discussion
on the parameter values of the labour-market matching function, please consult Sterk (2010,
pg. 22-23). Differences in parameter values between our model and Sterk (2010) are due to
the somewhat different set up of our model. However, the differences are so small that they
do not affect the main conclusions drawn in this paper.
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Sterk (2010) sets five targets for his steady state procedure: aggregate unemployment
is set at 5 %; aggregate mobility is 0.65 % per month (0.1 % due to long-distance offers);
mobile and vulnerable households consume the same amount of housing in steady state; the
steady state value of housing wealth is 140 % of total output; the probability that a vacancy is
filled is 0.34. The discount rates for the different household types follow from Iacoviello and
Neri (2010), where the discount factor for the resilient households implies a yearly steady
state real interest rate of 3 %. Note that the monthly frequency implies that the discount
factor in Table 4.1 corresponds to monthly discount rates. The values for the discount rates
are within the range of those used in the monetary/real business cycle literature (see e.g.
Iacoviello (2005) for a discussion). The preference parameter for housing in the utility
function, α f , follows from the steady state targeting described above. The low value for the
resilient households relative to that of vulnerable households is a result of the requirement
that both household types consume the same amount of durable goods in the steady state.
The utility flow from moving, ψ f , is also found through the steady-state targeting procedure.
Note that in our version of the model this parameter value differs slightly between household
types. The same holds true for κ f which, due to its negative value should be interpreted as
stigma from being unemployed. The negative value of κ f deviates from more standard
models where workers and employers are engaged in a Nash bargaining over the surplus
from a match. In such models (a positive) κ f affects the incentives for a firm of posting
vacancies. In the model in Sterk (2010), where workers receive a fixed share of the surplus,
κ f is only relevant in that it affects the incentives for unemployed workers to accept long-
distance job offers.
Table 4.1 Descriptions, values and sources of the parameters used in the model. The lower
part of the table contains parameters which are specific to each household type.
Parameter Description Value Source
ν0,r Initial share of vulnerable households 0.5
Θ Parameter in loss-function –23.667 Own calculations
γ3 Parameter in loss-function 0.439 Bin and Landry
(2013)
Vulnerable Resilient
β f Discount factor 0.9899 0.9975 Iacoviello and Neri
(2010)
α f Housing preferences 0.250 0.080 Steady state
ψ f Utility from new location −7.037 −7.054 Steady state
κ f Utility from unemployment −6.639 −6.665 Steady state
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4.4 Results
In this section we present the results from our simulation exercise. Simulations are carried
out by varying flood probability in the risky region according to the probabilities corre-
sponding to the return periods in six common U.S. flood zones: 1/10(once every ten years),
1/25, 1/75, 1/50, 1/100, 1/500. Due to the monthly frequency of our model, the monthly
probability of flooding becomes Prrpi =
1
10∗12 ,
1
25∗12 and so forth. In the benchmark scenario
we set the probability of flooding equal to zero. All results are presented as percentage
deviations from the steady-state values
4.4.1 Mobility and unemployment
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Figure 4.4 Change in mobility and aggregate unemployment.
The property valuations pvt,i from Equation 4.2, illustrated in Figure 4.3, limit the max-
imum debt (see Equation 4.6). Only the mobility of vulnerable households is directly af-
fected, as debt is not important for the mobility of resilient households. Comparing Figure
4.3 with the left panel of Figure 4.4 reveals the direct connection between property val-
uations and mobility. We readily see that the mobility of vulnerable households follows
property valuations, but the relative deviation from steady state for mobility is larger than
the relative deviation for property valuations. For the return period 1/10 there is a 35 %
immediate reduction in mobility relative to steady state, declining slowly over time. The
decrease in mobility leads these households to reject long distance job offers. This leads
to an increase in unemployment as shown in the right panel in Figure 4.2. The impact on
the mobility of resilient households is only modest since these households are not directly
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affected by the property valuations. Resilient households also receive the profits of the firm
in the economy. In order to compensate for the loss in income due to lower property valua-
tions, resilient households increase firm profits by posting less vacancies leading to a further
increase in unemployment.
4.4.2 Housing consumption and equilibrium housing prices
As mentioned in Section 4.3, lower mobility reduces the incentives for vulnerable house-
holds to hold housing stock. This is clearly shown in Figure 4.5. We see that the magnitude
of the change in housing consumption relative to steady state is limited — at maximum
about 0.07 %. It is to be noted that housing consumption returns to its steady state value
outside the simulation period. The decrease in demand also reduces the equilibrium hous-
ing price (Figure 4.5). The decrease in pt,i is similar in shape to pvt,i, but it returns to the
steady-state housing price before pvt,i stabilises, and the relative deviation is smaller. The
reason behind this result follows from our discussion in Section 3.3. The extent of influence
from pvt,i on pt,i depends on the Lagrange multiplier λcc,t,i, f , defined by the Euler equation
for debt (Equation 4.B11 in Appendix 4.B). λcc,t,i, f increases initially, dropping steadily
over time until it reaches its steady state value around time-period t = 59. As vulnerable
households shed housing stock they increase their consumption of non-durable goods over
time. In Equation 4.B11, increased future consumption possibilities reduce the reliance on
debt, leading also to a reduction of λcc,t,i, f . The declining λcc,t,i, f dampens the impact from
property valuations on equilibrium housing prices.
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Figure 4.5 Housing consumption and housing prices.
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4.4.3 Welfare effects and clustering
So far we have identified a clear direct effect of property valuations on the mobility of
vulnerable households in the risky region. We also found indirect effects leading firms to
leave the risky region, making it less attractive for both household types. This suggests that
resilient households would migrate out of the risky region, while vulnerable households
remain stuck. The left panel of Figure 4.6 reveals a negative EV for vulnerable households,
meaning that vulnerable households receive a utility gain from property valuations. Our
results suggest a utility gain corresponding, at its maximum, to more than 1 % of steady-
state income for the return period 1/10. From the discussion in Section 4 we know that lower
mobility affects the utility of vulnerable households via two channels: unemployment and
moving costs. The negative EV strongly suggests that the moving costs channel dominates.
Somewhat paradoxically, it thus appears that vulnerable households experience a welfare
gain associated with residing in the risky region. However, this is an equilibrium effect
originating from the declining mobility of vulnerable households due to the reductions in
property valuations. As an increasing share of members of the vulnerable household can
no longer afford to migrate, moving costs also decline. The negative EV of the vulnerable
household in the risky region should therefore be understood as an equilibrium outcome of
reduced mobility for this household type.
The mobility of resilient households is not directly affected by property valuations.
However, the deteriorating economic conditions make the risky region unattractive for these
households. The utility loss of the resilient households in the risky region related to the
increase in unemployment is indicated by the positive EV in the left panel of Figure 4.6. As
such, for the resilient households increasing unemployment in the risky region is associated
with welfare losses, reducing the attractiveness of the region.
The EV results show that vulnerable households find it beneficial to stay in the risky
region while resilient households prefer to migrate (EV in the safe region is slightly positive
for both household types). Vulnerable households in the safe region will also choose to
migrate to the risky region due to the negative EV (higher utility) in this region. The right
panel of Figure 4.6 shows that the share of vulnerable households for the return period 1/10
is, at its maximum, around 2.2 % higher than the steady state value. The absolute size of
the clustering varies only slightly between the return periods 1/500, 1/100, 1/75 and 1/50
(between 50.0 and 51.2 %).
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Figure 4.6 Change in welfare and share of vulnerable households.
4.5 Discussion
It is widely expected that climate change will lead to sea level rise and to increased river
discharge, implying a future rise in flood risk. Reducing exposure and vulnerability are
key elements in risk reduction and are consequently high on the climate change adaptation
agenda. Migration is increasingly seen as a way of reducing exposure and as an option for
climate change adaptation. A key goal in this policy context is to foster household mobility
(Findlay, 2012). In this paper we have shown how household mobility decisions may be
affected by already existing flood protection measures. Existing protection is likely to result
in spatial differences in flood risk. We argue that such differences can lead to a clustering
of vulnerable households in risky regions.
Our methodological approach has combined insights from two different strands of lit-
erature in a flood risk context; namely the literature on Tiebout-sorting and the macroeco-
nomic literature on spatial lock-in of households via a housing market mechanism. Follow-
ing the literature of Tiebout-sorting, our model predicts that the supply of a public good
(flood protection) affects household behaviour migration decisions via the housing market.
However, in line with the psychological literature on decision making under risk and uncer-
tainty, we have assumed that ex-ante risk is not directly relevant for households’ decision
making (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006; Slovic, 1987). Instead, we have assumed that credit-
constrained households are indirectly affected by flood risk if credit markets take risk into
account. In our model we have referred to credit-constrained households as vulnerable,
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highlighting the effect of lack of credit in a climate change adaptation context. The mobility
of these vulnerable households was crucially affected by the property valuations of a ficti-
tious real estate agent. Our results suggest that spatial differences in flood protection lead
to clustering of vulnerable households in risky regions. Flood risk not only had a direct im-
pact on mobility, but also indirect effects on migration as households reacted to equilibrium
price changes. The decline in property valuations in the risky region led to lower demand
for housing in this region, causing a difference in housing prices across the two regions.
This further incentivised vulnerable households to choose the risky regions.
The research goal of this paper was to investigate how clustering varies in size with the
level of protection in the risky region. We only find clustering effects of some magnitude
for return periods of 1/10 and 1/25 years. The following back-of-the-envelope calculation
illustrates what our results mean in terms of number of inhabitants in the risky region:
suppose there is a region with a return period of 1/10 years, with 100,000 inhabitants and an
initial share of vulnerable households of 50 %. According to our results this region would
experience an increase in the number of vulnerable households by over 1,000. If we assume
an average mortgage amortisation period of 30 years, our results suggest that clustering
effects can be of concern if credit markets reasonably expect that a mortgage holder will
have experienced a flood before the mortgage is repaid.
The mechanisms presented in this paper relate to those discussed by (Barnett et al., 2008)
who discuss a number of poverty traps where poor households underinvest in productive
assets as a manner of reducing future losses. In our model the vulnerable households are
prevented from undertaking ex-ante risk reduction measures (i.e. moving away from hazard
before the disaster occurs) due to the presence of a credit constraint. Vulnerable households
consequently invest less in assets (housing) due to the reduced collateral services of housing.
However, in contrast to Barnett et al. (2008) vulnerable households underinvest in assets as
a result of a credit market mechanism and not at as a result of individual risk aversion.
As argued in Chapter 2, a heavy reliance on hard measures in flood risk reduction such
as engineered flood defences have in the past led to a concentration of population and eco-
nomic assets in flood-prone areas. This is the flood risk reduction strategy implemented
in a range of developed countries. It is however, increasingly argued that long-term flood
risk reduction strategies should also involve soft measures providing stimuli for individual
vulnerability reductions (Filatova et al., 2013). Our model results suggest that facilitating
access to mortgage credit could be a potentially important instrument in reducing vulnera-
bility.
Although our model set up and data suggest a developed country context, our results
also provide lessons for developing countries. Governments in developing countries often
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lack the financial resources to fully finance disaster risk, meaning they will have to rely on
risk reduction by individual households and on loss sharing through insurance and credit
markets. Governments in such countries face challenges with reconciling economic de-
velopment with adaptation to flood risk. The rapid socio economic development and rapid
urbanisation has led to a dramatic increase in the number of flood-prone areas in these coun-
tries. In addition, the increase in the demand for housing has led to changes in the housing
finance models of a number of countries such as China and Malaysia, with banks and other
private actors gradually replacing the government as the primary provider of mortgages.
Our results suggest that such a development could lead to an increased share of vulnerable
households in risky areas, which is clearly not in line with adaptation goals.
For the sake of tractability, we have relied on a number of assumptions in our modelling
approach. Firstly, the quantitative predictions of our model depend on the value of a number
of parameters such as the loan-to-value ratio χ . However, as illustrated by the sensitivity
analysis in Appendix 4.E, the qualitative predictions of our model appear quite robust. Sec-
ondly, our setting is one where there is no actual flood event. We made this assumption to
exclude risk as a factor directly influencing household decision making. Abstracting from
the impact of an actual flood can also justify the use of expected utility-formulation of the
property valuations by the real estate agent. Both of these assumption are important expla-
nations behind the low impacts from flood risk that we find. An extensive literature suggests
that decisions made under uncertainty and risk take subjective instead of objective probabili-
ties into account (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Subjective
probabilities are particularly relevant in the immediate aftermath of an event (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1973). Pryce et al. (2011) propose an interesting framework for analysing how
housing market responses to floods vary with different types of risk perceptions, without
quantifying the effects. In the following chapter we analyse the impact on mobility when
households themselves expect future housing prices to fall in the aftermath of a flood event.
Appendix 4.A Labour-market dynamics
In order to keep the description of the model concise, we have left out equations which are
defined identically to Sterk (2010) and which are only indirectly relevant for our discussion
(e.g. details of the labour-market). For a complete list of equations regarding labour-market
and firms, please consult Sterk (2010, pp. 16-18). ndo,t,i, f , the fraction of members with a
long-distance job offer, is determined by:
ndo,t,i, f = ω gˆt−1,ins,t,i, f (4.A1)
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where gˆt,i is the probability that a firm meets a worker while ω represents the fraction of
meetings where a worker is required to move in order to become employed. ns,t,i, f , the
fraction of household members in search of employment, is defined as:
ns,t,i, f = nu,t,i, f +ρ(1−nu,t,i, f ) (4.A2)
Here ρ is the exogenous job destruction rate. The fraction of unemployed members consists
of members who either did not receive a job offer in the previous period or who declined a
long-distance offer because moving was unattractive:
nu,t,i, f = ns,t−1,i, f (1− gˆt−1,i)+ndo,t−1,i, f (1−F(ε¯do,t,i, f )) (4.A3)
The aggregate number of households in search of jobs is the share of vulnerable and resilient
households searching for jobs:
nˆs,t,i = νt,ins,t,i,vul +(1−νt,i)ns,t,i,re (4.A4)
Similarly, aggregate unemployment is:
nˆu,t,i = νt,inu,t,i,vul +(1−νt,i)nu,t,i,re (4.A5)
The labour market is modelled using a matching framework, allowing for labour-market
frictions. The aggregate number of matches mˆt,i between firms and job searchers is modelled
as a Cobb-Douglas function:
mˆt,i = µ nˆηs,t,ivˆ
1−η
t,i (4.A6)
where vˆt,i is the aggregate number of vacancies, µ a scale parameter and η an elasticity
parameter. The probability that a job searcher meets a firm, gˆt,i, is described as:
gˆt,i =
mˆt,i
nˆt,i
(4.A7)
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In both regions, the representative firm in the economy produces za,t,i per period using labour
as input. Households’ labour income is a fixed share ξ of total revenues, yt,i, f = ξ za,t ,
meaning that the firm receives the remaining share (1− ξ )za,t,i. Aggregate firm profits are
therefore given by:
Πˆt,i = (1− nˆu,t,i)(1−ξ )za,t,i−ϑ vˆt,i (4.A8)
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Appendix 4.B Household maximisation problem
The household maximisation problem reads as follows:
maxct,i, f ,ht,i, f ,dt,i, f E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tf {lnct,i, f +α f lnht,i, f +κ f nu,t,i, f +ulo,t,i, f } (4.B9)
s.t.
ct,i, f + pt,i(ht,i, f −ht−1,i, f )+nm,t,i, f ζ +Rt−1dt−1,i, f
= (1−nu,t,i, f )yt, f +dt,i, f
dt,i, f = nm,t,i, f χ pvt,i, f ht,i, f +(1−nm,t,i, f )dt−1,i, f
ns,t,i, f = nu,t,i, f +ρ(1−nu,t,i, f )
nu,t,i, f = ns,t−1,i, f (1− gˆt−1,i+ω gˆt−1,i(1−F(ε¯do,t,i, f )))
nm,t,i, f = ω gˆr,t−1ns,t,i, f F(ε¯do,t,i, f )+(1−ω gˆr,t−1ns,t,i, f )F(ε¯t,i, f )
Maximising the utility function subject to the constraints we arrive at the following first-
order conditions (see also Sterk, 2010):
α f
ht,i, f
− pt,i
ct,i,g
+β f
pt+1,i
ct+1,i, f
+λcc,t,i, f nm,t,i, f χ pvt,i = 0 (4.B10)
1
ct,i, f
−λcc,t,i, f +β f [λcc,t+1,i, f (1−nm,t+1,i, f )− Rtct+1,i, f ] = 0 (4.B11)
ζ
ct,i, f
−λcc,t(χ pvt,iht,i, f −dt−1,i, f )+ ε¯t,i, f −ψ f = 0 (4.B12)
κ f − yt,i, fct,i, f + ε¯do,t,i, f − ε¯t,i, f +(1−ρu)Gt,i, f = 0 (4.B13)
where λcc,t,i, f is the Lagrange-multiplier on the debt constraint, and where Gt,i, f is a pa-
rameter capturing a composition effect on the labour-market: if more members with a long-
distance offer move, implying an increase in unemployment, positively affecting the fraction
of members employed in future periods.
Gt,i, f =
(
−ω gˆt−1,i
∫ ε¯do,t+1,i, f
ε¯t+1,i, f
εdF(ε)+(ε¯do,t+1,i, f − ε¯t+1,i, f )(1− gˆt,i
+ω gˆt,i[1−F(ε¯do,t+1,i, f )])+ ε¯t+1,i, fω gˆt,i[F(ε¯do,t+1,i, f )−F(ε¯t+1,i, f )]
)
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It can be shown that:
∫ ε¯do,t+1,i, f
ε¯t+1,i, f
εdF(ε) =
σ√
2π
[
exp(−1
2
ε¯2t+1,i, f
σ2
)− exp(−1
2
ε¯2do,t+1,i, f
σ2
)
]
Appendix 4.C Description of variables
Table 4.C1 Description of the endogenous variables in the model
Variable Description
ct,i, f Consumption of non-durable goods
ht,i, f Consumption of housing
nm,t,i, f Mobility rate
dt,i, f Debt
ns,t,i, f Household job search rate
nu,t,i, f Household unemployment rate
ndo,t,i, f Fraction of household members with a long-distance job offer
λcc,t,i, f Lagrange-multiplier of the debt constraint
pt,i Housing price
yt,i, f Labour income
ˆgt,i Probability of a labour market match
Appendix 4.D Solution procedure and stability of the model
The model in Sterk (2010) is a DSGE model which is solved by the principle of log-
linearisation. This approach uses Taylor expansion around the steady state to replace all
equations by approximations, where the approximations are linear functions in the log-
deviations of the variables. Results from these kind of models generalise to infinite horizon
stochastic problems with uncertainty. The model is reformulated as a mixed complemen-
tarity problem and programmed in GAMS. This also entails replacing the infinite horizon
formulation with a finite time formulation. The approximation of infinite horizon can pos-
sibly lead to biased results due to final period effects (Lau et al., 2002). In order to impose
stability of the system we assume zero steady-state growth of all endogenous variables. We
furthermore replaced all stochastic parameters from the original model with the mean values
of those parameters.
A frequently observed problem with the conversion from infinite horizon to finite time
is final period effects. Since a unit housing has no collateral value in the last period, it
could be beneficial for a household to sell an infinitely large amount of housing in the final
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period, allowing for an infinitely large increase in ct,i, f . To avoid these kind of effects
we have restricted consumption of all goods to positive values. However, the use of fixed
(and modestly sized) discount factors and interest rate, ensures that explosive increases in
consumption of non-durable goods are avoided. To see this, consider Equation (4.B11).
For footloose households, for which λcc,t,i, f is always equal to zero, the relation between
ct,i, f and ct+1,i, f is fixed. For vulnerable households explosive increases in ct,i, f are limited
by a combination of a fixed discount factor close to 1 and constraints on λcc,t,i, f . This
result is in line with the turnpike theorem which states that a competitive equilibrium path
converges to a balanced growth path if future consumption is sufficiently weighted. We have
experimented with a number of constraints limiting the growth of endogenous variables in
the final period, with only minor impacts on our results, confirming the stability of the
system and absence of final period effects.
In addition, our model could possibly also suffer from another well known problem in
models where households are able to take on debt. One could imagine that a household
would like to borrow and consume as much as it likes, paying off interest payments by bor-
rowing more (Ponzi scheme). In our model, debt is irrelevant for equilibrium allocations
of footloose households (consider Equation (4.B12) for λcc,t,i, f equal to zero), eliminating
the incentive for this household type to engage in Ponzi schemes. For vulnerable house-
holds, the level of debt is controlled by the debt constraint, eliminating the possibilities of
ever-increasing levels of debt.
Appendix 4.E Sensitivity analysis
Table 4.E2 Impacts on a number of key variables from variations in χ for the return peri-
ods used in the simulation exercises. The table shows the original value of χ used in the
simulation; the original value minus 10 %; and the original value plus 10 %.
χ=0.8 χ=0.72 χ=0.88
safety level 1/10 1/100 1/500 1/10 1/100 1/500 1/10 1/100 1/500
nm1, f l,vul −33.83 −3.94 −0.80 −36.75 −4.35 −0.88 −30.82 −3.53 −0.71
EV1, f l,vul −1.22 −0.14 −0.03 −1.36 −0.15 −0.03 −1.09 −0.12 −0.02
p1, f l −0.64 −0.07 −0.01 −0.73 −0.08 −0.02 −0.56 −0.06 −0.01
υ20, f l 1.85 0.20 0.04 2.10 0.23 0.05 1.63 0.18 0.04
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Chapter 5
Loss aversion and housing market
capitalisation of flood risk
How are households’ risk judgments reflected in housing prices? Using a dy-
namic equilibrium model this paper investigates how loss aversion in the af-
termath of a flood affects the extent of capitalisation of flood risk into housing
prices. The role of housing as an asset plays a key role in the model: expected
reductions in future housing prices due to flooding translates into reductions in
demand, causing falling housing prices. If households are modelled as fully
rational, capitalisation effects are only minor. However, if households are loss
averse, housing prices decline by up to 9 %.
5.1 Introduction
Sea level rise and coastal storm surges are imposing challenges for flood control systems
across the world (IPCC, 2012, 2014). The rapid growth in the number and the value of
assets located in harm’s way influences policy responses to increasing risks (Kunreuther
et al., 2013). There is a growing interest in how coastal real estate markets will be shaped
by individual adaptative responses to the anticipated but evolving threats associated with
increasing risk (McNamara and Keeler, 2013).
Economic theory suggests that increasing future risk is a relevant input for households’
decisions on the housing market (Kahn, 2014). A home-owner’s stock of housing is a large
part of a households’ total wealth, meaning significant fluctuations in housing prices trans-
late into significant fluctuations in a households’ wealth. Investment in housing therefore
determine wealth and consumption possibilities in the future. According to basic economic
theory, forward-looking households would wish to reduce their exposure to future reduc-
tions in wealth by decreasing their stock of housing in risky areas.
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A large body of hedonic pricing studies finds evidence supporting the theoretical predic-
tions that risk is relevant for decisions on the housing market. Hedonic pricing studies have
investigated households’ willingness to pay for location specific flood protection. These
studies consistently find negative impacts of flood risk on housing prices, suggesting that
property values capitalise individual risk judgements (Atreya et al., 2013; Bin et al., 2008;
Bin and Landry, 2013; Bin and Polasky, 2004; Daniel et al., 2009b; MacDonald et al., 1987;
Shultz and Fridgen, 2001; Speyrer and Ragas, 1991). Capitalisation effects have also been
observed in areas not directly affected by floods (Hallstrom and Smith, 2005), ruling out
possibly confounding effects from damage and reconstruction activities.
A key question is how households form expectations on future housing prices in the
context of flood risk. A literature on decision making under risk and uncertainty argues
that households, when faced with low probability high impact events, such as floods, make
decisions which deviate from what is considered rational (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989).
In particular, behavioural anomalies could potentially have an impact on housing market
decisions. Several studies suggest that households are averse towards realising nominal
losses on the housing market (Bokhari and Geltner, 2011; Genesove and Mayer, 2001).
Housing demand may therefore reflect expectations on whether a potential house buyer
expects to realise nominal losses on his purchase. However, people respond to the risks
that they actually experience rather than to expert judgments (Slovic, 1987), so technical
assessments may be of limited relevance for housing market decisions (Hunter, 2005). In
particular, people may have difficulties envisioning the impact of low probability events
such as floods. Hazard events provide new information, leading individuals to easily recall
and envision similar hazards (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Housing market decisions in
the aftermath of a flood may therefore temporarily capture the risk information provided by
the event (availability heuristics).
The predictions that risk judgments are only partly determined by technical assessment
of risk are confirmed by the hedonic pricing literature (Bin and Landry, 2013). First, al-
though the provision of information regarding hazard probability can cause housing price
differentials across different flood zones, capitalisation effects are especially pronounced
in the aftermath of floods (Kousky, 2010). Second, the impacts of flood events on risk
judgements are generally found to diminish over time (Atreya et al., 2013; Bin and Landry,
2013).
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the dynamics of housing prices in the floodplain
in the immediate aftermath of a flood event. More specifically, we investigate how housing
market decisions and housing prices are affected by loss aversion and availability heuristics.
Loss aversion is incorporated using the probability weighting from Prospect Theory (PT)
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The presence of availability bias implies a sudden increase
in risk judgments and a subsequent decline over time. To capture the dynamic path of
risk awareness in the aftermath of a flood, we model expected housing price reductions
according to the time-decay function in Bin and Landry (2013).
Investigating the dynamics of housing prices in the aftermath of a flood requires using a
model where the demand for housing is a general equilibrum outcome of a range of simul-
taneous decisions on several markets (Kuminoff et al., 2013). Such a model should capture
feedback-effects between housing prices, mobility and labour markets (Chen et al., 2013).
Furthermore, decisions on the housing market are intertermporal choices, requiring the use
of a fully dynamic model. We use a modified version of the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model developed by Sterk (2010), where the shadow value of housing is partly
determined by the future resale value of the housing stock.
In the previous chapter we used a similar model to investigate endogenous household
sorting if flood risk was taken into account by a credit lender. In this chapter we incorporate
expectations of falling housing prices directly into each household types’ shadow value
of housing – i.e. the marginal utility gain from an extra unit of housing. By using the
probability weighting function from PT we obtain a range of model outcomes coherent with
individual decision processes under uncertainty as suggested by PT.
The innovative contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold. First, we pro-
vide a model where housing market decisions are endogenously determined as a function
of individual risk judgements. This is novel in the broader literature of climate change
driven migration. Second, the general equilibrium features of the model incorporate the
psychological findings in the field of decisions under uncertainty – PT in particular – into
traditional economic modelling. This allows for a quantitative exploration of the impact of
loss aversion and availability biases on the dynamics of the housing market.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 describes the model; Section 5.3 shows
our results; Section 5.4 discusses results and concludes.
5.2 The model
It is well known that household mobility is constrained by the value of a households’ assets
such as land and housing stock. For example, much of a households’ wealth is invested in
its housing stock, and fluctuations in housing prices therefore significantly impact house-
holds’ total wealth. Some studies argue that declining asset value can lead to poverty traps
and spatial lock-in of vulnerable households (Barnett et al., 2008). A strand of literature
in macroeconomics argues that falling housing prices in effect impose a credit constraint
(Ferreira et al., 2010, 2012; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; Quigley, 2002). According to this
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literature, declining housing prices may deter the geographical mobility of households who
depend on obtaining a mortgage for financing a move.
For our analysis we use a version of the general equilibrium model from Sterk (2010).
In this model, agents’ geographical mobility follows from an intertemporal optimisation
decision. The model includes financial frictions on the side of households and frictions on
the labour market. Similar to Sterk (2010), we distinguish between two household types —
one type that depends on obtaining a mortgage for financing a move (vulnerable households)
and one type that does not (resilient households).
The main innovation in our model relative to the model presented in Chapter 4 is the
incorporation of housing price expectations directly into the shadow-value of housing, i.e.
the equilibrium value of one unit housing for each household type. Since households differ
in terms of how much they discount the future, the impact from expectations on the shadow-
value of housing also differs between household types.
5.2.1 Risk judgements
Traditionally, economic analysis of decision making under risk and uncertainty has relied on
formulations based on Expected Utility (EU) theory. According to conventional expected
utility theory, risk aversion refers to the concavity of a person’s utility of wealth. This fea-
ture of expected utility theory has been criticised as unrealistic (Rabin, 2000). Particularly
relevant in the context of natural disasters, experimental evidence suggests that utility func-
tions in the loss domain are convex rather than concave (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2009).
This means again that risk premiums estimated using expected utility theory with a concave
function may well be incorrect.
One possible explanation for problems arising from applying EU in this context is the
presence of loss aversion: if economic outcomes are evaluated as losses and gains, decision
makers are likely to be more sensitive to a loss than to a gain of a similar magnitude in
absolute terms. These limitations of EU have been adressed by PT (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In PT individual decisions are modelled by
combining a risk-seeking utility function with a non-linear transformation of probabilities,
resulting in risk-averse behaviour for high losses and low probabilies. PT may therefore
be better suited than EU to capture individual decision making in the context of natural
disasters (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012).
In our model, flood risk is incorporated through expectations in time t, reflecting the
concern that housing prices in the following period t+1, deviate from a benchmark housing
price pss. Expectations are incorporated in the shadow value of housing, meaning that the
utility value of an extra unit housing reflects uncertainty about future housing prices.
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Floods occur with a probability Pr. In t = 0, households evaluate the probability and
impact on housing prices of one flood occurring at time t = 1. Households expect that
housing prices will grow by a factor ∆+ absent a flood, and that they will be reduced by a
factor ∆− in case of a flood. According to a standard EU formulation, the expected change in
housing price, ∆t will be a weighted sum of the expected growth and the expected reduction
in housing prices:
∆t = (1−Pr)∆+t +Pr∆−t (5.1)
The expected housing prices in the following period, E[pt+1] are therefore:
E[pt+1] = pt [1+(1−Pr)∆+t +Pr∆−t ] (5.2)
Under PT, households evaluate the outcomes ∆+t and ∆−t as prospects of gains and losses.
Households do not merely evaluate the objective probability of each outcome, but attach
subjective weights, w(Pr) to the outcomes. Prospective losses are given higher weight than
prospective gains of an equal size. Loss aversion is incorporated in the model by the loss
aversion parameter λ ≤ 1. The expected change in housing prices under PT becomes:
∆t = w(1−Pr)∆+t +λw(Pr)∆−t (5.3)
The PT version of Equation 5.2 can be written as:
E[pt+1] = pt [1+w(1−Pr)∆+t +λw(Pr)∆−t ] (5.4)
In our model the benchmark price pss is the steady-state housing price. Consequently,
there is no expected growth in housing prices in the absence of a flood, i.e., ∆+= 0. Equation
5.4 therefore becomes:
E[pt+1] = pt [1+λw(Pr)∆−t ] (5.5)
We use the probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
described as:
w(Pr) =
Prδ
[Prδ +(1−Pr)δ ] 1δ
(5.6)
An example of w(Pr) is illustrated in Figure 5.1. In general we have w(Pr) > Pr for
small Pr and w(Pr) < Pr for large values of Pr, representing the overweighting of low
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probability events. Lower values of δ would increase the distortion of the probability, and
higher values of λ would give more weight to losses. Parameter values for δ and λ are
obtained from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) who derived plausible ranges of parameter
values through experiments.
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Figure 5.1 The probability weighting function from Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
for δ = 0.6 and λ = 1.75.
We analyse a region located in the floodplain, with a return period of 1/100 years. The
monthly frequency implies that in each t there is a fixed probability of flooding of 1100/12.
A number of recent hedonic pricing studies have investigated how the housing price effect
of a flood decays over time (Atreya et al., 2013; Bin and Landry, 2013). Bin and Landry
(2013) found a price differential between 6% and 20%, which essentially disappears after
5-6 years. Similar to the ratio-model in Bin and Landry (2013), we specify a functional
form for ∆−t which decays at a decreasing rate:
∆−t = θ −
γ
t
(5.7)
where the coefficients θ = 0.01643 and γ = 0.43929 are the coefficients from the ratio
specification model in (Table 4; Model 8 Bin and Landry, 2013).
5.2.2 Household utility and mobility
The model is defined for two representative households f , consisting of a continuum of
members. We differentiate between resilient and and vulnerable households, i.e
f ∈{resilient(re),vulnerable(vul)}. The concentration of vulnerable households in the flood-
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Figure 5.2 Reductions in the price of housing (∆−t ) from the hedonic pricing analysis in Bin
and Landry (2013).
plain is given by the share of vulnerable household νt . Both households receive utility from
consumption of non-durable goods ct, f as well as from square metres of housing ht, f . The
fraction of unemployed household members (nu,t, f ) receive a utility flow κ from time spent
at home. Households also receive a stochastic locational utility flow ulo,t, f . Households
choose ct, f , ht, f and dt, f so as to maximise utility:1
maxE0
∞
∑
t=0
β tf {lnct, f +α f lnht, f +κ f nu,t, f +ulo,t, f } (5.8)
Their budget constraint is:
ct, f + ptht, f +nm,t, f ζ +Rt−1dt−1, f
= (1−nu,t, f )yt, f + ptht−1, f +dt, f (5.9)
The left-hand side of the budget constraint shows household expenditures. Here pt is
the housing price in units of non-durable goods, ζ represents moving costs and nm,t, f is
the fraction of moving household members of type f at time t in region i (or, equally,
the mobility rate of household type f ). Rt−1 is the gross interest rate on debt from the
previous period to be repaid in t, dt, f is the amount of debt. The right-hand side shows
1A more detailed presentation of the household maximisation problem, a list of the endogenous variables
in the model and a description of the labour market dynamics can be found in the Appendix of Chapter 4.
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household income. The employed members (1−nu,t, f ) receive labour-income yt, f . Resilient
households receive the profits of the firm in addition to labour income, while vulnerable
households only receive labour income. The term ptht−1, f is the current resale value of the
housing stock from the previous period. Income consequently consists of labour-income,
new debt and the sales value of the existing housing stock. The amount of debt in each
period is restricted by the following constraint:
dt, f ≤ nm,t, f χ ptht, f +(1−nm,t, f )dt−1, f (5.10)
The debt constraint consists of two terms. The first term is only relevant for household
members who move. For these household members a new mortgage will be limited by
housing wealth ptht, f multiplied by the loan-to-value ratio χ . For household members who
do not move the maximum amount of debt is limited by the existing amount of debt (the
second term). The fact that the collateral requirement applies only to household members
who intend to move, reflects that the debt constraint is really a refinancing constraint.
Households also receive a utility flow from private factors such as changes in family
composition or changes in the neighbourhood, represented in the model as a locational
utility flow ulo,t, f . In each period there is a stochastic shock εt . The parameter εt is normally
distributed with mean equal to zero and standard deviation σ . In equilibrium there will be
two cut-off levels for εt – one for household members with a long-distance job offer, ε¯do,t, f
and one for household members without such an offer, ε¯t, f . ndo,t, f represents the share of
household members with a long-distance job-offer. Household members that do not move,
receive εt as a utility-flow, while household members that move receive a fixed utility flow
ψ f instead. The parameter ψ f can be interpreted as perceived benefits of moving, before
a move has actually taken place. As in Sterk (2010), ψ f actually takes on negative values
for both household types, which appears unrealistic. However, in the empirical application
what truly matters for the household decision is the difference in distribution between εt
and ψ f . The presence of ψ f means that moving is attractive for members with a relatively
low realisation of εt . If εt is below the cut-off level, the household member will move.
F(.) represents the cumulative density function of the shock εt . F(εdo,t, f ) is therefore the
mobility rate of household members with a long-distance job offer, while F(εt, f ) is the
mobility rate of household members without such an offer.
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The locational utility flow ulo,t, f is formulated as:
ulo,t, f = ndo,t, f [ψ f F(ε¯do,t, f )+
∫ ∞
ε¯do,t, f
εdF(ε)]
+(1−ndo,t, f )[ψ f F(ε¯t, f )+
∫ ∞
ε¯t, f
εdF(ε)] (5.11)
The mobility rates follow from the utility flow cut-offs:
nm,t, f = ndo,t, f F(ε¯do,t, f )+(1−ndo,t, f )F(ε¯t, f ) (5.12)
nm,t, f is the fraction of household members who move out of the floodplain during time
period t. Defining Nt, f as the size of household-type f living in the floodplain at the end of
t. The household size evolve over time with the fraction of movers:
Nt, f = Nt−1, f (1−nm,t, f ) (5.13)
The share of agents of the vulnerable household type relative to agents of the resilient
household type (i.e., the share of vulnerable households), νt , is calculated as:
νt =
Nt,vul
∑ f Nt, f
=
Nt−1,vul(1−nm,t,vul)
∑ f Nt−1, f (1−nm,t, f )
(5.14)
5.2.3 Housing demand
The main innovation in our model relative to the model in Chapter 4 is the incorporation of
housing price expectations in the household decision making problem. Housing price ex-
pectations are incorporated in in Equation 5.15 which is the first-order condition for housing
(for derivation of all first-order conditions, see the Appendix of Chapter 4):
pt
ct, f
=
α f
ht, f
+β f E
[
pt+1
ct+1, f
]
+λcc,t, f nm,t, f χ pt (5.15)
The right-hand side of Equation 5.15 shows the shadow-value of housing which indi-
cates the utility change due to an incremental change in ht, f . The shadow-value consists
of three terms: the direct utility gain from a marginal unit of housing; the utility gain from
the discounted resale value of a unit housing; the additional borrowing capacity generated
by an extra unit of housing. λcc,t, f in this equation is the Lagrange-multiplier on the debt
constraint. Since λcc,t, f = 0 for resilient households, the last term is not directly relevant for
their optimal choice of housing. Equation 5.15 must be satisfied for both λcc,t, f l = 0 and
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λcc,t,vul ̸= 0. Housing prices are implicitly determined by the closure of the housing market
in Equation 5.16. h¯i is the fixed supply of housing:
h¯i = νtht,vul +(1−νt)ht, f l (5.16)
5.3 Results
In this section we present the results from the simulation exercises. Simulations are car-
ried out by varying the exponent δ and loss aversion parameter λ in Equation 5.5. In
the simulations we use the parameter values δ ∈ {0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9,1} and λ ∈
{1,1.75,2.25}. Note that the combination of parameter values δ = 1 and λ = 1 corre-
sponds to an EU formulation. All results are presented as percentage deviations from the
steady-state values.
When households expect a fall in the expected resale value of housing, the shadow-value
of housing (the right-hand side of Equation 5.15) reduced for both household types. The
slightly lower discount factor of the vulnerable household type suggests that the housing
demand of this household type would be less sensitive than resilient households to reduc-
tions in the resale value of housing. However, the binding debt constraint for vulnerable
households implies that reductions in mobility caused by reductions in housing prices lead
to decreasing housing demand.
Figure 5.3 plots the shadow-value of housing for both households, for all values of λ
and for three values of δ . The figure shows that the drop in shadow-value is similar across
household type, meaning that reductions in the marginal utility from housing are largely
driven by changes in the parameters of the probability weighting function rather than by
differences in discount factor. For the values of the parameters in the probability weighting
function leading to the largest bias relative to EU, the shadow-value declines by 8.7 %
(resilient household) and 8.9 % (vulnerable household).
As the marginal utility of housing falls, demand for housing is decreased, leading to a
reduction in the equilibrium housing price. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4 which shows
the dynamics of housing prices. The solid lines in the figure shows results where δ = 0.6
– the median value from Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The solid lines indicate that the
presence of loss aversion leads to a reduction in housing prices of between 0.6 % and 1.6
% relative to steady-state housing prices. The shaded area illustrates the range of outcomes
under all values of δ and λ . As predicted by Figure 5.3, there are virtually no changes in
housing prices under EU. However, for the values leading to the most extreme distortion in
the probability weighting function (δ = 0.3 and λ = 2.25), housing prices decline by about
9 % relative to the steady-state housing price.
88
5.3 Results
(δ = 0.3) (δ = 0.6) (δ = 1)
−7.5
−5.0
−2.5
0.0
−7.5
−5.0
−2.5
0.0
−7.5
−5.0
−2.5
0.0
(λ
=
1)
(λ
=
1.75)
(λ
=
2.25)
0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20
Time (months)
 
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
fro
m
 s
te
ad
y 
st
at
e 
Figure 5.3 The shadow-value of housing.
The fall in housing prices reduces the housing wealth of both household types. How-
ever, only the mobility of vulnerable households is directly affected by the fall in housing
prices, as debt is not important for the mobility of vulnerable households. Figure 5.6 shows
that the mobility of vulnerable households is significantly reduced: for the most extreme
values of the parameters in the probability weighting function, the mobility of the vulner-
able households is reduced by nearly 60 % relative to the steady-state mobility rate. The
mobility of resilient households is indirectly affected by the fall in housing prices as a lower
resale value of the housing stock reduces the demand for consumption goods for this house-
hold type. A lower level of consumption goods means that the utility loss from paying the
moving costs increas. Figure 5.5 shows, however, that the reduction in the mobility rate of
resilient households is modest, corresponding at its maximum to 1.3 % of the steady-state
mobility rate.
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Figure 5.4 Housing prices (the shaded area illustrates the range of outcomes under all values
of δ and λ ).
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Figure 5.5 Mobility resilient households.
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Figure 5.6 Mobility vulnerable house-
holds.
5.4 Discussion
Losses from flood disasters have increased dramatically during the last decades and are
expected to increase further in the future (IPCC, 2014). Although the main driver behind
increasing losses is growth in population and assets located in harm’s way, a climate signal
can not be excluded (IPCC, 2012). Economic theory suggests that self-interested individuals
would respond to the threat of increasing risk by reducing their exposure. Home-owners
would wish to shield themselves from potential losses in wealth by investing less in housing
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in risky areas (Kahn, 2014). Individual adaptive response could lead to falling housing
prices in risky areas.
Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we have shown how a "near-miss" flood
event led to updating of risk judgements, reducing housing demand and housing prices in
the flood-plain. Similarly to the previous chapter, declining housing prices led to reduction
in household mobility through a credit market mechanism. Using the probability weighting
function from PT we obtained a range of model outcomes, exploring the plausible set of
outcomes if households respond to increasing risk in line with predictions from PT. In the
most extreme case, our results suggest a reduction in equilibrium housing prices of about
9 %, leading to a more than 60 % reduction in the mobility rate of vulnerable household.
However, the reductions in the mobility of resilient households was much smaller. Conse-
quently, the temporary increase in risk judgments can have permanent effects in terms of
change of composition of the population in the floodplain.
Within the hedonic pricing literature behavioural anomalies such as loss aversion and
availability biases are often offered as explanations for the capitalisation of risk on the hous-
ing market in the aftermath of flood events (Daniel et al., 2009a). Hence, the size of the
capitalisation effects would be determined by the extent of behavioural biases. Findings in
this chapter largely support this argument.
Similarly to the previous chapter, the findings in this chapter also relate to the literature
on household migration as a climate change adaptation strategy. Although much of the
policy debate has focused on waves of migrating households, researchers have recently
started investigating the impacts on household mobility from extreme events (Black et al.,
2013; Findlay, 2012; Kniveton et al., 2012). In this context migration is seen as a form of
individual adaptation. Our results suggest that credit constrained household are more likely
to remain in risky areas than households which are not subject to such credit constraints.
This chapter adds to the previous chapter by showing that hazard induced poverty-traps are
not only a result of credit lender practice but can originate from market mechanisms set in
motion by individual responses to increasing risk.
A fundamental assumption in our analysis is that availability biases lead individuals to
expect falling housing prices. However, it is well-known that flood hazard correlates with
amenities associated with coastal locations (Rappaport, 2007; Rappaport and Sachs, 2003).
Some potentially hazardous areas are disproportionally populated by well off rather than by
vulnerable households. In such situations updated risk judgements may lead to an increase
in the concentration of households most willing and able cope with risk (Bunten and Kahn,
2014). The mechanisms envisaged in this chapter, where a "near miss" flood leads to an
increased concentration of presumably worse off households in the floodplain, may be more
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relevant in less affluent areas, for example in areas of urban decline (Glaeser, 2005).
The focus of this chapter is on differences in mobility rates between households, mean-
ing we do not analyse immigration or calculate net-migration (we did, however, analyse
immigration in the previous chapter). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the prospect of
lower housing prices might lead some potential home-owners to buy houses in areas re-
cently affected by floods in order to "get a good deal". In particular, this effect is likely to
be strong if people expect protection to increase. This is left for future research.
The findings in this chapter have clear relevance for risk reduction and risk financing
policies. It is increasingly argued that disaster risk reduction policies should not only focus
on protection but should also target social vulnerability. A large proportion of socially vul-
nerable households in risky areas likely entails a lower degree of individual mitigation and
difficulties in the distribution of risk information and in the implementation of evacuation
routines. Our results also challenge calls for a shift towards a heavier reliance on private
sector involvement risk financing such as insurance. Since the uptake of insurance tends to
be rather low among vulnerable households, an increased concentration of this household
type in risky areas also implies a decrease in coverage in these areas. Using a simulation
model this chapter has provided a number of testable hypotheses. It is our hope that future
research aims at empirically investigating whether falling housing prices in the aftermath
of floods are associated with an increased concentration of vulnerable households in risky
areas.
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Part III
Flood risk and expectations: impacts on
regional labour supply and production

Chapter 6
What if Dutch investors started worrying
about flood risk?
While the previous chapters investigated the details of household migration un-
der flood risk, this chapter focuses on the macroeconomic effects from a change
in risk expectations. We use a Spatial Computable General Equilibrium model,
describing the Dutch economy as a flow of goods and services between 15 sec-
tors in 40 regions. The model is used to analyse the macroeconomic impacts
when investors take downside risk due to flooding into account in their invest-
ment decisions. Our case study is the large Rotterdam area, the Netherlands.
We find that the decrease in investments in the large Rotterdam area leads to
a reduction in capital and production, leading to a reduction in potential mon-
etary disaster losses, but not to a reduction in population. The modified in-
vestment behaviour reduces the long-term impacts from a flood on government
tax-revenues, but it also leads to welfare losses among households residing in
risky regions.
6.1 Introduction
The flooding of the Danube in the summer of 2013 and the winter floods in the UK in
January, 2014, are just two of many large-scale flood disasters which recently have hit mod-
ern industrialised economies. Such disasters cause large direct economic losses as well
This chapter is based on Husby, Trond G, Brenden Jongman, and Reinhard Mechler (2015). "What
if Dutch investors started worrying about flood risk? Implications for disaster risk reductions." Regional
Environmental Change (Forthcoming).
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as ripple-effects, leading to economic losses beyond the location directly affected by the
disaster (Hallegatte, 2008). The prospects of increasing future risk due to socio economic
developments and climate change have drawn attention to the allocation of risk across and
within countries, as well as between the public and private sector (Botzen, 2013; Jongman
et al., 2014; Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler, 2014; Mechler et al., 2014).
There is a wide continuum of sharing risk and responsibilities in flood risk management
across countries (Aakre et al., 2010). One of the most extreme cases in terms of public
sector responsibilities is the Netherlands. The country is one of the most flood-prone in the
world, with more than 50 % of its land exposed to flooding (de Moel et al., 2011). Tra-
ditionally, the Dutch government has responded to the threat of water through a tax-payer
funded system of very high safety standards combined with a public ex-post compensation
scheme (Aerts and Botzen, 2011). However, the traditional approach has not led to a de-
crease in exposure (Husby et al., 2014). For example, due to the rapid economic growth
in the economically important Randstad-region, a major flood event here would have major
economic consequences for the country as a whole (Bouwer and Vellinga, 2007).
A number of near-miss flood events, leading to mass evacution of population at risk,
has led to a rethinking of the strategy, including a shift in focus towards reducing the con-
sequences should a flood happen (Kabat et al., 2005). Adaptive measures in spatial devel-
opment such as new building codes, elevation of buildings, or even relocation, have been
introduced as part of a new strategy (Min. I& M, 2009, 2014). Crucially, the new proposals
imply a partial reallocation of risk, shifting some of the responsibility for mitigating flood
damage from the public to the private sector. Current research on flood risk management
in the Netherlands revolves around the suitability of these types of measures for the Dutch
situation (Veraart et al., 2014).
A growing body of research argues that it is plausible that private investors could take
flood risk into account in their investment decisions, decreasing the capital stock in risky
areas (Baker and Bloom, 2013; Balvers et al., 2009; Barro, 2013; Hallegatte, 2011; Kousky
et al., 2006). Despite substantial damages in case of a flood and uncertainties regarding
compensation of losses, risk perceptions in the Netherlands are currently low (Botzen and
van den Bergh, 2012; Terpstra et al., 2009). It is questionable whether flood risk is currently
relevant for private investment decisions. Little is therefore known about the relative contri-
bution from factors behind changes in investment behaviour, or about the ensuing macroeco-
nomic effects. This chapter takes on the challenge, analysing the thought-experiment what
if investors started worrying about flood risk in the Netherlands.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the long-term economic and welfare effects if
investors in the Netherlands take flood risk into account. We assume that risk is directly rel-
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evant for capital investments and indirectly relevant for households’ decisions as changes in
investments lead to changes in production and price changes. We propose a macroeconomic
model where investment decisions are based on a mean-semivariance approach (Markowitz,
1959). In our model, risk-averse investors base their investment decisions on the probability
of flooding and on the capital damage should a flood occur. Simulations of increases in
probability and capital damage allow us to investigate the conditions necessary to trigger
behavioural responses from investors.
6.2 Methodology
In the economic disaster literature it is common to distinguish between direct and indirect
effects of flood disasters (see, e.g., Merz et al., 2010; Rose, 2004). Direct effects cover
the immediate losses resulting from a certain level of inundation in a particular area, while
indirect effects are conceptualised as business interruptions, for example when damage to
infrastructure interrupts supply lines resulting in scarcity of intermediate and final goods.
Estimating indirect and long-term effects of disasters is particularly challenging due to the
complex interlinkages between different sectors and agents within the economy. Several
authors have used Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models to analyse indirect and
long-run effects (for a review, see Okuyama, 2008). These models represent an economy
as systems of equations, where agents in the economy react to price changes determined
by market equilibria. Income and spending are modelled as circular flows interconnecting
all sectors and regions of the economy. One major strength of these models is their ability
to incorporate sectoral interlinkages and economic behaviour of agents (Mechler, 2013).
Another strength with this model type is that direct effects are treated as inputs (direct
damage) while indirect effects are model outcomes (general equilibrium effects), thereby
avoiding double counting of losses.
6.2.1 RAEM: general description
The model used in this chapter — RAEM (Regional Computable General Equilibrium
Model) — is a recursively dynamic Spatial Computable General Equilibrium (SCGE) model.
The model was initially developed for cost-benefit analyses of transport infrastructure projects
in the Netherlands (Ivanova et al., 2007; Thissen, 2005). It distinguishes 40 regions, cor-
responding to the Dutch NUTS-3 level as defined by Eurostat, and it spans 15 production
sectors. Agents in RAEM are firms, households, a federal government, an external trade sec-
tor, and an investment agent. RAEM is inspired by the New Economic Geography (NEG)
school — a theoretical direction which focuses on how the spatial pattern in the location
of economic production is an outcome of agglomeration and dispersion forces (Fujita and
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Thisse, 1996; Krugman, 1991). A central assumption in NEG is that firms and consumers
benefit from a certain geographical location. In this type of models, the presence of market
power (monopolistic competition) allows for spatial increasing returns to scale. Because
of increasing returns to scale, firms will locate in only one market. In addition, trade costs
lead firms to prefer locating in larger markets. Households, in turn, has a taste for the va-
riety of products available in one region. In addition, mobile households move to where
the real wage is highest. These households are attracted to larger regions because of the
higher nominal wages and a wider array of varieties for sale there. RAEM incorporates
feedback effects between production and households’ location decisions. These feedback
effects result in clustering of economic activity and population.
Figure 6.1 A simplified description of the model structure of RAEM.
The flow of goods and services within one region and the feedback effects between pro-
duction and household consumption decisions are illustrated in Figure 6.1. In each sector
a number of slightly differentiated firms produce combining labour and capital composite
with intermediate inputs. Domestic production is described by a Leontief production func-
tion. The level of capital is defined by the (depreciated) amount of capital stock from the
previous period and new investments (A).
A share of domestic production is exported to other regions and a share is destined
for demand within the region. The total supply of goods within one region is the sum of
domestic production and imports and equals, in equilibrium, total domestic demand (B).
Total domestic demand for a good is composed of intermediate demand and final demands.
Intermediate goods are used as inputs to production, while final demand is the sum of gov-
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ernment demand, investment demand and household demand for consumption goods (C).
Households’ optimal demand for consumption goods is determined by maximising house-
holds utility subject to a budget constraint. Utility is determined by relative prices and
available consumption budget, as well as by the level of amenities. Households receive
labour and capital income and spend their consumption budget on different consumption
goods and taxes. Households’ location decision, carried out by comparing utility across
regions, determines local labour supply (D).
6.2.2 Utility and migration
RAEM incorporates representative households for each region i. Households receive utility
derived from consumption of goods from sectors Si. The households’ utility function is for-
mulated as a Linear-Expenditure System (Stone-Geary utility function). According to this
formulation households receive utility from consumption of goods CSi,i above a subsistence
level µHSi,i. The regional household maximises utility Ui:
Ui =∏
Si
(CSi,i−µHSi,i)αHSi,i (6.1)
Maximisation of utility subject to a budget constraint results in the following optimal con-
sumption of goods (for the ease of presentation, taxes are surpressed from the equations
below):
αHSi,i(CBUDi−∑
Si
PSi,iµHSi,i) = PSi,i(CSi,i−µHSi,i) (6.2)
where CBUDi represents the households’ consumption budget and PSi,i prices of goods and
services.
Households’ migration decision is split into two steps. In a first step, a household de-
cides whether to move from the region or not, where the choice to move is based upon the
difference between the average regional household’s utility (∑k Uk/N) and the household’s
utility in region i. In the second step the household decides to which region it will locate.
This choice is based on the region-specific preferences and the level of the household’s
utility in region j. The flow of labour supply from region i to j, LMIGi, j, becomes:
LMIGi, j =∑
k
LSk
Bmigi+∑k Uk/N−Ui
∑l(Bmigl +∑k Uk/N−Ul)
Amigi, j +U j
∑l(Amigi,l +Ul)
(6.3)
Bmigi and Amigi, j are parameters representing households’ taste for specific locations or
origin-destination combinations, respectively. Total labour supply in region i is calculated
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as the sum of initial labour supply LS0i and net inflow of labour from other regions, minus
time spent on the commuting (travel time Ttimei, j multiplied by commuting households
LCMi, j):
LSi = LS0i +∑
j
(LMIG j,i−LMIGi, j)−∑
j
(Ttimei, jLCMi, j) (6.4)
Labour commuting between two regions is determined by the labour endowment in the
origin as well as by the total demand for labour, ∑Si LSi,i, in the destination. In addition,
increased travel time and transport costs, T money j,i have a negative impact on commuting
trips.
LCM j,i = aM j,i(LSi−UNEMPi)aM j,i(∑
Si
LSi,i)1−aM j,i exp[−βTj,i(Ttime j,i+T money j,i)]
(6.5)
6.2.3 Production and monopolistic competition
Each sector contains a number of firms producing slightly differentiated goods and ser-
vices. Firms are assumed to be homogeneous and have the same production technology and
consequently the same equilibrium output size. It is furthermore assumed that markets are
characterised by increasing returns and monopolistic competition. Fixed labour and capital
costs are related to firms’ initial establishment in the industry. Each new firm produces one
particular variety of a product. Price mark-ups enable firms to cover fixed costs.
Production is modelled using nested CES and Leontief production functions. In the up-
per nest, intermediate goods are combined with a capital-labour bundle in fixed proportions
(Leontied). The level of the capital-labour bundle KLSi,i is determined by combining labour
LSi,i and capital KSi,i inputs, according to a CES production function:
KLSi,i = aKLSi,i[γKSi,i(KSi,i)σSi,i + γLSi,i(LSi,i)σSi,i]
1
σSi,i (6.6)
Here aKLSi,i represents a scale parameter of the capital-labour bundle, γLSi,i and γKSi,i
are share parameters of labour and capital, respectively, while σSi,i represents the elastic-
ity of substitution. The amount of the capital-labour bundle KLSi,i used in production is
therefore set as a fixed share of the sectoral output XDSi,i:
KLSi,i = ioKLSi,iXDSi,i (6.7)
where ioKLSi,i represent the coefficient for labour-capital bundle. The price of the compos-
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ite capital-labour bundle, PKLSi,i, is derived as a weighted average of variable capital and
labour production costs. Fixed capital inputs are defined as a fixed share f cKSi,i multiplied
by the number of firms operating in the sector, NFSi,i. Variable capital costs are defined as
capital inputs KSi,i minus fixed costs, multiplied by the rental costs of capital – RKSi,i. Fixed
labour costs are defined as a share f cLSi,i multiplied by the number of firms.
PKLSi,iKLSi,i = (KSi,i−NFSi,i f cKSi,i)(RKSi,i+δPI)+(LSi,i−NFSi,i f cLSi,i)PLi (6.8)
The optimal amounts of capital, labour and intermediate goods are determined by the
sectoral production technology as well as by input prices. Total capital and labour use are
derived as the sum of the variable costs plus the total fixed costs of the sector:
KSi,i = KLSi,i
(
γKSi,i
RKSI,i+δSi,iPI
)
PKLσSi,iaKLσKLSi,i−1+NFSi,i f cKSi,i (6.9)
LSi,i = KLSi,i
(
γLSi,i
PLi
)
PKLσSi,iaKLσKLSi,i−1+NFSi,i f cLSi,i (6.10)
Consumers have a taste for varieties of goods and services produced by the firms, pur-
chasing output of all the firms in the sector. The number of varieties available to consumers
is equal to the number of firms operating within the sector. Equation 6.11 shows that the
amount of goods available for consumption XDSi,i is the sum of production destined for do-
mestic production XDDESi,i, j, imports from EU (EEU25Si,i) and from the rest of the world
(EROWSi,i), weighted by a factor AUXVSi,i:
XDSi,i =
(
∑
j
XDDESi,i, j +EEU25Si,i+EROWSi,i
)
AUXVSi,i (6.11)
Markets for goods and services are in equilibrium in each region of the country. Con-
sequently, the total supply of a commodity, XSi,i, is equal to the sum of the demand of the
regional household, CSi,i, the demand of the federal government, CGSi,i, the region-specific
demand for physical investment goods, ISi,i, the changes in stocks,SVSi,i, the demand for
commodities from freight trade and transport margins, T MXSi,i , and the intermediate de-
mand from other regions XDS j, j:
XSi,i =CSi,i+CGSi,i+ ISi,i+SVSi,i+T MXSi,i+∑
S j
(ioSi,S j,iXDS j, j) (6.12)
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6.2.4 RAEM: recursive dynamics and capital accumulation
The connection between different time periods in RAEM is modelled according to a re-
cursively dynamic formulation. The model consists of a sequence of temporary equilibria
where the equilibria are connected to each other through capital accumulation over time.
Capital KSi,i,t in sector Si in region i evolves due to capital depreciation δ and sector- and
region-specific investment INVSi,i,t . Parameters and initial values of variables in RAEM
are calculated using a Social Accounting Matrix for the Netherlands from the year 2006.
Frequency is yearly, and we analyse the period t = 2007, ...,2025.
KSi,i,t+1 = KSi,i,t(1−δSi,i)+ INVSi,i,t (6.13)
Investment in period t is based on expected capital growth in t+1, which again is a gen-
eral equilibrium outcome in period t. Determining capital stock in the next period, KSi,i,t+1,
as a function of capital growth f (αRORSi,i,t), investments in the original formulation of
RAEM are summarised by the following equations:
INVSi,i,t = KSi,i,t [ f (αRORSi,i,t)+(1−δSi,i)] (6.14)
where
αRORSi,i,t = exp(RORSi,i,t −ROR0Si,i,t) (6.15)
and
RORSi,i,t =−1+
RKSi,i,t
PISi,i,t
+1−δSi,i
1+ RGDtGDPDEFt
(6.16)
The variables/parameters are: RORSi,i,t : Expected rate of return to capital investments;
ROR0Si,i: Baseline expected rate of return; αRORSi,i,t : Growth rate of the rate of return
relative to baseline; RKSi,i,t : Equilibrium capital growth, or equally, equilibrium rate of
return; PISi,i,t : Price of investment; RGDt : Nominal interest rate; GDPDEFt : GDP deflator.
Using Equation 6.13, we can write the region- and sector-specific investment in terms of
the capital stock and as a function of the expected capital growth above baseline growth
(Equation 6.15). The expected rate of return to capital RORSi,i,t is determined as a function
of the equilibrium rate of return RKSi,i,t , the price of investment PISi,i,t as well as the adaptive
expectations regarding the interest rate.
We incorporate flood risk as a "correction factor" to the expected rate of return. The
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risk adjusted expected rate of return is modelled in line with the mean-variance approach,
developed for risk analysis under downside risk (Markowitz, 1959). In this approach, re-
turn to capital is based on the mean rate of return and volatility. Expected returns to cap-
ital investments are penalised with a risk premium RPSi,i, determined by the semi-variance
Var(RKSi,i,t) as well as relative risk-aversion A. The use of the semi-variance captures the
notion that only downside risk is relevant for investors. Reflecting high aversion to the
impacts of catastrophic events such as floods, the parameter of relative risk-aversion is set
to A = 4, indicating a high level of risk-aversion (Mechler, 2004). A flood which occurs
with probability pi can reduce the rate of return with a certain amount ∆Si,i. ∆Si,i thus rep-
resents the percentage reduction in capital growth due to a flood. Defining RK∗Si,i,t as the
risk-adjusted rate of return, we have:
RK∗Si,i,t = (1− pi)RKSi,i,t + pi(RKSi,i,t −∆Si,i)−
A
2
Var(RKSi,i,t) (6.17)
= RKSi,i,t − pi∆Si,i− A2Var(RKSi,i,t) (6.18)
Using Equation 6.16 we have:
RORSi,i,t =−1+
RKSi,i,t−pi∆Si,i−A2 Var(RKSi,i,t)
PISi,i,t
+1−δSi,i
1+ RGDtGDPDEFt
(6.19)
The yearly probability of flooding pi corresponds to the return period in each dike ring.
The true probability of flooding in each location is also influenced by other variables such
as the probability of dike failure at water levels below the design standard. By using the
return period we thus assume that the safety level conveys the relevant information for the
investment decision. ∆Si,i is calculated using the direct capital damage per sector from all
the scenarios in Jonkhoff et al. (2008). To obtain NUTS3-level values for pi and ∆Si,i we
sum over all dike-rings DR:
pi ∗∆Si,i =∑
DR
pDR,i ∗∆DR,Si,i (6.20)
6.3 Case-study: the large Rotterdam area
The large Rotterdam area is used as a case-study. It is a densely populated region which
contains the second biggest city in the Netherlands and one of Europe’s largest ports. Its
geographical location on the delta of two major rivers makes it highly vulnerable to flood-
ing, and it is one of the few regions in the Netherlands where adaptive measures in spatial
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development are being proposed as a response to future increases in flood risk (Min. I& M,
2009).
As indicated by Figure 6.2, the large Rotterdam area consists of several dike-rings with
varying safety standards. Safety standards require that the height of the dikes meets a design
level expressed as exceedance probabilities (the probability that the water level exceeds the
top of the dike) or as return periods (exceedance probability and return period will be used
interchangeably throughout the text). Return periods vary between 1/10,000 and 1/4,000
in areas susceptible to intrusion from the sea and between 1/2,000 and 1/1,250 for areas
susceptible to river flooding. Although most residential and industrial areas are protected
by dikes, there is considerable variation in the probability of flooding within the region. For
example, built-up areas between the river and the dike are subject to higher flood probabili-
ties than areas behind the dike (de Moel et al., 2014). In addition, it is likely that the actual
probability of flooding in some areas differs substantially from the safety standards. Differ-
ences in the spatial concentration of economic activity as well as differences in inundation
depths mean that there are relatively large sectoral differences in direct damage between
dike-rings.
6.3.1 Data
Values for pi and ∆Si,i are calculated from the data showed in Table 6.1 below. Data used for
the calculation of the share of capital at risk, ∆Si,i, is obtained from Jonkhoff et al. (2008).
Jonkhoff et al. (2008) investigated both direct and indirect damages for a number of dike
breaches in the region of Rotterdam (see Figure 6.2). Total direct capital damages were
calculated using the Dutch Damage and Casualty model HIS-SSM (Kok et al., 2005). This
model combines modelled maximum inundation depth and a range of asset-type specific
depth-damage functions and maximum damage values to estimate potential losses from a
specific flood scenario, on a 100m x 100m resolution. The damage estimates represent
losses at replacement values, and include an additional 5% on top of the direct damages to
represent part of the indirect losses. The HIS-SSM model is extensively used by government
and research organizations for the exploration of flood risk management policies (e.g., de
Bruijn and van der Doef, 2011; Kind, 2014). Table 6.1 reports the direct sectoral capital
damage, as a percentage of the total capital stock in each sector, from the flood scenarios
in Jonkhoff et al. (2008). The table also indicates the safety level (return period) of the
dike-rings in the scenarios.
6.3.2 Simulations and scenarios
In order to investigate the sensitivity of model results to different values of pi and ∆Si,i, we
run a number of different scenarios, increasing probability, damage or both. By varying
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Figure 6.2 The large Rotterdam area and NUTS-3 regions in the Netherlands. Dike breaches
from the flood scenarios in Jonkhoff et al. (2008) are indicated in the left part of the figure.
the parameters in Equation 6.18 we thus simulate macroeconomic effects as risk-averse
investors expect an increase in probability or damage or both. As mentioned above, the low
level of risk perception among the population in the Netherlands could mean that flood risk
is currently not an important factor in private decision making such as investment decisions.
We define our baseline scenario as a scenario in which investments are unaffected by risk.
In Equation 6.18 this entails setting pi = ∆Si,i = 0. By increasing pi we simulate a situation
where investors believe protection decreases relative to its current level. Similarly, increases
in ∆Si,i imply that investors believe that the share of capital at risk increases relative to the
current situation.
To illustrate how the modified investment behaviour affects disaster impacts, we simu-
late one of the dike breach scenarios from Jonkhoff et al. (2008). This scenario is dike-ring
14 in the region of Rotterdam, with breach points indicated in Figure 6.2. We simulate a
flood in t = 2016, assuming, as the original study, a disruption period of two months. The
flood is incorporated in RAEM as a partial reduction in available land, housing stock, capital
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Table 6.1 The table shows the return period of each dike-ring and the sectoral capital damage
from the scenarios in Jonkhoff et al. (2008).
Dike ring 14 15 16 17 20 21 22
Probability 1/10,000 1/2,000 1/2,000 1/4,000 1/4,000 1/2,000 1/2,000
Sector Damage as percentage of capital
Agriculture 0.243 1.619 1.082 0.002 0.013 0.0250 0.068
Mining and quarrying 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing 0.135 0.080 0.130 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.103
Electricity, gas and
water supply
0.213 0.012 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.022
Construction 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.0018 0.000 0.000 0.003
Trade and repair con-
sumer services
0.097 0.032 0.039 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.035
Hotels, restaurants
and cafe
0.211 0.069 0.084 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.077
Transport 0.064 0.092 0.109 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.031
Storage and commu-
nication
0.176 0.253 0.298 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.085
Financial services 0.165 0.099 0.067 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.043
Business services,
renting, real estate
0.232 0.139 0.094 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.060
Public administration 0.405 0.140 0.174 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.197
Education 0.248 0.086 0.107 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.121
Health and social
work
0.019 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033
Culture, sports and
leisure
0.011 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018
stock and labour force. We interpret the reduction in labour force in RAEM as casualties.
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6.4 Results from the case-study
6.4.1 Ex-ante results: changes in labour force, production and unem-
ployment
Figure 6.3 shows the impacts from the modified investment behaviour on labour force, pro-
duction and unemployment in the region of Rotterdam under all scenarios until 2015. The
shaded area indicates the range of impacts across scenarios on each variable. As shown by
the green shaded area, production declines by up to 1.2 % relative to baseline production.
However, as shown by the red shaded area in the figure, labour force is reduced by up to
0.1 % relative to baseline labour force. As shown by the blue shaded area, unemployment
increases by up to 2 % relative to baseline unemployment. Our results thus suggest that the
reduction in production is about ten times higher than the reduction in labour force. The re-
duction in production is also accompanied by a relatively large increase in unemployment.
Our model results indicate that, despite worsening economic conditions in the Rotterdam
region (lower real wages, lower production and less varieties available to consumers), the
decrease in population is only minor.
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Figure 6.3 Impacts on labour force, production and unemployment in the region of Rot-
terdam. The red shaded area shows changes in labour force, the green shaded area shows
changes in production and the blue shaded area shows changes in unemployment.
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6.4.2 Ex-post results: capital destruction and casualties
The results showed in the previous subsection suggested that the decrease in investments in
the large Rotterdam areas leads to lower production, but only to small reductions in labour
force. In terms of exposure to flooding, the decrease in production and capital stock reduces
the potential capital damage of a flood. However, there are only limited reductions in the
number of casualties in case of a flood. This is illustrated in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 which show
percentage reductions in direct capital damage and casualties in the scenarios relative to the
original model without the modified investment behaviour. There are minor reductions in
capital damage in all scenarios where ∆Si,i stays at its current level, while the damage in
scenarios where ∆Si,i increases by a factor of 10, direct damage is reduced by less than 1
% relative to the baseline scenario. In scenarios where ∆Si,i increases by a factor of 100,
capital damage is reduced by between 3 and 5 %. However, the reductions in casualties are
almost identical across all scenarios.
Table 6.2 Percentage reductions in direct
capital damage in the scenario runs rela-
tive to the original model.
pi multiplied by ∆Si,i multiplied by
1 10 100
1 0.00 0.07 3.23
10 0.01 0.07 3.25
100 0.03 0.09 3.40
1000 0.07 3.40 4.81
Table 6.3 Percentage reductions in casu-
alties in the scenario runs relative to the
original model.
pi multiplied by ∆Si,i multiplied by
1 10 100
1 0.02 0.02 0.09
10 0.02 0.02 0.09
100 0.02 0.02 0.09
1000 0.02 0.09 0.12
6.4.3 Ex-post results: welfare losses and tax revenues
Welfare losses, calculated as equivalent variation (Hicks, 1943), over the time-span 2007–
2025 are depicted in Figure 6.4. Here, equivalent variation refers to welfare losses as a
percentage of household’s yearly income. The time-span in Figure 6.4 covers both the ex-
ante period as well as long-term ex-post. In a given year (horizontal axis), the isolines show
the reduction in welfare as pi increases. Movements along the vertical axis thus shows how
impacts vary with different probabilities of flooding, while movements along the horizontal
axis illustrate how impacts develop over time. The left panel shows results from scenarios
where ∆Si,i in Equation 6.18 is held at its current level, the centre panel shows results from
scenarios where ∆Si,i increases by a factor of 10 and the right panel shows results from
scenarios where ∆Si,i increases by a factor of 100.
The left panel, which shows results from scenarios where damage is kept constant, sug-
gests that welfare losses due to the modified investment behaviour are minor. Before the
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Figure 6.4 Impacts on household welfare in the large Rotterdam area. The vertical axis
shows pi while the horizontal axis shows year. The left panel shows results from scenarios
where ∆Si,i in Equation 6.18 is held at its current level, the centre panel shows results from
scenarios where ∆Si,i increases by a factor of 10 and the right panel shows results from
scenarios where ∆Si,i is increased by a factor of 100.
flood, welfare losses amount to maximum 0.01 % of household income. After the flood, the
decrease in welfare corresponds to maximum 0.08 % of household income. However, the
figure also suggests welfare losses are almost entirely due to the flood. Welfare losses are
substantially larger in scenarios where ∆Si,i increase by a factor of 10 (centre panel), but the
increase in welfare losses is not proportional to the increase in ∆Si,i. Welfare losses before
2016 are maximum 0.05 % of household income.
The centre panel shows that changes in probability has some effect on welfare losses:
for the current level of probability there are welfare decreases by about 0.1 % and for cases
where probability increases by a factor of 100 welfare decreases by more than 0.25 %. The
right panel, which shows results from scenarios where ∆Si,i increases by a factor of 100,
shows a further decrease in welfare, amounting to around 1 % of income before the flood,
reaching a maximum of above 3 % of income around 2025. The right panel suggests that
welfare losses are almost entirely driven by the modified investment behaviour. Losses
accelerate over time and are mainly driven by ∆Si,i (although flatter isolines towards the
end of the time interval indicate that differences in probabilities become more important
over time). The indirect effects of a flood can have detrimental effects of a governments
fiscal position in the sense that a drop in production reduces tax income. However, as
shown above, the modified investment behaviour diverts production away from the region
of Rotterdam, reducing the impact of a flood and, as a consequence, the indirect effects. This
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is illustrated in Figure 6.5 where the left panel shows results for scenarios where damage in
Equation 6.18 is kept at its current level. The modified investment behaviour leads to a slight
increase in tax revenue before the flood (around 1 % higher than baseline tax revenue by
2015). The flood leads to an immediate drop in tax revenue in all scenarios. Interestingly,
for scenarios where probability increase by a factor of 10 or 100 the increasing isolines
suggest that the flood has the effect of setting the economy on to a negative growth path
with declining tax revenues over time. The middle and right panel of Figure 6.5 suggest that
diversion of investment away from the region of Rotterdam has in fact a positive effect on
tax-revenues. This suggests that the modified investment behaviour and the ensuing outflow
of productive capital from the region of Rotterdam limits the impact of a flood on public
finances.
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Figure 6.5 Impacts on tax revenues. The vertical axis shows pi while the horizontal axis
shows years. The left panel shows results from scenarios where ∆Si,i in Equation 6.18 is
held at its current level, the centre panel shows results from scenarios where ∆Si,i increases
by a factor of 10 and the right panel shows results from scenarios where ∆Si,i increases by a
factor of 100.
6.5 Discussion
The possibility of future increases in flood risk has intensified the debate on the roles and
responsibilities of public and private sector agents in flood risk management. The discussion
is particularly relevant for our case-study — the large Rotterdam area in the Netherlands.
Traditionally, Dutch flood risk management has focused almost entirely on prevention and
public ex-post loss compensation. This strategy can be explained by high concentration of
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population and economic assets in flood-prone areas, leading to covariate risk in the case of
a flood disaster (Mechler and Bouwer, 2014). Large and quasi-irreversible investment costs
and the public good features of flood protection justify an important role of the Dutch gov-
ernment in flood risk management in the Netherlands (Fankhauser et al., 1999). Attempts to
introduce private disaster insurance have been complicated by the potential high covariate
risk in the case of a flood disaster, as well as high transaction costs, uncertainties related to
risk assessment and limited markets for risk sharing products (Froot, 2001). It is, however,
increasingly argued that the traditional approach should be complemented with measures
limiting the consequences in case of a flood (Kabat et al., 2005). Answering calls for a more
integrated approach, the Dutch government has made efforts in incorporating for example
spatial planning measures in flood risk management policies (Min. I& M, 2014; van den
Hurk et al., 2014). Crucially, elements of the proposed flood risk management strategy
entails a partial shift in the allocation of risk, where private sector agents to some extent
are responsible for covering their own risk. However, as the recent rejection of mandatory
flood insurance for home-owners has shown, the introduction of market-based instruments is
likely to face challenges. In this chapter we have attempted to inform the debate by studying
macroeconomic implications of a possible incentive effect from increased risk awareness.
The goal of this chapter was to investigate the long-term economic and welfare effects
if risk-averse investors in the Netherlands took flood risk into account in their investment
decisions. By increasing the values of the key parameters probability of flooding and po-
tential capital damage we shed some light on the potential investor responses to two aspects
of flood risk and on the ensuing macroeconomic effects. More specifically, we analysed
impacts on production, on population and on household welfare in the large Rotterdam area
when risk-averse investors started worrying about downside risk in the region.
Our results suggest that combinations of increases in probability and capital damage
can cause investors to divert investments away from the large Rotterdam area. Yet, the
decline in investment has a dual impact. On the one hand there is a reduction in productive
capital in the region, reducing capital damage in case of a flood by as much as 5 %. The
reductions in productive capital also reduces the impact from a flood on tax revenues. On the
other hand, the decrease in economic activities also leads to an increase in unemployment
and prices of consumption goods, causing welfare losses among households in the large
Rotterdam area. According to our results these welfare losses can amount to more than 3 %
of yearly household income. Overall, although potential disaster losses can be reduced, it
is questionable whether diversion of investments away from risky areas is desirable due to
the negative side effects. This resonates with conclusions drawn in other studies (Ligtvoet
et al., 2009; Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola, 2000).
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Turning to the sensitivity of our results to increases in key parameters, our simulation
exercises suggest that investment decisions are particularly sensitive to increased capital
damage (higher ∆Si,i). If the potential capital damage increases to close to 100 %, anything
else than very high levels of protection is likely to cause large decreases in investments. This
reflects a frequently raised concern in the current Dutch policy debate: high and increasing
exposure justifies very high safety levels. Projected future increases in the concentration of
economic activity in vulnerable areas such as the region of Rotterdam provide arguments
for increasing the protection in these areas (Kind, 2014).
The point of departure for our analysis is that, while there is a good understanding
about flood risk in the Netherlands, risk is currently of limited importance for household-
level adaptation. This is in line with conclusions drawn in empirical studies that argue that
flood risk is a relatively minor concern for people in the Netherlands (Terpstra et al., 2009).
Indeed, international experience shows that in the absence or a long time after an event,
risk is likely to have a limited direct impact on household decision making (see Slovic,
1987). For example, Kunreuther and Pauly (2006) argue that both probabilities and potential
government assistance are of limited importance in household decisions on whether or not
to buy insurance. Most importantly, risk may play a limited role in households location
decision (Hunter, 2005). Studies examining housing market impacts of floods show that risk
perceptions are systematically increased by concrete events, yet only temporarily so. Such
studies find that disaster events such as floods lead to a temporary housing price difference
between risky and non-risky areas (e.g., Atreya et al., 2013; Bin and Landry, 2013).
Overall, lack of actionable risk perceptions and strong incentives may lead to increasing
exposure over time, meriting considerations regarding policy-induced reallocation of risk
from the public to the private sector. We have analysed a situation where risk is directly
relevant only for investors, while households are indirectly affected through supply-side ad-
justments and ensuing price effects. However, as our results suggest, the indirect effects,
reflected as lower production and increased unemployment in areas at risk, do not necessar-
ily provide strong enough signals for households to relocate. This is in line with results from
other studies (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Vigdor, 2008). The negative welfare effects as-
sociated with the reallocation of risk voice the equity-concerns raised by Linnerooth-Bayer
and Amendola (2000).
It is argued that the current policy regime in the Netherlands provides little incentives for
individual adaptation (Aerts and Botzen, 2011; Botzen and van den Bergh, 2008; Filatova,
2014). Our model results suggest that a partial reallocation of risk can provide incentives
for individual adaptation. On the one hand our results suggest that the direct capital damage
from a flood can be reduced by diverting investments away from areas at risk. Provision of
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information about hazard as well as information about the effectiveness of individual adap-
tation measures could help private sector agents in making decisions on their own exposure
to flood risk. On the other hand, ensuring the public good characteristics of protection is an
important goal for policy makers: publicly financed prevention can help ensuring that safety
does not become a good primarily enjoyed by the privileged.
In order to make the analysis clear and the model tractable, we have relied on a number
of simplifying assumptions. Firstly, as a country-level analysis would require additional data
on flood damage from other regions, we have limited our analysis to the large Rotterdam
area. Secondly, we have followed the convention of modelling a representative regional
household who does not react to the level or changes in risk. This allows us to observe
changes in average values, but we are unable to provide detailed analyses of changes in the
socio-economic composition of a region. We leave these open questions for future research.
Appendix 6.A Calibration
This Appendix elaborates upon the calibration of RAEM. The design of a CGE model in-
volves the following steps: firstly, the general structure of the model must be defined, deter-
mining agents of the economy, relevant markets and the flow of goods and services between
market agents. Subsequently, functional forms have to be chosen for production and de-
mand functions, where parameter values for the functional forms must be derived. The
most commonly used procedure to determine parameter values is calibration, which implies
that parameter values are obtained on the basis of data from a single year observation of the
economy.
Let us write the CGE model as a system of equations with a set of unknown parameters
θ , such that a vector of exogenous variables X results in a vector of endogenous variables
Y :
G(Y,X ,θ) = 0 (6.A1)
The calibration approach implies that Equation 6.A1 is deterministic, which again entails
the system of equations can be solved for the vector of parameters θ using only observations
from a single year only (the benchmark year). The benchmark equilibrium data setor is
derived from the Social Accounting Matrix. Parameters values that cannot be derived from
the benchmark equilibrium data set are usually derived econometrically or obtained from
the literature.
The values for Armington substitution elasticities used in RAEM were derived based
on econometric estimations. Armington elasticities regulate the imperfect substitution in
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demand between imports and domestic supply. In RAEM Armington substitution elastici-
ties partly determine the imports and exports between the Dutch economy and the rest of the
world. Data used to derive the parameter values of the Armington substitution elasticities on
international trade, domestic production and prices from Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
Netherlands for the period 1980-2002. The specific parameter values used in RAEM can be
found in Table 5 in Ivanova et al. (2007).
Another important parameter in the RAEM model is the elasticity of substitution be-
tween capital and labour. RAEM incorporates unique values for substitution elasticities for
each sectors in each region. Parameter values for elasticities of substitution were calculated
for 15 sectors on national level, assuming that there are minor interregional differences in
the elasticities of substitution. Data used for the estimation is the EU-KLEMS database
which measures industry level economic growth, productivity, employment creation, cap-
ital formation and technological change for all European Union member states from 1970
onwards. The specific parameter values can be found in Table 6 in Ivanova et al. (2007).
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Chapter 7
Public concern as a driver of disaster
losses
This chapter builds upon the previous chapter by analysing labour migration
and ensuing macroeconomic effects in the aftermath of a flood event. The flood
event does not result in casualties, but leads to an increase in public concern
regarding the safety of the affected area. We quantify the macroeconomic losses
originating from the sudden increase in public concern and analyse regional
distributional effects. For the analysis, we propose a combined macroeconomic
model allowing for incorporating individual heterogeneity in beliefs and the
cumulative consequences of exchanges of risk opinions in the aftermath of a
disaster.
7.1 Introduction
“Risk events interact with psychological, social, and cultural processes in ways
that can heighten or attenuate public perception of risk and related risk be-
havior. Behavioral patterns, in turn, generate secondary social or economic
consequences but may act also to increase or decrease the physical risk it-
self....[T]raditional cost-benefit and risk analyses neglect these higher-order im-
pacts and thus greatly underestimate the variety of adverse effects attendant on
certain risk events (and thereby underestimate the overall risk from the event).
In this sense, social amplification provides a corrective mechanism by which
society acts to bring the technical assessment of risk more in line with a fuller
determination of risk.” (pp. 177–178, Kasperson et al., 1988).
It is well documented that disasters, even relatively minor ones, can elicit strong pub-
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lic concern regarding the safety level of an affected region. As regional economies com-
pete with one another for customers, businesses and employees, relatively small changes
in opinions can generate substantial reductions in regional economic activity. Decreases in
production and population in one region may well translate into increases in production and
population in another. To date, few studies have quantified the macroeconomic losses origi-
nating from a sudden increase in public concern or analysed distributional effects (Giesecke
et al., 2012).
As discussed in Chapter 3, disaster losses are often estimated with Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models. This type of models allows for simulating the macroeconomic
effects of economic shocks. CGE-models represent the economy as a circular flow of goods
and services, where agents are connected through systems of interlinked equations. Many
CGE models are single-region models set up on a national scale, thereby ruling out inter-
regional and nation-region feedbacks. Spatial CGE models overcome this shortcoming by
introducing interregional trade and household mobility (Giesecke and Madden, 2013). In
spatial CGE models, a single-region shock leads to ripple effects, transmitting disaster losses
to sectors and regions not directly affected by the disaster.
However, some authors argue that CGEs currently in use are based on assumptions
which make them somewhat ill-suited for analyses in the context of risk and uncertainty
(Safarzynska et al., 2013). First, individual responses to risk and uncertainty in these mod-
els are modelled using actuarial calculations of risk (Lecca et al., 2013; Pratt et al., 2013).
This is at odds with the psychological literature which argues that objective probabilities
play a limited role for decision making in the context of risk and uncertainty (Kunreuther
and Pauly, 2006). Second, CGEs generally use the concept of representative economic
agents. This masks substantial heterogeneity in individual responses to risk found in empir-
ical studies (e.g., Smith et al., 2006). In addition, the use of representative agents rules out
interaction between agents within a certain household type (Colander et al., 2008).
The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) suggests that the public percep-
tion of risk can be amplified through interactions of agents with possibly biased individual
opinions (Kasperson et al., 1988). Although the SARF is highly informative, it is a con-
ceptual framework not originally designed for practical modelling. However, some of the
mechanisms envisaged in the SARF can be incorporated in Agent-Based Models (ABMs).
ABMs are bottom-up models designed to evaluate the cumulative consequences of individ-
ual decision-making under heterogeneous beliefs and interactions. ABMs have been applied
in a wide range of research areas and they have been actively applied to explore the dynam-
ics of coupled socio-enviromental systems as reviewed by An (2012); Filatova et al. (2013);
Heckbert et al. (2010); Matthews et al. (2007). In the context of flood risk, ABMs have
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been applied to study the evaluation of flood protection measures (Brouwers and Boman,
2011; Dawson et al., 2011; O’Connell and O’Donnell, 2013; Sobiech, 2013), vulnerability
dynamics in the aftermath of flood events (Naqvi and Rehm, 2014), the impacts of biased
flood risk perceptions on land values and patterns (Filatova et al., 2009a,b, 2011) and en-
vironmentally related migration processes (Kniveton et al., 2012). A growing literature is
using ABMs to investigate how collective opinions are shaped through dynamic interactions
of individual agents (Castellano et al., 2009; Stauffer, 2013). Recently, such a model has
been employed to illustrate the formation of collective risk perceptions (Moussaïd, 2013).
The focus on individual interacting agents whose behaviour is guided by simple rules
rather than by optimising behaviour means that ABMs accommodate many of the limita-
tions of CGEs. However, fully integrating CGEs and ABMs is challenging for a number of
reasons. In the econometric literature, it is well known that the presence of unobservable
social interactions can lead to multiple equilibria (Blume et al., 2011). Social interactions
could lead to problems with identifying causal mechanisms and they could be a source of
instability in the general equilibrium (Ackerman, 2001). Additionally, individual level dy-
namics within the ABM are likely to interfere with adjustments of supply and demand in
the CGE, leading to problems with convergence (Mandel, 2012). As such, a full integration
of the two model types may well render the CGE unsolvable.
In this chapter, we exploit the relative strengths of CGE and ABM modelling approaches.
Instead of fully integrating the two models, we propose a combined model consisting of a
modified version of the CGE model used in Chapter 6 (RAEM), soft-linked with an opinion
dynamics ABM. The CGE and the ABM are connected through households’ location de-
cisions. We incorporate household location decisions in the recursive dynamic structure of
the CGE, meaning changes in population result in a labour supply shock in at the beginning
of each model period.
The ABM depicts a society in which agents meet in a social network in discrete time,
communicating and exchanging opinions about the disutility of residing in a risky area. Each
agent starts with an initial opinion about the marginal utility reduction from living in a risky
area instead of a safe areas. These initial values were derived from a choice experiment on
households location preferences under flood risk (Sheremet and Brouwer, 2015). Crucially,
individual opinions are potentially updated through the influence of other opinions. The
extent to which individual agents adjust their opinions is determined by an agent-specific
level of uncertainty.
The goal of this chapter is to show how a sudden increase in public concern in the
aftermath of a flood event can amplify the macroeconomic losses from the event. We also
illustrate the impact of uncertainty and the presence of extremist opinions on the estimated
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losses. For this purpose we simulate a flood in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Risk perceptions
among inhabitants in the Netherlands are currently very low (Terpstra et al., 2009), but it is
likely that a flood event would trigger large behavioural reactions (Olsthoorn et al., 2008).
We simulate the impacts from a flood with both the CGE model and the combined CGE-
ABM, comparing outcomes between the two versions of the model. As in Chapter 6, a
flood is incorporated in the CGE as a negative shock to the capital stock. In the combined
CGE-ABM the flood leads to capital damage and public concern. Simulation exercises are
used to show variations in effects for different values of key parameters in the ABM.
Our results suggest that an increase in public concern, leading to a labour supply shock,
causes production losses in Rotterdam in the aftermath of the flood. As households in-
creasingly choose to locate in other regions than Rotterdam, the drop in labour supply and
demand for products amplifies the magnitude of production losses from the capital dam-
age from the flood. However, as households choose to locate elsewhere than Rotterdam,
there are changes in the spatial distribution of labour supply, again impacting the regional
production structure of the Netherlands. Simulation results suggest that the amount of indi-
vidual extremist opinions as well as the individual uncertainty regarding the safety level in
Rotterdam have large quantitative impacts on the modelled production losses.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 7.2 presents the model; section 7.3 de-
scribes our simulations and presents our results; section 7.4 discusses and concludes.
7.2 The model
The CGE model used in this chapter builds upon the model used in the previous chapter
(RAEM). In the Chapter 6, labour migration was modelled as an equilibrium adjustment
mechanisms. Here households moved until utility levels were equal across regions (spatial
equilibrium). In this chapter we replace the labour migration function from the original
model (Equation 6.5), introducing labour migration as an additional mechanism in the re-
cursive dynamics part of the model, out-of-equilibrium location decisions.
Recursive dynamics in the original formulation of RAEM are implemented using an in-
vestment agent who allocates the savings in the economy to capital investments in different
sectors and regions. In this chapter we extend the model with an additional recursive dy-
namic mechanism: household location decisions are modelled in-between the yearly equi-
libria in RAEM. Location decisions are based on inputs from RAEM as well as on the level
of public concern determined by the ABM. Figure 7.1 illustrates the household location de-
cision as well as the dynamic feedback effects between household location decisions and
RAEM.
The upper part of the figure illustrates the ’cumulative causation’ mechanism between
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Figure 7.1 An illustration of the recursive dynamics in the combined model.
household location decisions and economic activity. Households’ location decisions deter-
mine labour supply and final demand for goods in each region. Changes in labour supply
and demand for goods affect firms, leading to adjustments in prices and wages (determin-
ing households’consumption budget). Consumption budget and prices, in turn, feed back
into the household location decision, again determining labour supply in the next period.
Note that this setup implies that the direct supply side impacts from the flood will occur in
Time Period 1, while changes in labour supply will occur in Time Period 2 (this sequence
of events is not an intrinsic feature of the model but has been chosen such that the direct and
indirect effects can easily be distinguished).
In the absence of a shock, the model will reproduce the benchmark equilibrium in each
time period. We introduce a shock in the form of a flood event. The flood event leads to
partial destruction of capital, affecting the supply side of RAEM. The event leads to public
concern, the extent to which is determined by the ABM. The lower part of the figure shows
that household location decisions are, in each period, also affected by public concern deter-
mined by the ABM. As such, public concern enters as a corrective factor in the household
location decision process.
7.2.1 Risk judgements and household location decisions
The household location decision function in this chapter, described in Appendix 7.A, is
based on the multinomial logit migration function developed by Anas (Anas and Liu, 2007).
In the economic modelling literature residential location is often considered as a discrete
choice (Anas and Liu, 2007; Klaiber, 2014). In this approach, households choose a region of
location i such as to maximise indirect utility Vi,t . We separate utility into two components:
119
Public concern as a driver of disaster losses
Vi,t = Ui,t +Ei,t . Here Ui,t is the indirect utility from market-factors (consumption budget
and prices), while Ei,t represents the utility flow from amenities, capturing the influence of
non-monetary factors on households’ location decision (for a presentation of the household
maximisation problem, see Appendix 7.A). For the purposes of this chapter, amenities cap-
ture public goods such as safety from flooding. The probability of the discrete choice for
region i, Pi,t , is modelled according to the multinomial logit function (McFadden, 1978):
Pi,t =
exp(Vi,t)
∑ j exp(Vj,t)
, ∑
i
Pi,t = 1 (7.1)
Following the setup depicted in Figure 7.1, the labour supply in region i, LSi,t+1, is
calculated by multiplying total population in the Netherlands, Popt by Pi,t :
LSi,t+1 = PoptPi,t (7.2)
Following Equation 7.1, a lower level of safety (i.e., a reduction in Ei,t ) reduces the
attractiveness of a region. The empirical literature on the housing market impact of floods
suggests that disasters cause an increasing awareness of the risk of residing in floodplain
(Atreya et al., 2013; Bin and Landry, 2013). A disaster event therefore can have the effect
of leading households to differentiate between areas which are relatively more risky than
other nearby areas. We assume that the utility flow from amenities in region i is reduced
by an amount corresponding to the size of the population living at risk inside this region.
We divide each region i into a risky and a safe area, where the share of residential land in
the risky area is given by νi. Residing in the risky area is associated with a reduction in
the utility flow from amenities by a factor ∆− ≤ 1. The total utility flow from amenities in
region i, Ei,t , is given by:
Ei,t = (1−νi)Ei+νiEi∆− = Ei[1−νi(1−∆−)] (7.3)
7.2.2 Individual risk opinions leading to public concern
The social amplification or risk framework highlights how public concern is shaped by pos-
sibly biased risk opinions being transmitted from person to person. An agent specific neg-
ative shock may therefore turn into an aggregate shock, provided the agent is "connected"
enough. However, although highly informative, the social amplification of risk framework
remains too conceptual to be used for practical modelling of opinion dynamics. We base
our modelling approach on the Deffuant model (Deffuant et al., 2000), where agents adjust
opinions on a topic through exchanges of opinions with other agents whenever the differ-
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ence in opinion is below a given threshold. According to this model agent a= 1, ...,N has an
individual risk perception in time-step T S, Oa,T S, that varies continuously within an inter-
val. In each time-step of the model individual agents meet at random and evaluate whether
an exchange of opinions makes sense. Exchanges of opinions will occur if the opinions
of the two agents differ by less than the da. In the original formulation of the model this
parameter is referred to as the confidence bound, reflecting an agents’ openness or uncer-
tainty. It is assumed that people do not take into account opinions out of their range of
uncertainty. Consequently, agents with a high value of da are more likely to be influenced
by other agents. This implies the following setup:
Oa,T S =Oa,T S−1+µ[Ob,T S−1−Oa,T S−1]
if |Ob,T S−1−Oa,T S−1|< da (7.4)
µ is a parameter which controls the speed of convergence, which has little quantitative
impacts on the results as long as µ > 0. Similar to other studies, we set µ = 0.5. We set
the threshold parameter for all agents proportional to the standard deviation of the initial
distribution of opinions, da = θ ∗σ , where 0 < θ < 10 is a parameter used for simulations
and σ is the standard deviation of opinions across the population. Consequently, agents are
willing to exchange opinions with agents whose opinion differs from their own by a factor
proportional to the standard deviation of opinions. Increasing uncertainty is captured as an
increase in θ : high uncertainty implies that agents are potentially influenced by opinions
that differ substantially from their own opinion.
We assume that all agents are initially exposed to the same information, forming an in-
dividual opinion on the information and thereafter exchanging risk opinions. This is very
similar to the original Deffuant model. However, opinion dynamics models such as the
Deffuant model have been criticised for lack of empirical grounds (Chacoma and Zanette,
2015). Firstly, the original model was mainly used for illustrative purposes, and opinions
were set to vary over an arbitrary interval. In our context individuals have opinions around
the safety level of a region. Oa,T S is therefore interpreted as percentage reduction in the
utility-flow from amenities associated with living in a risky location. Values for the reduc-
tion in utiliity-flow from amenities was obtained from a choice experiment (see Sheremet
and Brouwer (2015)). In this experiment households were asked to trade off the location of
a house (risky area versus safe areas) with a number of other attributes (travel time, house
size, monthly expenditures). The disutility from a risky location was calculated using the
parameter value of the coefficient for house location (see Appendix 7.B for more informa-
tion and calculations).
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Secondly, the assumption on random exchanges of opinions across the population ap-
pears unfounded: in many contexts it is likely that agents interact only with other agents
within their private or job network. We set up a simple social network using data from the
Dutch Housing Demand Survey (2009). This data set contains rich information on charac-
teristics on agents, but there is no information on connections between agents. Although the
literature offers little guidance on how to create social networks in such situations (Blume
et al., 2011), it is well known that people navigate social networks by looking for common
features between themselves and other people (Watts et al., 2002). This suggests a model
where individuals are grouped into categories according to, for instance, occupation, educa-
tion level and so forth. By grouping these categories into a tree-like hierarchy, it is possible
to obtain the "social distance" between two individuals in the network. It is assumed that
the probability of two agents being linked is greater the shorter the social distance between
the two agents (Newman, 2003).
We choose a relatively simple approach, where the social distance between agents is cal-
culated based on overlapping characteristics of agents (age categories, ethnicity, postcode,
occupation, education level) as reported in the Dutch Housing Demand Survey (2009). We
transform the social distance in terms of probabilities by assuming that a complete overlap
of characteristics between two agents results in a 100% probability of there being a link
between the two agents. Next, a random adjacency matrix is created where links between
agents are calculated using the probabilities reflecting the social distance between agents.
This results in an undirected network, where the probability of an existing link between
two agents is governed by the spatial proximity between agents as well as their overlapping
characteristics.
The model population N is used as a representative sample for the entire population in
one region. We set N = 3000, letting one time-step in the model correspond to a random
draw of 1500 pairs of agents. Our own experiments suggest that increasing N above 3000
only has minor impacts on the results and comes at the cost of increased computing time.
Pairs with unconnected agents are removed, meaning that the actual number of agents ex-
changing opinions varies between the time-steps of the model. Initial opinions Oa,0 are
formed in T S = 0 and are based on results from the choice experiment in Sheremet and
Brouwer (2015). As mentioned above, Oa,0 ≥ 0 is interpreted as the percentage reduction
in utility-flow from amenities associated with living at risk. In each time-step of the ABM,
agents meet and exchange opinions subject to the rule in Equation 7.4. Consequently, Oa,1
is updated for potential influence from others. Finally, public concern PC is calculated by
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averaging Oa,1000 over all agents in the final period (T S = 1000):
PC =
∑n On,1000
N
(7.5)
Consequently, PC is interpreted as the percentage reduction in utility-flow from ameni-
ties associated with living at risk, averaged over the population. Next, we calculate the
reductions in the utility flow from amenities as ∆− = 1−PC. From Equation 7.3, we have
that PC = 0 does not alter the utility flow from amenities, while PC > 0 results in a re-
duction in this utility flow. From this equation it can easily be seen that Oa,0 > 0 leads to
PC > 0. As such, even the initial level public concern, based entirely on the results from
the choice experiment, leads to a reduction in the utility flow from amenities. Next we show
how interactions between the agents can lead to an amplification of public concern.
7.2.3 Introducing extremist opinions
The threshold parameter da is the most important determinant of the dynamics (Deffuant
et al., 2000). This parameter essentially controls the number of peaks in the final distribution
of opinions and can be interpreted as the agent-specific level of uncertainty: for larger values
of da an individual agents’ opinion is more likely to be influenced by the opinions of others
– i.e., the agent is more uncertain about his/her own opinion. The first simulation exercise
consists of varying the parameter θ , which amounts to varying the level of uncertainty. By
varying the level of individual uncertainty, we are thus able to control the number of clusters
of individual risk perceptions.
However, varying da only allows us to investigate the dynamic properties of the system
of individual opinions under normal conditions, while an extreme event such as a flood
disaster is likely to push the system out of its normal state. In order to simulate opinion
dynamics in the aftermath of a flood we follow the approach in (Fortunato and Stauffer,
2006), introducing a perturbation into the system. This perturbation consists of assigning
a share δ of randomly selected "extremist opinions". Extremists opinions are introduced
by changing the opinion of a number of randomly selected agent by the parameter ξ . i.e.
Oa,T S|extremist = Oa,T S(1+ ξ ) where ξ = 2σ and P(Oa,T S|extremist) = δ . We assume that
extremists are not affected by other agents’ opinions, i.e. da|extremist = 0 (Acemoglu et al.,
2013). Table 7.1 summarises the parameters used in the opinion dynamics ABM.
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Table 7.1 Parameters used in the agent-based model of opinion dynamics.
Parameter Description Value
N Number of agents 3000
ν Share of residences in the risky area 0.04
σ Standard deviation of Oa,T S
da Threshold value/uncertainty [0,θσ ]
δ Simulation parameter, share of extremists [0,0.01,0.1,0.3]
θ Simulation parameter, uncertainty [0,1,10]
ξ Simulation parameter, extremists [0,2σ ]
7.3 Simulations and results
Similar to Chapter 6, we use inputs from the dike breach scenarios from Jonkhoff et al.
(2008) to simulate the macroeconomic impact of a flood. In this study, the authors used
RAEM to estimate direct and indirect effects from a number of dike breach scenarios in
Rotterdam. In this chapter we use only the capital destruction from the Dike Ring 14 sce-
nario (see Table 6.1). We analyse the macroeconomic effects from a flood occurring in
Rotterdam in the year of 2008, comparing model outcomes under the original model with
outcomes from the extended model. As is common practice in the CGE literature, impacts
are measured as percentage changes from a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, created by
assuming an exogenous growth path of endogenous variables. Firstly we run the original
model using the capital damage from Jonkhoff (Jonkhoff et al., 2008) (RAEM scenario).
Next, we run a number of scenarios with the combined model where we assume that the
flood in 2008 also leads to public concern regarding the safety in the region of Rotterdam
(RAEM-ABM scenarios). Importantly, we assume the flood event leads to public con-
cern regarding safety from flooding in Rotterdam, disregarding public concern regarding
the safety in other regions.
Summing up, we run the following scenarios, comparing outcomes with the BAU sce-
nario:
• RAEM scenario: model run with the original model (flood leads to capital destruc-
tion).
• RAEM-ABM scenarios: model run with the extended model (a flood leads to capital
destruction and causes public concern).
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Using Equation 7.3, the utility flow from amenities in Rotterdam is defined as:
Ei,t =

Ei ∀ t (RAEM scenario)
Ei[1+νi(∆−−1)] if t = 2008 (RAEM-ABM scenarios)
Ei ∀ t ̸= 2008 (RAEM-ABM scenarios)
(7.6)
The RAEM-ABM scenarios are used to illustrate the contribution of driving forces of
public concern. Intuitively, the presence of extremist opinions in the population would
only lead to large shifts in public concern if people are influenced by such opinions. Here
we will assume that people are more easily influenced by extremist opinions under higher
levels of individual uncertainty. The RAEM-ABM scenarios are carried out by varying two
key parameters in the ABM: either the share of extremists δ or the uncertainty parameter
θ or both. Different combinations of the two parameters amount to a total of 12 scenarios.
Scenario names and corresponding parameter values are listed in Table 7.2. For ease of
presentation, these scenarios are also assigned to four groups (in parenthesis).
Table 7.2 RAEM-ABM scenarios.
Extremists
(δ )
Uncertainty (θ )
0 1 10
0 no_no (group1) no_mid (group1) no_hi (group1)
0.01 lo_no (group1) lo_mid (group1) lo_hi (group2)
0.1 mid_no (group2) mid_mid (group2) mid_hi (group4)
0.3 hi_no (group3) hi_mid (group3) hi_hi (group4)
7.3.1 Labour supply and production in Rotterdam
As mentioned in Section 7.2, the direct economic impact from the flood occurs in the same
year as the flood (2008) while the labour supply effects will only occur from the following
time period (2009 onwards). This suggests that the labour supply response to the flood
under the RAEM scenario would differ substantially from those under the RAEM-ABM
scenarios. In the RAEM scenario household location decisions are only affected by the flood
as the capital destruction leads to lower wages, higher unemployment and higher prices in
Rotterdam. In the latter scenarios household location decisions are also affected by public
concern regarding the safety in Rotterdam.
Figure 7.2 shows impacts from the flood on the equilibrium labour supply in Rotter-
dam for the RAEM scenario as well as for RAEM-ABM scenarios. Impacts are presented
as percentage change from the BAU labour supply. The figure clearly shows the effect of
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Figure 7.2 Impacts on labour supply in Rotterdam, measured as percentage deviations rela-
tive to the baseline labour supply.
public concern. In the RAEM scenario labour supply in Rotterdam declines gradually. In
the RAEM-ABM scenarios labour supply drops sharply between 2008 and 2009, subse-
quently declining gradually. After 2009 the lines representing the RAEM-ABM scenarios
are steeper than the line representing the RAEM scenario, suggesting that, in addition to the
additional shock in 2009, labour supply declines more rapidly in the RAEM-ABM scenarios
than in the RAEM scenario. There is also some variation between the RAEM-ABM scenar-
ios. The labour supply response is almost identical in scenarios where the share of extremist
is zero, or where the share of extremists is low and uncertainty is zero or low (group1). The
changes in labour supply increase with uncertainty and the share of extremists. The largest
decrease in labour supply is observed for scenarios with high uncertainty and middle to high
amounts of extremists.
Figure 7.3 shows impacts on production in Rotterdam under the RAEM scenario (the
original CGE model) and under the RAEM-ABM scenarios, measured as percentage change
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Figure 7.3 Impacts on total output in Rotterdam through time and across scenarios, mea-
sured as percentage deviations relative to the baseline output.
from BAU production. In the RAEM scenarios the flood event in 2008 causes an immediate
reduction in production of about 0.05% relative to BAU. The immediate drop is followed
by a gradual decline in production over time. In the RAEM-ABM scenarios, the drop in
production is followed by a large reduction the following year. As discussed above, the
capital destruction is followed by a reduction in labour supply. The reduction in production
is not proportional to the reduction in labour supply: the shortage of labour leads firms in
Rotterdam to substitute labour with other factors of production, reducing the impact of the
decline in labour supply on production, making it less than proportional.
7.3.2 Labour supply and production in the Netherlands
Figure 7.4 shows impacts from the flood on the regional labour supply in the Netherlands in
2015, measured as changes from BAU labour supply. The left panel shows changes under
the RAEM scenario and the right panel shows changes under the RAEM-ABM scenarios.
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Figure 7.4 Impacts on the regional supply of labour in 2015 under the RAEM scenario (left
panel) and average over the RAEM-ABM scenarios (right panel), measured as percentage
deviations relative to the BAU labour supply.
In both the RAEM and the RAEM-ABM scenarios there is a decrease in labour supply
in Rotterdam. Under the RAEM scenario all other regions experience a small increase in
labour supply. In the RAEM-ABM scenarios the decrease in labour supply in Rotterdam is
of larger magnitude than in the RAEM scenario. In addition, the increase in labour supply is
largest in two of the most populous and economically important regions in the Netherlands
– Amsterdam and Utrecht, providing evidence of the strong agglomeration forces in these
regions assumed in the model.
Figure 7.5 shows changes in production, measured as changes from BAU production,
in the Netherlands in 2015. The left panel shows results under the RAEM scenario and the
right panel shows the average change in production under the RAEM-ABM scenarios. Un-
der the RAEM scenario the decrease in production in Rotterdam is followed by a decrease
in production in neighbouring regions, suggesting that the decrease in exports from Rot-
terdam leads to decreasing production in regions with close trade-relations to Rotterdam.
A very different pattern is observed in the RAEM-ABM scenarios: the largest increases in
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Figure 7.5 Impacts on regional production in 2015 under the RAEM scenario (left panel) and
average change over simulation scenarios (right panel), measured as percentage deviations
relative to the BAU production.
production are observed in regions adjacent to Rotterdam.
The results from Figure 7.5 illustrate the impacts on the regional production structure
from a shift in the spatial distribution of labour supply. As households increasingly locate
elsewhere, scarcity of labour in Rotterdam leads to an increase in the price of labour and a
subsequent decrease in production in labour-intensive sectors. The decrease in production in
labour-intensive sectors in Rotterdam has two effects on the regions adjacent to Rotterdam:
firstly, the reduction in imports from Rotterdam of labour-intensive goods creates room for
increased production in these sectors. Secondly, the decrease in production in Rotterdam
as well as an increase in population in Amsterdam and Utrecht – all within commuting
distance from the regions adjacent to Rotterdam – leads to an increase in commuting from
Amsterdam, Utrecht and Rotterdam to the neighbouring regions of Rotterdam. The increase
in commuting reduces the cost of labour in these regions, allowing for an increase in the
production in labour-intensive sectors. Our results thus suggest that the negative impacts on
production in Rotterdam from an increase in public concern, are partly compensated by an
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increase in production in other regions.
7.4 Discussion
The possibility of growing disaster losses due to increases in flood risk highlight the need for
macroeconomic models able to give realistic estimates of losses associated with these disas-
ters. Some authors have argued that traditional tools used for risk analysis, which disregard
public concern, are likely to underestimate total disaster losses (Kasperson et al., 1988).
In this chapter we have developed an operational model which allows for investigating the
predictions posed by the largely theoretical Social Amplification of Risk Framework. In
order to develop such a model we used elements from the economic literature on household
migration in the context of climate change (Klaiber, 2014). We proposed a connected model
consisting of an opinion dynamics ABM and a CGE model. This allowed for incorporating
individual behavioural responses under risk and uncertainty while preserving the rigid struc-
ture of the CGE. In our model a flood led to public concern, reducing the attractiveness of a
disaster affected region as a potential residence. Household location-decisions occurred be-
tween the time-steps of the CGE, providing a between-equilibrium mechanism connecting
the time periods in the CGE.
Although ABMs currently in use are highly informative in illustrating specific phenom-
ena such as opinion formation, fully-fledged macroeconomic ABMs developed so far rely
on a number of restrictions to reach stability (Mandel, 2012), and often remain too ad hoc to
be used for concrete policy advice (Colander et al., 2008). In this chapter we have proposed
a connected model, which allows for combining the individual level interactions from an
opinion dynamics ABM with the rigourous macroeconomic structure of the CGE model.
Public concern, formed between the equilibria of the CGE affect the households’ location
decisions, capturing out-of-equilibria dynamics. In our connected model, the labour-supply
shock increases with the level of public concern, meaning that the emergent properties in
the opinion dynamics ABM partly translate into the CGE.
As an empirical application of the model we simulated a flood in Rotterdam, comparing
changes in labour supply and production as predicted by the original CGE model (RAEM)
with changes in labour supply and production predicted by the connected model (RAEM-
ABM). In the RAEM-ABM scenarios the reduction in labour supply in Rotterdam was
significantly larger than in the RAEM scenario. There were also large differences between
the RAEM-ABM scenarios: in scenarios with large uncertainty and a medium to high share
of extremists (group4) the reductions in labour supply were nearly three times larger than
in scenarios with no extremists or low uncertainty (group1). In other words, the large varia-
tions in production impacts across scenarios from a capital shock assumed identical across
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scenario, means our model predicts multiple equilibria in estimated disaster losses.
The reduction in labour supply, which also entails a reduction in demand for products,
exacerbated production losses significantly. As such, public concern in the aftermath of a
flood had the effect of magnifying the production shock in the region of Rotterdam. How-
ever, public concern also had impacts on the spatial distribution of households and produc-
tion in the Netherlands. In the RAEM scenarios Rotterdam experienced a decrease in labour
supply and production. The capital destruction in Rotterdam, and the subsequent decrease
in production led to a decrease in exports and a decrease in production in regions with trade-
links to Rotterdam. In the RAEM-ABM scenarios, there was an increase in labour supply in
large agglomerations such as Amsterdam and Utrecht as well as an increase in production in
regions located close to Rotterdam. The decrease in labour supply in Rotterdam following
the public concern, led firms to substitute labour with capital, leading to an increase in inter-
mediate demand and import demand in Rotterdam. Due to existing trade-links, this demand
was mainly supplied from surrounding regions. An increase in commuting from Amster-
dam and Utrecht to regions adjacent to Rotterdam was also observed. As was the case
with labour supply, the combination of large uncertainty and a large amount of extremists
magnified public concern.
The findings in this chapter have implications for risk analysis used to support politi-
cal decisions on the level of safety. Traditionally, such analyses devote scant attention to
indirect effects from disasters. In particular, behavioural responses which involve inter-
actions are ignored. We argue that ignoring such indirect effects is likely to result in an
underestimate of disaster losses. We find that disaster losses increase with uncertainty and
the share of extremist opinions. Our results thus highlight the role of public concern as a
driver of losses, meaning that reducing public concern would reduce losses. Furthermore,
the RAEM-ABM scenarios illustrated that uncertainty was a key determinant of the level
of public concern. Better risk information — e.g. hazard maps, early warning systems but
also evacuation routines, usually implemented to reduce the direct damage of floods — can
potentially reduce uncertainty, public concern and finally disaster losses.
At face value, higher disaster losses, implying increased benefits from protection due to
higher losses, would support arguments for increasing the level of safety. As we showed
in Chapter 2, the strong public reactions in the aftermath of the flood in the Netherlands in
1953 were likely a factor behind the implementation of the current system of high safety
standards. In contrast with Chapter 2, the modelled government in this chapter does not
initiate a large-scale reconstruction programme in the aftermath of the flood, meaning that
population responses to risk are not dampened by policy responses. Consequently, although
losses in Rotterdam are magnified, population responses reduce the exposure of Rotterdam
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to future increases in flood hazard. Furthermore, labour migration from Rotterdam has
positive economic effects for destination regions. Similar to Kasperson et al. (1988), this
chapter therefore suggests that the indirect effects from public concern are important for
risk analysis.
Appendix 7.A Households’ location decisions
Our model utilises the notion of a representative regional household, acting as both con-
sumer and potential labour supplier. Households are assumed to make a set of discrete
and continuous choices. Firstly, the household chooses its region of residence, denoted
i = 1, ...,40. The household location choice determines the regional labour supply, LSi.
Given the choice of residence, the households decide on: (i) the level of consumption goods
CSi,i from each sector Si= 1, ...,15, and (ii) the amount of (annual) hours of labour supplied,
which again determines the regional level of unemployment UNEMPi. The utility function
is modelled according to the Stone-Geary Linear Expenditure System (LES), where house-
holds receive utility from the consumption of goods above a certain subsistence level of
consumption, µHSi,i. Ei are regional-specific utility flows, or the level of amenities inherent
in each region. The elasticity of substitution between different types of goods is represented
by αHSi,i.
Ui =∏
Si
(CSi,i−µHSi,i)αHSi,i +Ei (7.A1)
Household income Yi is determined by wage income (the amount of worked hours multiplied
by the regional wage PWi, minus the net amount of regional labour supplied abroad, LROWi
multiplied by the foreign wage rate PROW multiplied by exchange rate ER and capital
income (capital KSi,i multiplied by the return to capital RKSI,i).
Yi = (LSi−UNEMPi)PWi+∑
Si
(KSi,iRKSi,i)−LROWiPLROWiER (7.A2)
The total household budget is defined by income net of taxes ty, transfers from the govern-
ment (T RFiGDPDEF) as well as unemployment benefits (UNEMPiPWiT REP). The budget
available for goods consumption CBUDi is calculated as the total budget minus savings SHi:
CBUDi = Yi(1− ty)+T RFiGDPDEF +UNEMPiPWiT REP−SHi (7.A3)
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Maximisation of Equation 7.A1 subject to the budget constraint in Equation 7.A3 leads to
the following Marshallian demand functions:
CSi,i = µHSi,i+
αHSi,i(CBUDi−∑S j PS j,iµHSi,i)
PSi,i
(7.A4)
By inserting the optimised values of consumption goods from Equation 7.A4 in Equation
7.A1 and rearranging we get the indirect utility function
Vi =
CBUDi−∑S j PS j,iµHS j,i
∏S j P
αHSi,i
S j,i
+Ei (7.A5)
The specification of Vi shows that the level of utility increases with consumption budget,
decreases with prices and expenditures on subsistence goods, and increases with the level
of amenities. The ensuing supply of labour LSi, measured in annual hours, is given by
the total population choosing region i minus the time spent on commuting to other regions
(∑ j(Ttimei, jLCMi, j), see also Chapter 6):
LSi = PopPi−∑
j
(Ttimei, jLCMi, j) (7.A6)
Appendix 7.B Choice experiment
Values for the utility reduction associated with residing in a risky location were obtained
from a survey in Sheremet and Brouwer (2015). It should be noted that the survey results
refer to the current situation where residents have quite diverse opinions about risk. The
simulation exercises carried out above reflect a thought experiment where we assume that a
recent flood event leads to increased concern. The utility reduction associated with residing
in a risky location obtained is used to provide a plausible range for the level of the utility
reduction in our thought experiment.
The survey used to collect data on respondent preferences about location of their houses
takes the form of a repeated discrete choice experiment. The theoretical underpinning for
such experiments is based on the random utility theory and well described in Ben-Akiva
and Lerman (1985). The theory assumes that there exists a linear additive utility function
dependent on the levels of attributes used in the study and possibly on socio-demographic
characteristics of the respondents. If the respondent is considering an alternative in a choice
situation, with given levels for each attribute in the attribute set, the random utility function
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in its simplest form can be written as follows:
Uin,al,cs = β ′xin,al,cs+ εin,al,cs (7.B7)
where β ′xin,al,cs is the set of all attributes (house location, area, travel time, and ex-
tra tax) of the situation under consideration, εin,al,cs the unobserved heterogeneity for in-
dividual in and alternative al in a choice situation cs , and β = {βloc,βtime,βarea,βtax}
a vector of utility parameters corresponding to the attributes. Assuming the error terms
are independently and identically distributed with an extreme value (Gumbel) distribution
F(εin,al,cs)= exp(−exp(εin,al,cs)) , the choice probabilities are generated by the multinomial
logit model:
Pr(yin,cs = j) = Pin,al,cs =
exp(β ′xin,al,cs)
∑Jinq=1 exp(β ′xin,q,cs)
(7.B8)
In our study, we are interested in estimating individual taste heterogeneity with respect
to different house location characteristics, and thus we employ a random parameter (mixed)
logit model. Such approach also allows us to decompose the mean of random utility co-
efficients to reveal sources of systematic taste heterogeneity. In particular, we are inter-
ested in taste variations with respect to a possible change of house location among house
owners and people renting their houses, and among respondents already living within or
outside a dike ring. For this, we create dummy variables dowins = (owner ∗ inside) and
dowoutside = (owner ∗ outside), and interact them with the means of β . And finally, we
also include respondents’ demographic characteristics as parameters in the equation for the
utility’s location parameter. The choice probabilities are now specified as follows:
Pin,al,cs =
exp(α j +β ′xin,al,cs)
∑Jiq=1 exp(αq+β ′xi,q,t)
(7.B9)
where αal is an alternative-specific constant, and individual random attribute coefficients
are defined as βin,k = βk + γ ′kzin,k +σkvin,,k , with zin being the set of location dummy and
demographic characteristics and vin,k representing individual specific unobserved hetero-
geneity, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation
one. Table 7.B1 presents results of the multinomial estimation of the model from Equation
7.B9. As can be seen from the table with estimation results γk are only significant in the
equation for the location attribute coefficient.
The choice experiment on willingness to pay for changes in house location and flood
protection was administered as a part of an Internet-based survey in December 2013. For
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Table 7.B1 Parameters used in the empirical application of the model
Coefficient Means Standard error
Random parameters in the utility function
βloc 2.512 0.515
βtime −0.051 0.024
βarea 0.049 0.018
βtax −3.467 0.142
Std. Dev. of parameter distributions
βloc 10.053 3.113
βtime 0.043 0.007
βarea 0.028 0.004
βtax 1.058 0.258
Non-random parameters in the utility function
α −0.697 0.145
γowoutside −1.111 0.326
γowinside 2.159 0.200
the experiment, we generated a D-efficient design (see ,e.g., Scarpa and Rose, 2008) that
was pretested in November 2013. Overall, for the WTP part of the choice experiment we
collected answers from 25 respondents during the pretest stage and 254 respondents during
the main stage. Only the latter data are used for preferences analysis. In addition, we
excluded the respondents who selected the status quo option in all choice situations, thus
reducing the data sample to stated choices of 125 respondents.
The initially generated experiment design consists of 10 blocks by 7 choice cards. In
order to account for a possible anchoring effect, this design is stacked to get 30 blocks and
modified in such a way that cards number 1, 4, or 7 become the starting cards in correspond-
ing 10-block groups. And finally, to test the preference stability, an extra card is added to
each block, so that the first and the last choice cards are the same. This results in a 30-block
design with 8 choice cards in each block.
There are two unlabeled alternatives and a status quo option in each card. An alternative
represents a hypothetical housing situation, which is described by four attributes – location
of a house (inside or outside the dike ring), percentage changes to the house’s area, changes
in travel time to work or to a city center, and a hypothesized increase in housing expenses.
Using the data from the choice-experiment, we calculate the baseline utility-level asso-
ciated with the current location as:
Wa = α+βlocLOCa (7.B10)
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where α = −0.70, βloc ∼ N(2.51,10.05) and LOCa = 2 indicates that agent a lives in a
protected area. The utility reduction associated with locating in an unprotected area for an
agent currently residing in a protected area is calculated as
∆Wa = (βloc+ γowinsideha)∆
LOC
a (7.B11)
where γowinside = 2.16, h = 1 if agent a is a homeowner and zero otherwise and ∆LOCa =
−1 indicates the difference in levels of the location attribute (unprotected and protected).
Although the parameters values of βloc allow for positive values of ∆Wa , we simplify by
setting ∆Wa = 0 in case the parameter takes on positive values. Finally, the reduction in the
utility-flow from amenities (i.e., flood protection) is calculated as:
Oa =| ∆
W
a
Wa
| (7.B12)
Appendix 7.C Results ABM
The development of public concern PC across all scenarios is shown in Figure 7.C1. As
shown in Table 7.2, scenarios no_no, no_mid and no_hi only illustrate the effects of varia-
tions in the uncertainty parameter θ . Figure 7.C1 illustrates the effect of changes in either
δ or θ or both. Comparing scenarios no_no, lo_no, mid_no and hi_no (for which θ = 0),
the ceteris paribus effect of increasing δ is a downward shift in E−T S. The figure also sug-
gests that increasing θ leads to reductions in PC. Furthermore, the reductions in PC from
increases in θ is larger for higher values of δ . In plain language, this means that uncertainty
has little effect on collective perceptions when the share of extremist opinions is low. When
the share of extremist opinions grows, uncertainty becomes an increasingly more important
determinant of collective risk perceptions.
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Figure 7.C1 Public concern shown as percentage reductions in the level of amenities.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
Flood risk is increasing in regions located close to the coast or rivers. Trends of urban de-
velopment in flood-prone areas combined with possible effects of climate change such as
sea-level rise and increased river discharge are likely to lead to further increases in flood
risk in the future. Projections of future disaster losses can help inform policy makers in
designing suitable policy responses to encounter the threat of increasing risk. Most of the
models used for such projections contain limited details on behavioural responses to risk. It
is, however, well known that humans respond to environmental changes such as increasing
risk. Responses such as moving out of harm’s way has an impact on exposure. Excluding
such responses could therefore lead to biased estimates of the overall risk. It is increasingly
argued that models used for disaster impact analysis should incorporate such behavioural
responses. This thesis broadly takes on this challenge, investigating the formation of be-
havioural responses to risk and the ensuing impacts on the macroeconomy using a range of
economic models.
8.1 Overview and answers to research questions
The thesis sought to answer the following three research questions:
1. What are the short and long run impacts on population dynamics of large scale flood
events?
2. Can flood risk affect household mobility through the housing market?
3. What are the macroeconomic impacts from household migration?
As a historical introduction to and an empirical investigation of the topics that are dis-
cussed later in the thesis, Chapter 2 presented empirical evidence of population dynamics
139
Conclusions
in the aftermath of the large flood in the Netherlands in 1953. The flood was followed by
an extensive flood risk reduction programme – the Deltaworks. We found that the flood had
temporary negative effects on population growth while the Deltaworks had permanent pos-
itive effects, suggesting that people not only respond to extreme weather events but also to
implemented policy measures. These results support findings from previous literature that
disasters have temporary effects on growth while policy measures have permanent effects.
This is an important insight in the context of disaster risk reduction, due to the possibility
of unintended consequences of risk reduction measures. In this specific case, the reduction
of the flood probability was associated with an increase in exposure over the longer term.
Models providing quantitative estimates of the negative welfare impacts due to disaster
events provide valuable inputs for policy decisions on how to respond to increasing risk.
Chapter 3 introduced the two main types of macroeconomic models currently in use for dis-
aster impact analysis, namely Computable General Equilibrium models and Input-Output
models. We argued that these models suffer from limitations in modelling how risk affects
households location decisions. In this part we also reviewed examples from the literature
providing evidence that risk affects households’ location decisions. We suggested that such
behavioural responses could be incorporated by combining the traditional models with ele-
ments of Agent-based models.
Part II (Chapters 4 and 5) of the thesis investigated housing market dynamics from
changes in expectations, as well as the interconnection between developments on the hous-
ing market and households’ location decisions. More specifically, this part focused on feed-
back effects between the housing market and household mobility. Since a large amount of
a households’ total wealth is invested in its housing stock it is likely that flood risk is a
factor for home-owners. Numerous empirical studies has found that flood risk capitalises in
housing prices, providing evidence that flood risk matters in housing market choices.
Chapter 4 investigated whether flood risk on the housing market reduces households’
geographical mobility. A key function of housing wealth is its collateral value. Declining
collateral value of housing reduces the geographical mobility of households dependent on
obtaining a mortgage for financing a move. A credit lenders’ fear of declining housing prices
in a flood-prone area reduces the collateral value of housing in this area and hampers the
mobility of credit-constrained households. Using a general equilibrium model, it was shown
how reductions in housing wealth can lead to an endogenous sorting mechanism resulting
in an increased concentration of vulnerable households in areas at risk. The model spanned
two regions (one risky, one safe) and two households, and included a fictive real estate
agent operating on behalf of a credit lender, determining the collateral value of housing
through real estate valuations. Real estate valuations were sensitive to flood risk, meaning
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the estimated value was lower in the risky region than in the safe region. One household
type (vulnerable) depended on obtaining a mortgage to finance a move and the other type
(resilient) was not subject to such constraints. The chapter found that the endogenous sorting
effects, leading to an increased concentration of vulnerable households in the risky region,
were of a substantial magnitude only if the level of safety in the risky region was extremely
low.
Can similar endogenous sorting effects also occur as a result of changed expectations
among households themselves? Moreover, how are these effects shaped by behavioural re-
sponses to risk? These were the central research questions of Chapter 5. Using a one-region
version of the model used in the preceding chapter, Chapter 5 showed how households’
expectations regarding future housing prices can result in clustering of credit-constrained
households in the flood-plain. Crucially, a drop in expected future housing prices implied a
decline in the future resale value of housing, reducing the demand for housing, triggering a
fall in current housing prices. As such, expected declines in future housing prices led to a
decline in current housing prices. Loss aversion and probability weighting were key drivers
of the results. If households were highly loss averse towards reductions in the resale price
of housing, there were large reductions in current housing prices as well as in household
mobility. In the limit case of expected utility (i.e. no loss aversion and rational households),
there were only marginal impacts on housing prices. This chapter thus concluded that clus-
tering effects only occur in cases where expectations were highly affected by behavioural
anomalies.
Part III of the thesis investigated the macroeconomic effects of changes in expectations
due to flood risk, focusing on regional impacts on labour and production. For this pur-
pose, both chapters employed a Spatial Computable General Equilibrium model which has
previously been used to analyse the macroeconomic effects of a flood in Rotterdam, the
Netherlands.
Chapter 6 analysed whether potential losses in Rotterdam were reduced if investor ex-
pectations reflected the potential capital destruction in case of a flood in the region. Investor
reactions were triggered by a policy change, amounting to a partial reallocation of risk from
the public to the private sector. Lower levels of capital investments reduced the capital stock
in Rotterdam, lowering the potential capital damage of a flood in Rotterdam. The reduc-
tion in capital stock also caused a reduction in production and higher unemployment in the
region. Households decided where to locate by comparing welfare across regions. Risk
was indirectly relevant for households’ location decisions, as the reductions in the real wage
following the reduction in production led to welfare reductions in Rotterdam. The model
results indicated that the indirect effect of risk on households’ location decisions was not
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sufficient to lead to a reduction in population in Rotterdam. As such, even if potential capital
losses from a flood in Rotterdam were reduced, the number of potential casualties stayed
virtually unchanged.
What is the impact on losses if risk is directly relevant for households’ location deci-
sions? This is likely to be the case in the aftermath of a disaster. Disasters can elicit strong
public reactions, possibly resulting in concern regarding the safety level of the disaster af-
fected area. Chapter 7 investigated whether public concern generated by a flood event in
Rotterdam exacerbated production losses from the flood. Public concern was shaped as
thousands of individual agents exchanging opinions about the negative welfare effects as-
sociated with residing in a region at risk. The level of public concern was amplified by
the amount of extremist opinions and by uncertainty among agents. Model results showed
how public concern in the aftermath of the flood reduced the labour supply in the region
of Rotterdam. This exacerbated production losses relative to model runs where the flood
did not elicit public concern. However, production losses for the Netherlands as a whole
were limited as the decrease in production in Rotterdam was compensated with increas-
ing production in adjacent regions. As such, interregional substitution effects were more
substantial than aggregate production losses.
8.2 Discussion and relevance for flood risk management
A key concern for policy makers in the context of disaster risk is to find optimal levels of
protection, balancing the costs of protection against the benefits of avoided negative effects
on welfare from disaster risk. Decision making under disaster risk can be portrayed as a
situation where economic decisions are subject to a lottery of outcomes. Policy makers try
to "change the lottery" by reducing risk to tolerable levels. As stated in the Introduction,
flood risk management aims at reducing overall risk by implementing measures aimed at re-
ducing combinations of hazard probability, exposure or vulnerability. In other words, policy
makers can change the lottery by reducing combinations of probabilities or consequences.
Completely eliminating risk is either impossible or likely to be extremely costly. In addition,
the choice of instrument matters for the long term development of overall risk. For exam-
ple, by focusing almost entirely on reducing probabilities, the risk reduction management
strategy of the Dutch government may involuntarily have contributed to increasing expo-
sure over time. In Chapter 2 we suggested a type of moral hazard effect where government
responses may have crowded out individual responses.
Traditionally flood risk management has focused mainly on reducing probabilities. How-
ever, there has recently been a marked shift toward a more integrated approach that focuses
on reducing exposure, not only probabilities. Several of the proposed policy instruments,
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such as the introduction of flood insurance, amount to a partial reallocation of risk from
the public to the private sector. Fundamental for these proposals is (i) the assumption that
risk is relevant for agents’ decision making - either directly, or indirectly through changes
in prices and (ii) that behavioural responses translate into a reduction in potential or actual
disaster losses. The models discussed in this thesis, which discuss behavioural responses,
can inform public policy to make better decisions on how to reduce overall risk.
A central theme throughout the thesis has been to what extent risk leads to behavioural
responses. Traditional economic models based on expected utility formulations incorporate
the implicit assumption that probabilities and consequences are known and are relevant for
decision making. Under convenctional expected utility decision makers do not distinguish
between objective probabilities and subjective probability and behavioural anomalies play
little role in the expectation formation process. In Chapter 4, where we assumed credit
lenders evaluated the housing price impact of flood risk on the basis of an expected utility
formulation, we found negative welfare effects from increasing probabilities but only in
cases where probabilities were high to begin with. Similarly, in Chapter 6 where investors
allocated capital based on a mean-variance model, increasing exposure was identified as
the main driver behind welfare losses. These two chapters suggest that, in the case decision
makers behave similar to expected utility – for example if all individuals are able to evaluate
benefits from collective reduction of probabilities versus those from individual reductions
in consequences – policy makers may be able to design combinations of policy instruments
that are welfare maximising.
However, in environments of true uncertainty behavioural responses are likely to be
affected by other factors than probabilities and consequences. In fact, much empirical lit-
erature suggests that behavioural responses to risk are highly context dependent: they may
be shaped by recent experiences and they may be affected by the opinions of other peo-
ple. Chapter 5 suggested that the relationship between probability and the magnitude of
response can be heavily affected by behavioural anomalies such as loss aversion and proba-
bility weighting. In Chapter 7 we suggested that probabilities or consequences were even of
minor importance for household location decisions in the aftermath of a flood event. Here
we showed how location decisions may be influenced by self-organising processes whereby
public concern was magnified through exchanges of individual risk opinions. Clearly, if
decision makers are not rational, policy makers will have a difficult task in designing op-
timal policy responses to risk. There might not even exist combinations of probabilities
and consequences that can be considered truly welfare maximising. As such, in the case
where behavioural responses have particularly large economic impacts, policy makers may
want to prioritise flexibility in policy design. Such flexible institutional design or adaptive
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regulatory schemes would allow policy makers to adjust regulations to circumstances where
behavioural failures have particularly detrimental welfare impacts.
8.3 Final remarks and suggestions for future research
How can economic modellers inform policy makers, contributing to better policy responses
to increasing future flood risk? As highlighted in several places in the thesis, models pro-
viding quantitative estimates of total disaster losses provide useful inputs to such policy
decisisions. However, the large heterogeneity in behavioural responses to risk complicate
the representation of individual responses in such models. Of fundamental importance is
the assumption of whether households are forward looking and risk averse or whether they
are myopic decision makers largely ignorant of future increases in risk. A large number
of studies has investigated households’ risk judgements, mainly using experimental or val-
uation methods. These studies paint a multifaceted picture of the expectation formation
process, providing evidence of large heterogeneity in risk judgements. However, these stud-
ies provide less details on how expectations translate into actual behavioural responses and
aggregate outcomes. Several chapters of this thesis have shown that the chosen represen-
tation of expectation formation matters for aggregate outcomes and consequently also for
estimated losses. This also has implications for the role of economic modellers in disaster
impact analysis. Instead of providing reduced-form estimates of disaster losses, modellers
may want focus on revealing drivers of behavioural responses and gaining an overview of
the most important propagation mechanisms of individual responses. Such an approach will
likely mean combining macroeconomic models with insights and results from models and
experiments focusing on individual decision making under risk and uncertainty. An inter-
esting task for future research is to investigate how heterogeneous risk judgements translate
into behavioural responses to risk. This thesis represents a small step in that direction.
144
Publications and working papers
Husby, Trond, Hofkes, Marjan W, Filatova, Tatiana, and Sheremet, Oleg (2015a). “Public
concern as a driver of disaster losses” TNO working paper.
Husby, Trond G, de Groot, Henri LF, Hofkes, Marjan W, and Dröes, Martijn I (2014a).
“Do floods have permanent effects? Evidence from the Netherlands” Journal of Regional
Science, 54(3), pp. 355–377.
Husby, Trond G, de Groot, Henri LF, Hofkes, Marjan W, and Filatova, Tatiana (2014b).
“Loss aversion and capitalisation of flood risk on the housing market?” IVM working
paper.
Husby, Trond G, de Groot, Henri LF, Hofkes, Marjan W, and Filatova, Tatiana (2015b).
“Flood protection and endogenous sorting of households: the role of credit constraints”
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies of Global Change, (Forthcoming)(-), pp. –.
Husby, Trond G, Mechler, Reinhard, and Jongman, Brenden (2014c). “What if the Dutch
started worrying about flood risk? Implications for disaster risk reduction” Regional En-
vironmental Change, (Forthcoming)(-), pp. –.
Jongman, Brenden, Koks, Elco E, Husby, Trond G, and Ward, Philip J (2014). “Increasing
flood exposure in the Netherlands: implications for risk financing” Natural Hazards and
Earth System Science, 14(5), pp. 1245–1255.
Koks, Elco E, Jongman, Brenden, Husby, Trond G, and Botzen, Wouter JW (2015). “Com-
bining hazard, exposure and social vulnerability to provide lessons for Flood Risk Man-
agement” Environmental Science & Policy, 47, pp. 42–52.
Koks, Elco E, Carrera, Lorenzo, Jonkeren, Olaf, Aerts, Jeroen CJH, Husby Trond G,
Thissen, Mark, Standardi, Gabriele, Mysiak, Jaroslav (2015). “Regional disaster im-
pact analysis: comparing Input-Output and Computable General Equilibrium models”
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences Discussions, 11(3), pp. 7053–7088.
145
Publications and working papers
Husby, Trond and Koks, Elco E (2015). “Improving the representation of household migra-
tion in disaster impact modelling” Natural Hazards, (Under review)(-), pp. –.
146
References
Aakre, Stine, Banaszak, Ilona, Mechler, Reinhard, Rübbelke, Dirk, Wreford, Anita, and
Kalirai, Harvir (2010). “Financial adaptation to disaster risk in the European Union”
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 15(7), pp. 721–736.
Acemoglu, Daron, Como, Giacomo, Fagnani, Fabio, and Ozdaglar, Asuman (2013). “Opin-
ion fluctuations and disagreement in social networks” Mathematics of Operations Re-
search, 38(1), pp. 1–27.
Ackerman, Frank (2001). “Still dead after all these years: interpreting the failure of general
equilibrium theory” Journal of Economic Methodology, 9(2), pp. 119–139.
Aerts, Jeroen CJH and Botzen, Wouter JW (2011). “Climate change impacts on pricing
long-term flood insurance: a comprehensive study for the Netherlands” Global Environ-
mental Change, 21(3), pp. 1045–1060.
Albala-Bertrand, Jose Miguel (2013). Disasters and the Networked Economy. Routledge,
New York.
An, Li (2012). “Modeling human decisions in coupled human and natural systems: review
of agent-based models” Ecological Modelling, 229, pp. 25–36.
Anas, Alex and Liu, Yu (2007). “A regional economy, land use, and transportation model
(RELU-TRAN)” Journal of Regional Science, 47(3), pp. 415–455.
Atreya, Ajita, Ferreira, Susana, and Kriesel, Warren (2013). “Forgetting the flood? An
analysis of the flood risk discount over time” Land Economics, 89(4), pp. 577–596.
Baker, Scott R and Bloom, Nicholas (2013). “Does uncertainty reduce growth? Using disas-
ters as natural experiments” NBER Working Paper 19475, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Balvers, Ronald, Du, Ding, and Zhao, Xiaobing (2009). “What do financial markets reveal
about global warming?” Working paper 09-04, Department of Economics, West Virginia
University.
Banzhaf, H Spencer and Walsh, Randall P (2008). “Do people vote with their feet? An
empirical test of Tiebout’s mechanism” American Economic Review, 98(3), pp. 843–863.
Barberis, Nicholas C (2012). “Thirty years of Prospect Theory in economics: a review
and assessment” NBER Working Paper 18621, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge Massachusetts.
147
References
Barca, Fabrizio, McCann, Philip, and Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés (2012). “The case for re-
gional development intervention: place-based versus place-neutral approaches” Journal
of Regional Science, 52(1), pp. 134–152.
Barnett, Barry J, Barrett, Christopher B, and Skees, Jerry R (2008). “Poverty traps and
index-based risk transfer products” World Development, 36(10), pp. 1766–1785.
Barro, Robert J (2009). “Rare disasters, asset prices, and welfare costs” American Economic
Review, 99(1), pp. 243–264.
Barro, Robert J (2013). “Environmental protection, rare disasters, and discount rates”
NBER Working Paper 19258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge Mas-
sachusetts.
Barro, Robert J and Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (2003). Economic Growth, 2nd Edition. MIT
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Beekink, Erik, Boonstra, Onno, Engelen, Theo, and Knippenberg, Hans (2003). Neder-
land in Verandering. Maatschappelijke Ontwikkelingen in Kaart Gebracht 1800–2000.
Aksant, Amsterdam.
Ben-Akiva, Moshe E and Lerman, Steven R (1985). Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and
Application to Travel Demand. MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Berrang-Ford, Lea, Ford, James D., and Paterson, Jaclyn (2011). “Are we adapting to
climate change?” Global Environmental Change, 21(1), pp. 25–33.
Beyers, William B (1980). “Migration and the development of multiregional economic
systems” Economic Geography, 56(4), pp. 320–334.
Bin, Okmyung, Kruse, Jamie Brown, and Landry, Craig Elliott (2008). “Flood hazards,
insurance rates, and amenities: evidence from the coastal housing market” Journal of
Risk & Insurance, 75(1), pp. 63–82.
Bin, Okmyung and Landry, Craig E (2013). “Changes in implicit flood risk premiums:
empirical evidence from the housing market” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 65(3), pp. 361–376.
Bin, Okmyung and Polasky, Stephen (2004). “Effects of flood hazards on property values:
evidence before and after Hurricane Floyd” Land Economics, 80(4), pp. 490–500.
Black, Richard, Adger, W Neil, and Arnell, Nigel W (2013). “Migration and extreme
environmental events: new agendas for global change research” Environmental Science
& Policy, 27, pp. S1–S3.
Black, Richard, Adger, W Neil, Arnell, Nigel W, Dercon, Stefan, Geddes, Andrew, and
Thomas, David (2011a). “Migration and global environmental change” Global Environ-
mental Change, 21.
Black, Richard, Bennett, Stephen RG, Thomas, Sandy M, and Beddington, John R (2011b).
“Climate change: migration as adaptation” Nature, 478(7370), pp. 447–449.
148
References
Blume, Lawrence E, Brock, William A, Durlauf, Steven N, and Ioannides, Yannis M (2011).
“Identification of social interactions” Vol. 1 of Handbook of Social Economics, North-
Holland, pp. 853–964.
Bokhari, Sheharyar and Geltner, David (2011). “Loss aversion and anchoring in commer-
cial real estate pricing: empirical evidence and price index implications” Real Estate
Economics, 39(4), pp. 635–670.
Bosker, Maarten, Brakman, Steven, Garretsen, Harry, and Schramm, Marc (2008). “A cen-
tury of shocks: the evolution of the German city size distribution 1925–1999” Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 38(4), pp. 330–347.
Botzen, Wouter JW (2013). Managing Extreme Climate Change Risks Through Insurance.
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Botzen, Wouter JW, Aerts, Jeroen CJH, and van den Bergh, Jeroen CJM (2009). “Willing-
ness of homeowners to mitigate climate risk through insurance” Ecological Economics,
68(8), pp. 2265–2277.
Botzen, Wouter JW, Kunreuther, Howard, and Michel-Kerjan, Erwan (2015). “Divergence
between individual perceptions and objective indicators of tail risks: Evidence from
floodplain residents in New York City” Judgment and Decision Making, 10(4), pp. 365–
385.
Botzen, Wouter JW and van den Bergh, Jeroen CJM (2008). “Insurance against climate
change and flooding in the Netherlands: Present, future, and comparison with other coun-
tries” Risk Analysis, 28(2), pp. 413–426.
Botzen, Wouter JW and van den Bergh, Jeroen CJM (2009). “Bounded Rationality, Climate
Risks, and Insurance: Is There a Market for Natural Disasters?” Land Economics, 85(2),
pp. 265–278.
Botzen, Wouter JW and van den Bergh, Jeroen CJM (2012). “Risk attitudes to low-
probability climate change risks: WTP for flood insurance” Journal of Economic Be-
havior & Organization, 82(1), pp. 151–166.
Boustan, Leah Platt, Kahn, Matthew E, and Rhode, Paul W (2012). “Moving to higher
ground: migration response to natural disasters in the early Twentieth Century” American
Economic Review, 102(3), pp. 238–244.
Bouwer, Laurens M (2011). “Have disaster losses increased due to anthropogenic climate
change?” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 92(1), pp. 39–46.
Bouwer, Laurens M (2013). “Projections of future extreme weather losses under changes in
climate and exposure” Risk Analysis, 33(5), pp. 915–930.
Bouwer, Laurens M and Vellinga, P (2007). “On the flood risk in the Netherlands” Flood
Risk Management in Europe, Selina Begum, Marcel JF Stive, and Jim W Hall, eds.,
Vol. 25 of Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research, Springer Nether-
lands, pp. 469–484.
149
References
Brandsma, Andries, Kancs, d’Artis, and Persyn, Damiaan (2014). “Modelling migration
and regional labour markets: an application of the new economic geography model RHO-
MOLO” Journal of Economic Integration, 29(2), pp. 372–406.
Brouwers, Lisa and Boman, Magnus (2011). “A computational agent model of flood man-
agement strategies” Computational Methods for Agricultural Research: Advances and
Applications, pp. 296–307.
Bunten, Devin and Kahn, Matthew E (2014). “The impact of emerging climate risks on
urban real estate price dynamics” Working Paper 20018, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Burby, Raymond J (2006). “Hurricane Katrina and the paradoxes of government disaster
policy: bringing about wise governmental decisions for hazardous areas” The ANNALS
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), pp. 171–191.
Böhringer, Christoph and Rutherford, Thomas F (2008). “Combining bottom-up and top-
down” Energy Economics, 30(2), pp. 574–596.
Cai, Ruohong and Oppenheimer, Michael (2013). “An Agent-based model of climate-
induced agricultural labor migration” 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Wash-
ington, DC, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
Camerer, Colin F and Kunreuther, Howard (1989). “Decision processes for low probability
events: policy implications” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 8(4), pp. 565–
592.
Castellano, Claudio, Fortunato, Santo, and Loreto, Vittorio (2009). “Statistical physics of
social dynamics” Reviews of Modern Physics, 81(2), pp. 591–646.
Cavallo, Eduardo, Galiani, Sebastian, Noy, Ilan, and Pantano, Juan (2013). “Catastrophic
natural disasters and economic growth” Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(5), pp.
1549–1561.
Cavallo, Eduardo and Noy, Ilan (2009). “The economics of natural disasters: a survey” RES
Working Papers 4649, Inter-American Development Bank,.
Chacoma, Andres and Zanette, Damian H (2015). “Opinion formation by social influence:
from experiments to modeling” PLOS ONE, 10(10), pp. 1–16.
Chan, Sewin (2001). “Spatial lock-in: do falling house prices constrain residential mobil-
ity?” Journal of Urban Economics, 49(3), pp. 567–586.
Chen, Yu, Fingleton, Bernard, Pryce, Gwilym, Chen, Albert S, and Djordjevic´, Slobodan
(2013). “Implications of rising flood-risk for employment location: a GMM spatial model
with agglomeration and endogenous house price effects” Journal of Property Research,
30(4), pp. 298–323.
Colander, David, Howitt, Peter, Kirman, Alan, Leijonhufvud, Axel, and Mehrling, Perry
(2008). “Beyond DSGE models: toward an empirically based macroeconomics” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 98(2), pp. 236–240.
150
References
Corbyn, Zoë (2010). “Mexican ’climate migrants’ predicted to flood US” Nature News,
Published online 26 July 2010.
Cutter, Susan L, Boruff, Bryan J, and Shirley, W Lynn (2003). “Social vulnerability to
environmental hazards” Social Science Quarterly, 84(2), pp. 242–261.
Daniel, Vanessa E, Florax, Raymond JGM, and Rietveld, Piet (2009a). “Flooding risk
and housing values: an economic assessment of environmental hazard” Ecological Eco-
nomics, 69(2), pp. 355–365.
Daniel, Vanessa E, Florax, Raymond JGM, and Rietveld, Piet (2009b). “Floods and resi-
dential property values: a hedonic price analysis for the Netherlands” Built Environment,
35(4), pp. 563–576.
Davidson, Paul (1991). “Is probability theory relevant for uncertainty? A Post Keynesian
perspective” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), pp. pp. 129–143.
Davis, Donald R and Weinstein, David E (2002). “Bones, bombs, and break points: the
geography of economic activity” American Economic Review, 92(5), pp. 1269–1289.
Davis, Donald R and Weinstein, David E (2008). “A search for multiple equilibria in urban
industrial structure” Journal of Regional Science, 48(1), pp. 29–65.
Dawson, Richard J, Peppe, Roger, and Wang, Miao (2011). “An agent-based model for
risk-based flood incident management” Natural Hazards, 59(1), pp. 167–189.
de Bruijn, K M and van der Doef, M (2011). “Gevolgen van overstromingen” Informatie
ten behoeve van het project Waterveiligheid 21e eeuw, Deltares, Delft.
de Kraker, Adriaan MJ (2006). “Flood events in the southwestern Netherlands and coastal
Belgium, 1400–1953” Hydrological Sciences Journal, 51(5), pp. 913–929.
de Moel, Hans, Aerts, Jeroen CJH, and Koomen, Eric (2011). “Development of flood expo-
sure in the Netherlands during the 20th and 21st century” Global Environmental Change,
21(2), pp. 620–627.
de Moel, Hans, van Vliet, Mathijs, and Aerts, Jeroen CJH (2014). “Evaluating the effect
of flood damage-reducing measures: A case study of the unembanked area of Rotterdam,
the Netherlands” Regional Environmental Change, 14(3), pp. 895–908.
Deffuant, Guillaume, Amblard, Frédéric, Weisbuch, Gérard, and Faure, Thierry (2002).
“How can extremism prevail? A study based on the relative agreement interaction model”
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 5(4).
Deffuant, Guillaume, Neau, David, Amblard, Frederic, and Weisbuch, Gérard (2000). “Mix-
ing beliefs among interacting agents” Advances in Complex Systems, 3(1), pp. 87–98.
Dell, Melissa, Jones, Benjamin F., and Olken, Benjamin A. (2014). “What do we learn
from the weather? The new climate-economy literature” Journal of Economic Literature,
52(3), pp. 740–798.
Deltaworks (2014). “The official web-pages of the Deltaworks programme." Available at
http://www.deltawerken.com/.
151
References
Depro, Brooks M, Timmins, Christopher, and O’Neil, Maggie (2012). “Meeting urban
housing needs: do people really come to the nuisance?” NBER Working Paper 18109,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Dosi, Giovanni (1990). “Finance, innovation and industrial change” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 13(3), pp. 299–319.
Dosi, Giovanni and Egidi, Massimo (1991). “Substantive and procedural uncertainty” Jour-
nal of Evolutionary Economics, 1(2), pp. 145–168.
Epple, Dennis, Gordon, Brett, and Sieg, Holger (2010). “Drs. Muth and Mills meet Dr.
Tiebout: integrating location-specific amenities into multi-community equilibrium mod-
els” Journal of Regional Science, 50(1), pp. 381–400.
Eriksson, Anders, Betti, Lia, Friend, Andrew D, Lycett, Stephen J, Singarayer, Joy S,
von Cramon-Taubadel, Noreen, Valdes, Paul J, Balloux, Francois, and Manica, Andrea
(2012). “Late pleistocene climate change and the global expansion of anatomically mod-
ern humans” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(40), pp. 16089–
16094.
Fankhauser, Samuel, Smith, Joel B, and Tol, Richard SJ (1999). “Weathering climate
change: some simple rules to guide adaptation decisions” Ecological Economics, 30(1),
pp. 67–78.
Farmer, J Doyne and Foley, Duncan (2009). “The economy needs agent-based modelling”
Nature, 460(7256), pp. 685–686.
Fehren-Schmitz, Lars, Haak, Wolfgang, Mächtle, Bertil, Masch, Florian, Llamas, Bastien,
Tomasto Cagigao, Elsa, Sossna, Volker, Schittek, Karsten, Isla Cuadrado, Johny, Eitel,
Bernhard, and Reindel, Markus (2014). “Climate change underlies global demographic,
genetic, and cultural transitions in pre-Columbian southern Peru” Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, 111(26), pp. 9443–9448.
Feng, Shuaizhang, Krueger, Alan B, and Oppenheimer, Michael (2010). “Linkages among
climate change, crop yields and Mexico–US cross-border migration” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 107(32), pp. 14257–14262.
Feng, Shuaizhang, Oppenheimer, Michael, and Schlenker, Wolfram (2012). “Climate
change, crop yields, and internal migration in the United States” Working Paper 17734,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Ferreira, Fernando, Gyourko, Joseph, and Tracy, Joseph (2010). “Housing busts and house-
hold mobility” Journal of Urban Economics, 68(1), pp. 34–45.
Ferreira, Fernando, Gyourko, Joseph, and Tracy, Joseph (2012). “Housing busts and house-
hold mobility: an update” Economic Policy Review, (18), pp. 1–15.
Filatova, Tatiana (2014). “Market-based instruments for flood risk management: A review
of theory, practice and perspectives for climate adaptation policy” Environmental Science
and Policy, 37, pp. 227–242.
152
References
Filatova, Tatiana, Parker, Dawn, and der Veen, Anne (2009a). “Agent-based urban land
markets: agent’s pricing behavior, land prices and urban land use change” Journal of
Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 12(1).
Filatova, Tatiana, van der Veen, Anne, and Parker, Dawn C (2009b). “Land market inter-
actions between heterogeneous agents in a heterogeneous landscape–tracing the macro-
scale effects of individual trade-offs between environmental amenities and disamenities”
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57(4), pp. 431–457.
Filatova, Tatiana, Verburg, Peter H, Parker, Dawn Cassandra, and Stannard, Carol Ann
(2013). “Spatial agent-based models for socio-ecological systems: challenges and
prospects” Environmental Modelling & Software, 45, pp. 1–7.
Filatova, Tatiana, Voinov, Alexey, and van der Veen, Anne (2011). “Land market mecha-
nisms for preservation of space for coastal ecosystems: an agent-based analysis” Envi-
ronmental Modelling & Software, 26(2), pp. 179–190.
Findlay, Allan M (2012). “Migration: flooding and the scale of migration” Nature Climate
Change, 2(6), pp. 401–402.
Fortunato, Santo and Stauffer, Dietrich (2006). “Computer simulations of opinions and
their reactions to extreme events” Extreme events in nature and society, Sergio Albeverio,
Volker Jentsch, and Holger Kantz, eds., Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 233–257.
Froot, Kenneth A (2001). “The market for catastrophe risk: a clinical examination” Journal
of Financial Economics, 60(2–3), pp. 529–571.
Fujita, Masahisa and Thisse, Jacques-Francois (1996). “Economics of agglomeration” Jour-
nal of the Japanese and International Economies, 10(4), pp. 339–378.
Fussell, Elizabeth, Curtis, Katherine J., and de Waard, Jack (2014). “Recovery migration to
the City of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: a migration systems approach” Popula-
tion and Environment, 35(3), pp. 305–322.
Gabaix, Xavier (1999). “Zipf’s law and the growth of cities” American Economic Review,
89(2), pp. 129–132.
Gallegati, Mauro, Giulioni, Gianfranco, and Kichiji, Nozomi (2003). “Complex dynamics
and financial fragility in an agent-based model” Advances in Complex Systems, 6(3), pp.
267–282.
Geanakoplos, John, Axtell, Robert, Farmer, J Doyne, Howitt, Peter, Conlee, Benjamin,
Goldstein, Jonathan, Hendrey, Matthew, Palmer, Nathan M, and Yang, Chun-Yi (2012).
“Getting at systemic risk via an agent-based model of the housing market” American
Economic Review, 102(3), pp. 53–58.
Gemenne, François (2011). “Why the numbers don’t add up: a review of estimates and pre-
dictions of people displaced by environmental changes” Global Environmental Change,
21, pp. S41–S49.
Genesove, David and Mayer, Christopher (2001). “Loss aversion and seller behavior: evi-
dence from the housing market” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), pp. 1233–1260.
153
References
Gerritsen, Herman (2005). “What happened in 1953? The Big Flood in the Netherlands in
retrospect” Philosophical transactions. Series A, Mathematical, physical, and engineer-
ing sciences, 363, pp. 1271–1291.
Giesecke, James A, Burns, William J, Barrett, Anthony, Bayrak, Ergin, Rose, Adam, Slovic,
Paul, and Suher, Michael (2012). “Assessment of the regional economic impacts of catas-
trophic events: CGE analysis of resource loss and behavioral effects of an RDD attack
scenario” Risk Analysis, 32(4), pp. 583–600.
Giesecke, James A and Madden, John R (2013). “Regional Computable General Equilib-
rium Modeling” Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, Elsevier, pp.
379–475.
Gintis, Herbert (2007). “The dynamics of general equilibrium” Economic Journal,
117(523), pp. 1280–1309.
Glaeser, Edward L (2005). “Should the government rebuild New Orleans, or just give
residents checks?” The Economists’ Voice, 2(4), pp. 1–7.
Glaeser, Edward L and Gyourko, Joseph (2005). “Urban decline and durable housing”
Journal of Political Economy, 113(2), pp. 345–375.
Grimm, Volker, Berger, Uta, Bastiansen, Finn, Eliassen, Sigrunn, Ginot, Vincent, Giske,
Jarl, Goss-Custard, John, Grand, Tamara, Heinz, Simone K, Huse, Geir, Huth, Andreas,
Jepsen, Jane U, Jörgensen, Christian, Mooij, Wolf M, Müller, Birgit, Pe’er, Guy, Piou,
Cyril, Railsback, Steven F, Robbins, Andrew M, Robbins, Martha M, Rossmanith, Eva,
Rüger, Nadja, Strand, Espen, Souissi, Sami, Stillman, Richard A, Vabø, Rune, Visser,
Ute, and DeAngelis, Donald L (2006). “A standard protocol for describing individual-
based and agent-based models” Ecological Modelling, 198(1–2), pp. 115–126.
Haavio, Markus and Kauppi, Heikki (2000). “Housing markets, liquidity constraints and
labor mobility.
Hallegatte, Stephane (2008). “An adaptive regional Input-Output model and its application
to the assessment of the economic cost of Katrina” Risk Analysis, 28(3), pp. 779–799.
Hallegatte, Stephane (2011). “How economic growth and rational decisions can make dis-
aster losses grow faster than wealth” Policy Research Working Paper Series 5617, The
World Bank, Washington DC.
Hallegatte, Stephane (2012). “An exploration of the link between development, economic
growth, and natural risk” Policy Research Working Paper Series 6216, The World Bank,
Washington DC.
Hallegatte, Stephane (2014). “Modeling the role of inventories and heterogeneity in the
assessment of the economic costs of natural disasters” Risk Analysis, 34(1), pp. 152–167.
Hallegatte, Stephane and Ghil, Michael (2008). “Natural disasters impacting a macroeco-
nomic model with endogenous dynamics” Ecological Economics, 68(1-2), pp. 582–592.
154
References
Hallegatte, Stephane and Przyluski, Valentin (2010). “The economics of natural disasters:
concepts and methods” Policy Research Working Paper Series 5507, The World Bank,
Washington DC.
Hallstrom, Daniel G and Smith, V Kerry (2005). “Market responses to hurricanes” Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(3), pp. 541–561.
Heckbert, Scott, Baynes, Tim, and Reeson, Andrew (2010). “Agent-based modeling in
ecological economics” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1185(1), pp. 39–53.
Hegselmann, Rainer and Krause, Ulrich (2002). “Opinion dynamics and bounded confi-
dence models, analysis, and simulation” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simu-
lation, 5(3).
Henderson, J Vernon (1974). “The sizes and types of cities” American Economic Review,
64(4), pp. 640–656.
Hicks, John R (1943). “The four consumer’s surpluses” Review of Economic Studies, 11(1),
pp. 31–41.
Hornbeck, Richard and Naidu, Suresh (2012). “When the levee breaks: black migration and
economic development in the American South” Working Paper 18296, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Hourcade, Jean-Charles, Jaccard, Mark, Bataille, Chris, and Ghersi, Frédéric (2006). “Hy-
brid modeling: new answers to old challenges. Introduction to the Special Issue of" The
Energy Journal"” Energy Journal, pp. 1–11.
Hu, Aijun, Xie, Wei, Li, Ning, Xu, Xuanhua, Ji, Zhonghui, and Wu, Jidong (2014). “Ana-
lyzing regional economic impact and resilience: a case study on electricity outages caused
by the 2008 snowstorms in southern China” Natural Hazards, 70(2), pp. 1019–1030.
Huggel, Christian, Stone, Dáithí, Auffhammer, Maximilian, and Hansen, Gerrit (2013).
“Loss and damage attribution” Nature Climate Change, 3(8), pp. 694–696.
Hunter, Lori M (2005). “Migration and environmental hazards” Population and Environ-
ment, 26(4), pp. 273–302.
Husby, Trond G, de Groot, Henri LF, Hofkes, Marjan W, and Dröes, Martijn I (2014). “Do
floods have permanent effects? Evidence from the Netherlands” Journal of Regional
Science, 54(3), pp. 355–377.
Iacoviello, Matteo (2005). “House prices, borrowing constraints, and monetary policy in
the business cycle” American Economic Review, 95(3), pp. 739–764.
Iacoviello, Matteo and Neri, Stefano (2010). “Housing market spillovers: evidence from
an estimated DSGE model” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(2), pp.
125–164.
155
References
IPCC (2012). “A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change” Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance
Climate Change Adaptation, C B Field, V Barros, T F Stocker, D Qin, D J Dokken, K L
Ebi, M D Mastrandrea, K J Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S K Allen, M Tignor, and P M Midgley,
eds., University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA.
IPCC (2014). “Climate change 2014: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. part A: Global
and sectoral aspects. contribution of working group ii to the fifth assessment report of the
intergovernmental panel on climate change” University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New
York, NY, USA, pp. 1–32.
Ivanova, Olga, Heyndrickx, Christophe, Spitaels, Karel, Tavasszy, Lori, Manshanden, Wal-
ter, Snelder, Maaike, and Koops, Olaf (2007). “RAEM: version 3.0” First report, Trans-
port & Mobility Leuven, Leuven.
Jongman, Brenden, Koks, Elco E, Husby, Trond G, and Ward, Philip J (2014). “Increasing
flood exposure in the Netherlands: implications for risk financing” Natural Hazards and
Earth System Science, 14(5), pp. 1245–1255.
Jonkhoff, Wouter, Koops, Olaf, van der Krogt, Rob A, Oude Essik, Gualbert HP, and Ri-
etveld, Elmer (2008). “Economische effecten van klimaatverandering. Overstroming en
verzilting in scenario’s, modellen en cases” TNO-Rapport, TNO Bouw en Ondergrond.
Jonkman, Sebastiaan N, Bockarjova, Marija, Kok, Matthijs, and Bernardini, Patrizia (2008).
“Integrated hydrodynamic and economic modelling of flood damage in the Netherlands”
Ecological Economics, 66(1), pp. 77–90.
Kabat, Pavel, van Vierssen, Wim, Veraart, Jeroen, Vellinga, Pier, and Aerts, Jeroen (2005).
“Climate proofing the Netherlands” Nature, 438(7066), pp. 283–285.
Kahn, Matthew E (2005). “The death toll from natural disasters: the role of income, geog-
raphy, and institutions” Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(2), pp. 271–284.
Kahn, Matthew E (2014). “Climate change adaptation: lessons from urban economics”
Working paper 20716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge Mas-
sachusetts.
Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos (1979). “Prospect Theory: an analysis of decision
under risk” Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263–291.
Kasperson, Roger E, Renn, Ortwin, Slovic, Paul, Brown, Halina S, Emel, Jacque, Goble,
Robert, Kasperson, Jeanne X, and Ratick, Samuel (1988). “The Social Amplification of
Risk: a conceptual framework” Risk Analysis, 8(2), pp. 177–187.
Kellens, Wim, Terpstra, Teun, and De Maeyer, Philippe (2013). “Perception and commu-
nication of flood risks: A systematic review of empirical research” Risk Analysis, 33(1),
pp. 24–49.
Keynes, John M (1937). “The general theory of employment” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 51(2), pp. 209–223.
156
References
Kim, Jae Hong and Hewings, Geoffrey JD (2012). “Integrating the fragmented regional
and subregional socioeconomic forecasting and analysis: a spatial regional econometric
Input-Output framework” Annals of Regional Science, 49(2), pp. 485–513.
Kind, Jarl M. (2014). “Economically efficient flood protection standards for the Nether-
lands” Journal of Flood Risk Management, 7(2), pp. 103–117.
Kirman, Alan P. (1992). “Whom or what does the representative individual represent?”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(2), pp. 117–136.
Klaiber, H Allen (2014). “Migration and household adaptation to climate: A review of
empirical research” Energy Economics, 46, pp. 539–547.
Knight, Frank H (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. Hart, Schaffner and Marx, New York.
Kniveton, Dominic R, Smith, Christopher D, and Black, Richard (2012). “Emerging mi-
gration flows in a changing climate in dryland Africa” Nature Climate Change, 2(6), pp.
444–447.
Kok, Matthijs, Huizinga, Jan, Vrouwenvelder, Martine, and Barendregt, A (2005). “Stan-
daardmethode 2004 – Schade en Slachtoffers als gevolg van overstromingen” DWW-
2005-005, RWS Dienst Weg-en Waterbouwkunde, Delft.
Koks, Elco E, Bockarjova, Marija, de Moel, Hans, and Aerts, Jeroen CJH (2014). “Inte-
grated direct and indirect flood risk modeling: development and sensitivity analysis” Risk
Analysis, 35(5), pp. 882–900.
Koks, Elco E, Jongman, Brenden, Husby, Trond G, and Botzen, Wouter JW (2015). “Com-
bining hazard, exposure and social vulnerability to provide lessons for Flood Risk Man-
agement” Environmental Science & Policy, 47, pp. 42–52.
Kousky, Carolyn (2010). “Learning from extreme events: risk perceptions after the flood”
Land Economics, 86(3), pp. 395–422.
Kousky, Carolyn (2012). “Informing climate adaptation: a review of the economic costs of
natural disasters, their determinants, and risk reduction options” Discussion paper 12-28,
Resources for the Future, Washington DC.
Kousky, Carolyn, Luttmer, Erzo FP, and Zeckhauser, Richard J (2006). “Private investment
and government protection” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 33(1), pp. 73–100.
Kousky, Carolyn and Walls, Margaret (2014). “Floodplain conservation as a flood mitigation
strategy: examining costs and benefits” Ecological Economics, 104, pp. 119–128.
Krugman, Paul (1991). “Increasing returns and economic geography” Journal of Political
Economy, 99(3), pp. 483–99.
Krugman, Paul (1996). “Confronting the mystery of urban hierarchy” Journal of the
Japanese and International Economies, 10(4), pp. 399–418.
Kuminoff, Nicolai V and Pope, Jaren C (2012). “Do "capitalization effects" for public
goods reveal the public’s willingness to pay?” Unpublished manuscript, Arizona State
University, May.
157
References
Kuminoff, Nicolai V, Smith, V Kerry, and Timmins, Christopher (2010). “The new eco-
nomics of equilibrium sorting and its transformational role for policy evaluation” Working
Paper 16349, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Kuminoff, Nicolai V, Smith, V Kerry, and Timmins, Christopher (2013). “The new eco-
nomics of equilibrium sorting and policy evaluation using housing markets” Journal of
Economic Literature, 51(4), pp. 1007–1062.
Kundzewicz, Zbigniew W, Kanae, Shinjiro, Seneviratne, Sonia I, Handmer, John, Nicholls,
Neville, Peduzzi, Pascal, Mechler, Reinhard, Bouwer, Laurens M, Arnell, Nigel, Mach,
Katharine, Muir-Wood, Robert, Brakenridge, G Robert, Kron, Wolfgang, Benito, Ger-
ardo, Honda, Yasushi, Takahashi, Kiyoshi, and Sherstyukov, Boris (2014). “Flood risk
and climate change: global and regional perspectives” Hydrological Sciences Journal,
59(1), pp. 1–28.
Kunreuther, Howard, Heal, Geoffrey, Allen, Myles, Edenhofer, Ottmar, Field, Christo-
pher B., and Yohe, Gary (2013). “Risk management and climate change” Nature Climate
Change, 3, pp. 447–449.
Kunreuther, Howard and Pauly, Mark (2006). “Rules rather than discretion: lessons from
Hurricane Katrina” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 33(1-2), pp. 101–116.
Lau, Morten I, Pahlke, Andreas, and Rutherford, Thomas F (2002). “Approximating
infinite-horizon models in a complementarity format: A primer in dynamic general equi-
librium analysis” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26(4), pp. 577–609.
Lecca, Patrizio, McGregor, Peter G, and Swales, J Kim (2013). “Forward-looking and
myopic regional Computable General Equilibrium models: how significant is the distinc-
tion?” Economic Modelling, 31, pp. 160–176.
Lee, Everett S (1966). “A theory of migration” Demography, 3(1), pp. 47–57.
Ligtvoet, Willem, Knoop, Joostx, Strengers, Bart, and Bouwman, Arno (2009). “Flood
protection in the Netherlands: framing long-term challenges and options for a climate-
resilient delta” Policy studies, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.
Linnerooth-Bayer, Joanne and Amendola, Aniello (2000). “Global change, natural disas-
ters and loss-sharing: issues of efficiency and equity” The Geneva Papers on Risk and
Insurance-Issues and Practice, 25(2), pp. 203–219.
Linnerooth-Bayer, Joanne and Hochrainer-Stigler, Stefan (2014). “Financial instruments
for disaster risk management and climate change adaptation” Climatic Change, pp. 1–16.
MacDonald, Don N, Murdoch, James C, and White, Harry L (1987). “Uncertain hazards, in-
surance, and consumer choice: evidence from housing markets” Land Economics, 63(4),
pp. 361–371.
Mandel, Antoine (2012). “Agent-based dynamics in the general equilibrium model” Com-
plexity Economics, 1(1), pp. 105–121.
158
References
Marchiori, Luca, Maystadt, Jean-François, and Schumacher, Ingmar (2012). “The impact of
weather anomalies on migration in sub-Saharan Africa” Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management, 63(3), pp. 355–374.
Markowitz, Harry (1959). Portfolio selection: efficient diversification of investments. Wiley,
New York.
Martin, Ian WR and Pindyck, Robert S (2014). “Averting catastrophes: the strange eco-
nomics of Scylla and Charybdis” NBER working paper 20215, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Massey, D S, Arango, J, Hugo, G, Kouaouci, A, Pellegrino, A, and Taylor, J Edward (1993).
“Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal” Population and Develop-
ment Review, 19(3), pp. 431–466.
Matthews, Robin B, Gilbert, Nigel G, Roach, Alan, Polhill, J Gary, and Gotts, Nick M
(2007). “Agent-based land-use models: a review of applications” Landscape Ecology,
22(10), pp. 1447–1459.
McFadden, Daniel (1978). Modelling the choice of residential location. Institute of Trans-
portation Studies, University of California.
McLeman, Robert (2013). “Developments in modelling of climate change-related migra-
tion” Climatic Change, 117(3), pp. 599–611.
McLeman, Robert and Smith, Barry (2006). “Migration as an adaptation to climate change”
Climatic Change, 76(1-2), pp. 31–53.
McNamara, Dylan E and Keeler, Andrew (2013). “A coupled physical and economic model
of the response of coastal real estate to climate risk” Nature Climate Change, 3(6), pp.
559–562.
Mechler, Reinhard (2004). “Natural disaster risk management and financing disaster losses
in developing countries” Ph.D. thesis, Karlsruher Reihe II, Risikoforschung und Ver-
sicherungsmanagement, Karlsruher Reihe II, Risikoforschung und Versicherungsman-
agement.
Mechler, Reinhard (2013). “Modeling aggregate economic risk: an introduction” Integrated
Catastrophe Risk Modeling, Springer, pp. 95–102.
Mechler, Reinhard and Bouwer, Laurens M. (2014). “Understanding trends and projec-
tions of disaster losses and climate change: is vulnerability the missing link?” Climatic
Change, pp. 1–13.
Mechler, Reinhard, Bouwer, Laurens M, Linnerooth-Bayer, Joanne, Hochrainer-Stigler,
Stefan, Aerts, Jeroen CJH, Surminski, Swenja, and Williges, Keith (2014). “Managing
unnatural disaster risk from climate extremes” Nature Climate Change, 4(4), pp. 235–
237.
Merz, Bruno, Kreibich, Heidi, Schwarze, Reimund, and Thieken, Annegret (2010). “As-
sessment of economic flood damage” Natural Hazards and Earth System Science, 10(8),
pp. 1697–1724.
159
References
Min. I& M (2009). National Water Plan. Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment,
The Hague.
Min. I& M (2014). “Synthesedocument deelprogramma Veiligheid” Backgroundreport
deltaprogramma 2015, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, The Hague.
Moussaïd, Mehdi (2013). “Opinion formation and the collective dynamics of risk percep-
tion” PLOS ONE, 8(12).
Mulder, Peter, de Groot, Henri LF, and Hofkes, Marjan W (2001). “Economic growth and
technological change: a comparison of insights from a neo-classical and an evolutionary
perspective” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 68(2), pp. 151–171.
Muth, John F (1961). “Rational expectations and the theory of price movements” Econo-
metrica, 29(3), pp. 315–335.
Naqvi, Ali Asjad and Rehm, Miriam (2014). “A multi-agent model of a low income econ-
omy: simulating the distributional effects of natural disasters” Journal of Economic In-
teraction and Coordination, 9(2), pp. 1–35.
Nenov, Plamen (2012). “Labor market and regional reallocation effects of housing busts”
Job market paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Neumayer, Eric and Barthel, Fabian (2011). “Normalizing economic loss from natural
disasters: a global analysis” Global Environmental Change, 21(1), pp. 13–24.
Neumayer, Eric, Plümper, Thomas, and Barthel, Fabian (2014). “The political economy of
natural disaster damage” Global Environmental Change, 24, pp. 8–19.
Newman, Mark EJ (2003). “The structure and function of complex networks” SIAM review,
45(2), pp. 167–256.
Noy, Ilan (2009). “The macroeconomic consequences of disasters” Journal of Development
Economics, 88(2), pp. 221–231.
Obokata, Reiko, Veronis, Luisa, and McLeman, Robert (2014). “Empirical research on in-
ternational environmental migration: a systematic review” Population and Environment,
36(1), pp. 1–25.
O’Connell, Enda and O’Donnell, Greg (2013). “Towards modelling flood protection in-
vestment as a coupled human and natural system” Hydrology and Earth System Sciences
Discussions, 10(6), pp. 8279–8323.
Okuyama, Yasuhide (2004). “Modeling spatial economic impacts of an earthquake: Input-
Output approaches” Disaster Prevention and Management, 13(4), pp. 297–306.
Okuyama, Yasuhide (2008). “Critical review of methodologies on disaster impacts estima-
tion” Background paper for EDRR report, World Bank, Washington DC.
Okuyama, Yasuhide and Santos, Joost R (2014). “Disaster impact and Input-Output analy-
sis” Economic Systems Research, 26(1), pp. 1–12.
160
References
Olsthoorn, Xander, van der Werff, Peter, Bouwer, Laurens M, and Huitema, Dave (2008).
“Neo-Atlantis: the Netherlands under a 5-m sea level rise” Climatic Change, 91(1-2), pp.
103–122.
Ortalo-Magné, Francois and Rady, Sven (2006). “Housing market dynamics: on the contri-
bution of income shocks and credit constraints” Review of Economic Studies, 73(2), pp.
459–485.
Palmer, Paul I. and Smith, Matthew J. (2014). “Earth systems: model human adaptation to
climate change” Nature, pp. 365–366.
Partridge, Mark D (2010). “The duelling models: NEG vs amenity migration in explaining
US engines of growth” Papers in Regional Science, 89(3), pp. 513–536.
Pielke Jr, Roger A, Gratz, Joel, Landsea, Christopher W, Collins, Douglas, Saunders,
Mark A, and Musulin, Rade (2008). “Normalized hurricane damage in the United States:
1900-2005” Natural Hazards Review, 9(1), pp. 29–42.
Piguet, Etienne (2010). “Linking climate change, environmental degradation, and migra-
tion: a methodological overview” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(4).
Pilarczyk, Krystian W (2007). “Flood protection and management in the Netherlands”
Extreme hydrological events: new concepts for security, Oleg F Vasiliev, Pieter HAJM
vanGelder, Erich J Plate, and Mikhail V Bolgov, eds., Springer Netherlands.
Pratt, Stephen, Blake, Adam, and Swann, Peter (2013). “Dynamic general equilibrium
model with uncertainty: uncertainty regarding the future path of the economy” Economic
Modelling, 32, pp. 429–439.
Pryce, Gwilym, Chen, Yu, and Galster, George (2011). “Theoretical foundations for under-
standing the impact of floods on house prices: an imperfect information approach with
amnesia and myopia” Housing Studies, 26(2), pp. 259–279.
Quattrociocchi, Walter, Caldarelli, Guido, and Scala, Antonio (2014). “Opinion dynam-
ics on interacting networks: media competition and social influence” Nature Scientific
reports, 4(4938).
Quigley, John M (2002). “Homeowner Mobility and Mortgage Interest Rates: New Evi-
dence from the 1990s” Working paper series, Berkeley Program on Housing and Urban
Policy, Berkeley CA.
Rabin, Matthew (2000). “Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration theorem”
Econometrica, 68(5), pp. 1281–1292.
Rappaport, Jordan (2007). “Moving to nice weather” Regional Science and Urban Eco-
nomics, 37(3), pp. 375–398.
Rappaport, Jordan and Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2003). “The United States as a coastal nation”
Journal of Economic Growth, 8(1), pp. 5–46.
Redding, Stephen J (2010). “The empirics of New Economic Geography” Journal of Re-
gional Science, 50(1), pp. 297–311.
161
References
Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés and Ketterer, Tobias D (2012). “Do local amenities affects the
appeal of regions in Europe for migrants?” Journal of Regional Science, 52(4), pp. 535–
561.
Rose, Adam (2004). “Economic principles, issues and research priorities in hazard loss esti-
mation” Modeling the Spatial Economic Impacts of Natural Hazards, Yasuhide Okuyama
and Stephanie Chang, eds., Springer Netherlands, pp. 119–142.
Rose, Adam and Guha, Gauri-Shankar (2004). “Computable General Equilibrium model-
ing of electric utility lifeline losses from earthquakes” Modeling the Spatial Economic
Impacts of Natural Hazards, Yasuhide Okuyama and Stephanie Chang, eds., Springer,
pp. 119–142.
Rose, Adam and Liao, Shu-Yi (2005). “Modeling regional economic resilience to disas-
ters: a Computable General Equilibrium analysis of water service disruptions” Journal of
Regional Science, 45(1), pp. 75–112.
Rose, Adam Z and Oladosu, Gbadebo (2008). “Regional economic impacts of natural and
man-made hazards: disrupting utility lifeline services to households” Economic Impacts
of Hurricane Katrina, H. Richardson, P. Gordon, and J. Moore, eds., Edward Elgar.
Safarzynska, Karolina, Brouwer, Roy, and Hofkes, Marjan (2013). “Evolutionary modelling
of the macro-economic impacts of catastrophic flood events” Ecological Economics,
88(C), pp. 108–118.
Sastry, M Lakshminarayan (1992). “Estimating the economic impacts of elderly migration:
An input-output analysis” Growth and Change, 23(1), pp. 54–79.
Savage, Leonard J (1954). The foundations of statistics. Wiley, New York.
Scarpa, Riccardo and Rose, John M (2008). “Design efficiency for non-market valuation
with choice modelling: how to measure it, what to report and why” Australian Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 52(3), pp. 253–282.
Schelling, Thomas C (1969). “Models of segregation” American Economic Review, 59(2),
pp. 488–493.
Schelling, Thomas C (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior. Norton, New York.
Scrieciu, Serban, Barker, Terry, and Ackerman, Frank (2013). “Pushing the boundaries
of climate economics: critical issues to consider in climate policy analysis” Ecological
Economics, 85, pp. 155–165.
Sheremet, Oleg and Brouwer, Roy (2015). “A Bayesian modelling framework for attribute
attendance in state preference research” Working paper, Institute for Environmental Stud-
ies (IVM), Amsterdam.
Shultz, Steven D and Fridgen, Pat M (2001). “Floodplains and housing values: implica-
tions for flood mitigation projects” Journal of the American Water Resources Association,
37(3), pp. 595–603.
162
References
Sieg, Holger, Smith, V Kerry, Banzhaf, H Spencer, and Walsh, Randy (2004). “Estimating
the general equilibrium benefits of large changes in spatially delineated public goods”
International Economic Review, 45(4), pp. 1047–1077.
Slovic, P (1987). “Perception of risk” Science, 236(4799), pp. 280–285.
Smith, Christopher D (2014). “Modelling migration futures: development and testing of the
Rainfalls Agent-based migration model – Tanzania” Climate and Development, 6(1), pp.
77–91.
Smith, V, Carbone, Jared C, Pope, Jaren C, Hallstrom, Daniel, and Darden, Michael (2006).
“Adjusting to natural disasters” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 33(1), pp. 37–54.
Sobiech, Cilli (2013). “Theoretical research framework” Agent-Based Simulation of Vul-
nerability Dynamics. A Case Study of the German North Sea Coast., Springer Theses,
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 31–73.
Speyrer, Janet Furman and Ragas, Wade R (1991). “Housing prices and flood risk: an
examination using spline regression” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,
4(4), pp. 395–407.
Stauffer, Dietrich (2013). “A biased review of sociophysics” Journal of Statistical Physics,
151(1-2), pp. 9–20.
Steenge, Albert E and Bocˇkarjova, Marija (2007). “Thinking about imbalances in post-
catastrophe economies: an Input–Output based proposition” Economic Systems Research,
19(2), pp. 205–223.
Sterk, Vincent (2010). “Home equity, mobility, and macroeconomic fluctuations” DNB
Working Papers 265, Netherlands Central Bank, Amsterdam.
Sznajd-Weron, Katarzyna and Sznajd, Józef (2000). “Opinion evolution in closed commu-
nity” International Journal of Modern Physics C, 11(06), pp. 1157–1165.
Terpstra, Teun, Lindell, Michael K, and Gutteling, Jan M (2009). “Does communicating
(flood) risk affect (flood) risk perceptions? Results of a quasi-experimental study” Risk
Analysis, 29(8), pp. 1141–1155.
Tesfatsion, Leigh and Judd, Kenneth L (2006). Handbook of computational economics:
agent-based computational economics, Vol. 2. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
The Economist (2010). “Drowning or waving. Available at
http://www.economist.com/node/17305544.
Thissen, Mark (2005). “RAEM : Regional applied general equilibrium model for the
Netherlands” A survey of spatial economic planning models in the Netherlands. Theory,
application and evaluation, NAi Publishers, Rotterdam Netherlands Institute for Spatial
Research (RPB), Den Haag.
Tiebout, Charles M (1956). “A pure theory of local expenditures” Journal of Political
Economy, 64, pp. 416–424.
163
References
Tobin, Graham A (1995). “The levee love affair: a stormy relationship?” Journal of the
American Water Resources Association, 31(3), pp. 359–367.
Tol, Richard SJ and Langen, Andreas (2000). “A concise history of Dutch river floods”
Climatic Change, 46(3), pp. 357–369.
Tsuchiya, Satoshi, Tatano, Hirokazu, and Okada, Norio (2007). “Economic loss assessment
due to railroad and highway disruptions” Economic Systems Research, 19(2), pp. 147–
162.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel (1973). “Availability: a heuristic for judging fre-
quency and probability” Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), pp. 207–232.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel (1992). “Advances in Prospect Theory: cumulative
representation of uncertainty” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), pp. 297–323.
van den Hurk, Martijn, Mastenbroek, Ellen, and Meijerink, Sander (2014). “Water safety
and spatial development: An institutional comparison between the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands” Land Use Policy, 36, pp. 416–426.
van der Klis, Hanneke, Baan, Paul, and Asselman, Natalie (2005). “Historische analyse van
de gevolgen van overstromingen in Nederland: een globale schatting van de situatie rond
1950, 1975 en 2005” Rapport, Rijkswaterstaat RIZA, Lelystad.
van der Leeuw, Sander E (2008). “Climate and society: lessons from the past 10 000 years”
AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment, 37(14), pp. 476–482.
van der Meer, Ad and Boonstra, Onno (2006). “Repertorium van Nederlandse gemeenten
1812–2006” Dans data guide 2, DANS - Data Archiving and Networked Services, The
Hague.
van Duijn, Mark and Rouwendal, Jan (2012). “Analysis of household location behaviour,
local amenities and house prices in a sorting framework” Journal of Property Research,
29(4), pp. 280–297.
Veraart, Jeroen A, van Nieuwaal, Kim, Driessen, Peter PJ, and Kabat, Pavel (2014). “From
climate research to climate compatible development: experiences and progress in the
Netherlands” Regional Environmental Change, 14(3), pp. 851–863.
Vigdor, Jacob (2008). “The economic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 22(4), pp. 135–54.
Von Neumann, John and Morgenstern, Oskar (1947). Theory of games and economic be-
havior (2d rev). Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Warner, Koko (2010). “Global environmental change and migration: governance chal-
lenges” Global Environmental Change, 20(3), pp. 402–413.
Watts, Duncan J, Dodds, Peter Sheridan, and Newman, Mark EJ (2002). “Identity and
search in social networks” Science, 296(5571), pp. 1302–1305.
Weisbuch, Gérard, Deffuant, Guillaume, Amblard, Frédéric, and Nadal, Jean-Pierre (2002).
“Meet, discuss, and segregate!” Complexity, 7(3), pp. 55–63.
164
References
Wesselink, Anna, Warner, Jeroen, and Kok, Matthijs (2013). “You gain some funding,
you lose some freedom: the ironies of flood protection in Limburg (The Netherlands) ”
Environmental Science & Policy, 30, pp. 113–125.
Wolfers, Justin (2006). “Did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates? A reconciliation
and new results” American Economic Review, 96(5), pp. 1802–1820.
Xiao, Yu (2011). “Local economic impacts of natural disasters” Journal of Regional Sci-
ence, 51(4), pp. 804–820.
165

Nederlandse samenvatting
Stedelijke ontwikkeling in overstromingsgevoelige gebieden, gecombineerd met de mogeli-
jke gevolgen van klimaatverandering – zoals zeespiegelstijging en een toename in de afvoer
van rivierwater – zullen in de toekomst waarschijnlijk tot verhoogde overstromingsrisico’s
in kust- en riviergebieden leiden. Om deze dreiging aan te pakken is het voor beleidsmak-
ers essentieel om inzicht te verkrijgen in de economische gevolgen van overstromingen. De
standaard economische modellen die hier vaak voor gebruikt worden bevatten echter weinig
tot geen informatie over veranderingen in het menselijk handelen ten gevolge van overstro-
mingsrisico’s. Het is algemeen bekend dat mensen reageren op dergelijke veranderingen
in hun leefomgeving; ze verhuizen bijvoorbeeld naar een veiliger gebied wanneer het over-
stromingsrisico toeneemt. De manier waarop mensen reageren en anticiperen op overstro-
mingsrisico’s heeft invloed op de mate waarin mensen worden blootgesteld aan overstro-
mingen. Het negeren van dit type gedrag (in de standaard modellen) zal dus leiden tot
onjuiste inschattingen van het totale overstromingsrisico. Om die reden wordt steeds vaker
beargumenteerd dat in de modellen, die gebruikt worden om de invloed van overstromin-
gen te kunnen kwantificeren, gedragsveranderingen ten gevolge van overstromingsrisico’s
meegenomen moeten worden. In dit proefschrift pak ik deze uitdaging aan door, met be-
hulp van verschillende economische modellen, gedragsreacties ten gevolge van overstro-
mingrisico’s en de daaruit voortvloeiende effecten op de macro-economie te kwantificeren.
Het proefschrift beantwoordt de volgende drie onderzoeksvragen:
1. Wat zijn de korte en lange termijn effecten van grootschalige overstromingen op de
demografie in Nederland?
2. Hebben overstromingsrisico’s ook via de woningmarkt invloed op de mobiliteit van
huishoudens?
3. Wat zijn de macro-economische effecten van migratie door huishoudens?
Als een historische inleiding tot- en een empirisch onderzoek naar de onderwerpen die
later in het proefschrift worden besproken, presenteer ik in hoofdstuk 2 empirisch bewijs
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voor de demografische veranderingen in de nasleep van de grote overstroming van 1953 in
Nederland. Ten gevolge van deze overstroming werd een uitgebreid overstromingsrisico-
reductieprogramma in werking gesteld: de Deltawerken. De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk
laten zien dat de overstroming van 1953 tijdelijke negatieve effecten had op de regionale
groei van de bevolking, maar dat de Deltawerken overwegend blijvende positieve effecten
hadden. Hieruit blijkt dat mensen niet alleen reageren op een ramp zelf, maar ook op de
daarna ingevoerde beleidsmaatregelen. Deze resultaten ondersteunen de bevindingen uit
eerdere onderzoeken die hebben aangetoond dat rampen vaak tijdelijke effecten op bevolk-
ingsgroei hebben, terwijl beleidsmaatregelen permanente effecten hebben. Dit is een belan-
grijk inzicht, omdat het suggereert dat risicobeperkende maatregelen mogelijk onbedoelde
gevolgen kunnen hebben. In het geval van de Deltawerken heeft de reductie van de over-
stromingskans geleid tot een toename in de blootstelling aan overstromingen op de langere
termijn.
Modellen waarin kwantitatieve schattingen van de effecten van overstromingen op wel-
vaart kunnen worden gemaakt leveren waardevolle inzichten voor beleidsmakers om in te
kunnen spelen op toenemende risico’s. Hoofdstuk 3 introduceert de twee belangrijkste
macro-economische modellen die gebruikt worden in het kader van een zogeheten ramp-
impactanalyse, namelijk algemene evenwichtsmodellen en input-output modellen. In dit
hoofdstuk beargumenteer ik dat deze modellen maar in beperkte mate in staat zijn te mod-
elleren hoe risico’s de keuze voor woonlocaties van huishoudens beïnvloeden, terwijl –
zoals ik aan de hand van voorbeelden uit de literatuur laat zien – blijkt dat risico’s wel
degelijk de keuze voor woonlocaties van huishoudens beïnvloeden. Om het woongedrag
van huishoudens beter te modelleren, raad ik dus aan om deze ‘traditionele’ modellen te
combineren met elementen van zogeheten ‘agent-based’-modellen.
In deel II (hoofdstukken 4 en 5) van het proefschrift onderzoek ik zowel de dynamiek
van de woningmarkt, teweeggebracht door veranderingen in verwachtingspatronen, als de
verbinding tussen ontwikkelingen in de woningmarkt en de beslissingen omtrent woonlo-
caties van huishoudens. Dit deel van het proefschrift gaat met name in op de feedback-
effecten tussen de huizenmarkt en de mobiliteit van huishoudens. Aangezien een groot
deel van het totale vermogen van huishoudens is geïnvesteerd in hun woningvoorraad, is
het waarschijnlijk dat het overstromingsrisico een rol speelt in het maken van keuzes op
de woningmarkt. Dit is ook aangetoond door talrijke empirische studies waaruit blijkt dat
overstromingsrisico’s kapitaliseren in de marktprijzen op de huizenmarkt.
In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik of overstromingsrisico’s via de woningmarkt de geografis-
che mobiliteit van huishoudens beperkt. Een belangrijke functie van het verkregen vermo-
gen door investeringen in huisvesting is de waarde van een huis; een daling in de waarde
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vermindert de geografische mobiliteit van huishoudens die een hypotheek nodig hebben
om een verhuizing te bekostigen. De mogelijke angst van kredietverstrekkers voor dalende
huizenprijzen in overstromingsgevoelige gebieden vermindert de waarde van woningen in
deze gebieden en belemmert daarmee de mobiliteit van huishoudens met kredietbeperkin-
gen. Met behulp van een algemeen evenwichtsmodel toon ik aan hoe een dergelijke vermin-
dering van door huizen verkregen vermogen (via kredietverstrekkers) kan leiden tot een en-
dogeen sorterings-mechanisme: huishoudens worden in de regio’s dusdanig gesorteerd dat
er een verhoogde concentratie van kwetsbare huishoudens in risicogebieden ontstaat. Het
model bevat twee regio’s – een risicovolle en een veilige regio – en twee typen huishoudens
– een kwetsbaar huishouden, dat afhankelijk is van het verkrijgen van een hypotheek om
een verhuizing te kunnen financieren, en een flexibel huishouden, dat niet belemmerd wordt
door kredietbeperkingen. Daarnaast introduceer ik een fictieve makelaar, die namens een
kredietverstrekker optreedt, en die de waarde bepaalt door middel van vastgoedtaxaties. In
het model zijn vastgoedtaxaties gevoelig voor overstromingsrisico’s. Dit betekent dat de
geschatte waarde in de risicovolle regio lager is dan in de veilige regio. De resultaten in
dit hoofdstuk laten zien dat het hiervoor genoemde sorteringseffect alleen van substantiële
omvang is wanneer het veiligheidsniveau in de riskante regio extreem laag is.
Uit de conclusie van hoofdstuk 4 rijst de vraag of het endogene sorteringseffect ook
optreedt door de verwachtingen van huishoudens zelf. Deze vraag staat centraal in Hoofd-
stuk 5. In dit hoofdstuk gebruik ik hetzelfde model als in hoofdstuk 4, maar dan gespeci-
ficeerd op één gebied, om te laten zien hoe de verwachtingen van huishoudens over toekom-
stige huizenprijzen kunnen leiden tot een clustering van kredietbeperkte huishoudens in
de overstromingsgebieden. In dit model impliceert een daling van de verwachtte toekom-
stige huizenprijzen ook een vermindering van de toekomstige wederverkoopprijs van de
woningen, wat weer leidt tot een gereduceerde vraag naar woningen en een daling in de
huidige huizenprijzen. Als zodanig leiden verwachte dalingen in toekomstige huizenpri-
jzen tot een vermindering van de huidige huizenprijzen. De resultaten van dit model wi-
jzen uit dat wanneer huishoudens ‘verliesmijdend’ gedrag vertonen, en dus sterk reageren
op vermindering van de wederverkoopprijs van woningen, de huidige huizenprijzen sub-
stantieel verminderen, alsook de geografische mobiliteit van huishoudens. Dit is dus an-
ders dan in de standaard modellen (die uitgaan van verwachte nutstheorie, huishoudens
die rationele keuzes maken en geen verliesaversie vertonen) waarin overstromingsrisico
slechts een marginale invloed op de huizenprijzen heeft. In dit hoofdstuk wordt gecon-
cludeerd dat de eerder genoemde sorteringseffecten alleen optreden wanneer de verwachtin-
gen over marktprijzen op de huizenmarkt sterk worden beïnvloed door het ‘irrationeel doen
en denken’ van huishoudens.
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Deel III van het proefschrift behandelt de macro-economische effecten van veranderin-
gen in verwachtingen vanwege overstromingsrisico’s en legt de nadruk op de gevolgen voor
regionale arbeid en productiefuncties. Dit onderzoek ik in zowel hoofdstuk 6 als hoofdstuk
7 aan de hand van een ruimtelijk algemeen evenwichtsmodel dat eerder is gebruikt om de
macro-economische effecten van een overstroming in Rotterdam te analyseren.
In hoofdstuk 6 onderzoek ik of potentiële verliezen in Rotterdam verminderd kunnen
worden als investeerders kunnen anticiperen op de potentiële kapitaalschade ten gevolge van
een overstroming. In het model worden de reacties van investeerders veroorzaakt door een
wijziging van het beleid, namelijk een gedeeltelijke herverdeling van de risico’s van de pub-
lieke naar de particuliere sector. Lagere kapitaalinvesteringen verminderen het aanwezige
kapitaal in Rotterdam, wat weer leidt tot een reductie van de potentiële kapitaalschade in
het geval van een overstroming. Daarentegen veroorzaakt een vermindering van het kapitaal
ook voor een verminderde productie en hogere werkloosheid in de regio. Zodoende wordt
de keuze van huishoudens om zich in Rotterdam te vestigen op indirecte manier door over-
stromingsrisico beïnvloed; de keuzes voor woonlocaties door huishoudens worden bepaald
door het vergelijken van welvaart in alle regio’s, en de reductie in reële lonen na een ver-
laagde productie heeft geleid tot een verminderde welvaart in Rotterdam. De modelresul-
taten geven echter aan dat de indirecte gevolgen van overstromingsrisico’s op beslissingen
van huishoudens over woonlocaties niet voldoende is om te leiden tot een bevolkingsafname
in Rotterdam. Dit betekent dat, zelfs wanneer de potentiële kapitaalschade ten gevolge van
overstromingen in Rotterdam wordt gereduceerd, het aantal potentiële slachtoffers onveran-
derd blijft.
Wat is echter de impact op verliezen als risico wél direct relevant is voor de woonlocatie
keuzes van huishoudens? Het is waarschijnlijk dat in de nasleep van een ramp, risico direct
invloed heeft op de keuze in woonlocatie van huishoudens. Rampen kunnen heftige pub-
lieke reacties ontlokken, wat mogelijk resulteert in bezorgdheid over het veiligheidsniveau
in het gebied dat is getroffen door een ramp. In hoofdstuk 7 onderzoek ik daarom of de
publieke bezorgdheid, die het gevolg is van een overstroming in Rotterdam, de produc-
tieverliezen verergert. In het model wordt publieke bezorgdheid gevormd door duizenden
individuele actoren die hun mening vormen en wisselen over de negatieve sociale effecten
van het wonen in een riskante (met betrekking tot overstromingen) omgeving. De mate van
publieke bezorgdheid wordt versterkt door de hoeveelheid extreme opvattingen over over-
stromingsrisico en door de onzekerheid over het overstromingsrisico bij de actoren. Model-
resultaten laten zien hoe publieke bezorgdheid in de nasleep van de overstroming het arbeid-
saanbod in de regio Rotterdam vermindert. Dit versterkt de productieverliezen ten opzichte
van het model waarin het publiek zich geen zorgen maakt over de gebeurde overstroming.
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De productieverliezen voor Nederland als geheel blijven echter beperkt, aangezien de daling
van de productie in Rotterdam gecompenseerd wordt met een verhoging van de productie in
de aangrenzende regio’s. Als zodanig, waren interregionale substitutie-effecten groter dan
de totale productie verliezen.
De onderzoeksresultaten in dit proefschrift tonen aan dat kennis over het gedrag van
huishoudens, in reactie of anticiperend op een overstroming, noodzakelijk is om overstro-
mingsrisico’s op een goede manier in kaart te brengen. Het maken van dit soort inschattin-
gen is essentieel om het gewenste niveau van bescherming tegen overstromingsrisico’s te
bepalen: hoe goed onze dijken ook zijn, de kans op een rampzalige overstroming is door
de gevolgen van klimaatverandering niet compleet uit te sluiten. Nieuwe modellen voor het
berekenen van schade door overstromingen geven een beeld van hoe bevolking en economie
zich ontwikkelen na een ramp. Kennis over het gedrag van bewoners kan de ontwikkeling
van een toekomstige klimaatadaptatiestrategie ondersteunen, niet alleen voor Nederland,
maar voor de hele Europese Unie.
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